Proceedings of the international symposium on the occasion of the inauguration of the House of Melanesia Noumea, 4-5 September 2008 = Actes du colloque international a l'occasion de l'inauguration de la Maison de la Melanesie Noumea, 4-5 septembre 2008 by International Symposium on New Calendonia (2008 : Noumea)
THE NEW 
PACIFIC REVIEW 
LA NOUVELLE REVUE DU PACIFIQUE 
THE NEW PACIFIC REVIEW 
LA NOUVELLE REVUE DU PACIFIQUE 
NEW CALEDON IA 
AND MELANESIAN UNITY 
Proceedings of the international symposium 
on the occasion of the inauguration of the House of Melanesia 
Noumea, 4-5 September 2008 
Actes du colloque international 
a I' occasion de l'inauguration de la Maison de la Melanesie 
Noumea, 4-5 septembre 2008 
The Pacific Centre 
ANU College of Asia and the Pacific 
The Australian National University 
Volume 4, No. 2 
Canberra-N oumea 
2009 
Editorial Board 
Jean-Yves Faberon, University ofNew Caledonia, Noumea 
Stewart Firth, RSPAS, Australian National University, Canberra 
Armand Hage, University of New Caledonia, Noumea 
Louise Peltzer, University of French Polynesia, Papeete 
Serge Tcherkezoff, EHESS and CREDO, Marseille 
Darrell Tryon, RSPAS, Australian National University, Canberra 
Volume Editors 
Jean-Yves Faberon, Noumea 
Armand Hage, Noumea 
Darrell Tryon, Canberra 
Translations : Armand Hage 
Copy-editing: Ewan Johnston 
Production: 
The Pacific Centre 
College of Asia and the Pacific 
The Australian National University 
PacificCentre@anu.edu.au 
Printer: University Printing Service, Australian National University, Canberra, Australia 
Cover: Julie Manley 
ISSN: 1445-4947 
In memory of Paul De Deckker 
( 1950-2009) 
Anthropologist and Historian 
President of the University of New Caledonia (2000-2005) 
Founder of the House of Melanesia/Maison de la Melanesie 
and 
Gregory Lawrence Urwin 
(1946-2008) 
Australian diplomat 
Pacific Forum Secretary General (2004-2008) 
Acknowledgements 
The House of Melanesia wishes to extend its warm thanks to the following people and entities 
for their precious help so the conference could be held in the best conditions: 
Secretariat d'Etat a l 'Outre-Mer 
Ponds Pacifique 
Haut-commissariat de la Republique in New Caledonia 
The Government of New Caledonia 
Agence Universitaire pour la Francophonie 
The University of New Caledonia 
Institut pour la Recherche et le Developpement, Noumea 
Goro Nickel 
Societe Le Nickel 
The French Embassy in Australia 
The Pacific Community 
Institut de Droit d'Outre-Mer, Universite Paul Cezanne, Aix-Marseille III 
The University of the South Pacific 
Aston University, Birmingham, United Kingdom 
Tab le of Contents 
Preface 
Darrell Tryon 
1 .  Opening Address 
Yves Dassonville 
2. New Caledonia is not an uncertain place 
Jean-Yves Faberon 
3 .  Prefatory Remarks 
Paul De Deckker 
4. Statement from the Prime Minister of Papua New Guinea 
Rt Hon Grand Chief Sir Michael Somare 
5 .  Melanesia - an important region for Australia 
Anita Butler and Stephan Bohnen 
What is Melanesia? 
I. Melanesia, the lands and the peoples 
Vll 
1 
3 
5 
9 
1 1  
6. Lands and seas : the Melanesian world, a geographical approach 2 1  
Christian Huetz de Lemps 
7. Political sociology: of men and cultures 3 1  
Ian Campbell 
8. Economy and the environment: which sustainable development for Melanesia? 39 
Paul Neaoutyine 
II. Melanesia, law and union 
9.  Melanesia, law and union: customs 45 
Laurent Chassot 
1 0. Democratic intervention, Biketawa and the 2006 Fij i  military coup 55 
Richard Herr 
1 1 . The incorporation of human rights by Melanesian states 69 
Daniel Dormoy and Laurent Tesoka 
12 .  Discussion: is Melanesia homogeneous enough to contemplate a unity plan? 77 
New Caledonia, a Melanesian land 
I. The Past 
1 3 .  The works of Jean-Marie Tj ibaou, a Kanak permanent reformulation 
Hamid Mokaddem 
II. The Present 
14. Kanak identity in law 
Jean- Yves Faberon 
85 
93 
v 
The New Pacific Review 
1 5 .  Kanak identity in fact, or what it means to be a Kanak now 
Elie Poigoune 
III. The Future 
1 6. Discussion: what is the future ofNew Caledonia' s Melanesian identity? 
An integrated Melanesia without New Caledonia 
I. The Past 
1 7. External influences on Melanesia 
Stewart Firth 
1 8 . Asserting internal dynamics: the Melanesian Spearhead Group 
Nathalie Mrgudovic 
II. The Present: the emergence and development of regional organizations 
in Melanesia 
19 .  The Diversity of regional organizations: a general overview 
Paul De Deckker 
20. Statement by the Director-General, Secretariat of the Pacific Community 
Jimmie Rodgers 
III. The Future 
2 1 .  Discussion: the strengths and weaknesses in being part of the 
Melanesian community 
New Caledonia and Melanesian unity 
I. The Past: New Caledonia and non-French Melanesians 
22. New Caledonia and non-French Melanesians: the Melanesian standpoint 
Jean-Pierre Nirua 
II. The Present: New Caledonia applying to be part of a united Melanesia 
23 .  New Caledonia' s  regional cooperation: what is at stake and 
what are the prospects? 
Laurent Semavoine 
24. European Union law resources for Melanesian unity 
Jacques Ziller 
III. The Future 
25 .  Discussion: what role can New Caledonia play in Melanesian unity? 
Vi 
1 07 
1 1 1  
1 1 7 
127 
141  
153  
1 59  
1 65 
1 7 1  
1 85 
1 99 
Preface 
This volume of the New Pacific Review/Nouvelle Revue du Pacifique (Vol.4 No.2) is an 
edited English-language version of the proceedings of an international symposium on New 
Caledonia held at the Institut de Recherche pour le Developpement (IRD) in Noumea, on 4-5 
September 2008.  
The original text, titled La Nouvelle-Caledonie pour /'integration melanesienne , appeared as 
Volume 4, Number 1 of the New Pacific Review/ Nouvelle Revue du Pacifique (Paris:  
L 'Harmattan, December 2008). 
The symposium was organized and facilitated by Paul de Deckker, Jean-Yves Faberon and 
Armand Hage to mark the foundation and launch of The House of Melanesia/La Maison de la 
Melanesie in Noumea. The mission of the House of Melanesia is to promote research in the 
social sciences and the humanities across Papua New Guinea and Island Melanesia 
(Solomons, Vanuatu, New Caledonia and Fiji) and to foster understanding and unity among 
the peoples and states of the South Pacific. 
It is indeed fortunate that the launch of the House of Melanesia/Maison de la Melanesie and 
the symposium on New Caledonia and Melanesian unity took place when it did. For many 
people did not realize that the chief instigator and co-director of the House of Melanesia, 
Professor Paul de Deckker, was gravely ill. He survived long enough to see the publication of 
La Nouvelle-Caledonie pour /'integration melanesienne, but suffered a tragic and untimely 
death in Paris on 7 July 2009. 
This volume: New Caledonia and Melanesian Unity, which appears as Vol.4 No.2 of the New 
Pacific Review/La Nouvelle Revue du Pacifique is dedicated to his memory. 
New Caledonia and Melanesian Unity is a focused collection of contributions by leading 
French Pacific, Pacific Islander and Australian scholars, covering a large number of 
disciplines, all concerned with the position and role of New Caledonia as a Melanesian 
country, both internally and as an island state in the Southwest Pacific, along with Papua New 
Guinea, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and Fiji .  The publication of an edited English language 
version of La Nouvelle-Caledonie pour /'integration melanesienne brings current French 
research within the purview of Anglophone readers, in the spirit of the Assises de la 
Recherche Frarn;aise dans le Pacifique, which took place in 2004. 
Darrell Tryon 
Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies 
Australian National University 
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1 . Openi ng Add ress 
Yves Dassonville 1 
Madam Vice President of the Government of New Caledonia, Mr President of the University, 
Honourable Members of the Government, Honourable Senator, Professors, Mr President of 
IRD, I can only acclaim this conference on the topic of New Caledonia's incorporation within 
Melanesia, for the Melanesian issue and the issue of Kanak identity have made up a major part 
of the French Government' s  policy for the last 20 years here in New Caledonia, both in 
domestic matters and external relations. 
Regarding domestic matters, I would like to remind you that the French Government, one of 
the signatories and partners in the Noumea Agreement, has given a paramount place to the 
notion of Kanak identity in the laws stemming from the Noumea Agreement, and this was 
restated, not long ago, here in New Caledonia, by Mr Christnacht: Kanak legitimacy is fully 
acknowledged, both in law and in fact. Identity is a complex notion analysed by historians, 
anthropologists, sociologists and psychologists. Its roots reach back into the past, but it is built 
in everyday life, and that is where the Government' s  responsibility lies. In this area, the 
Government has initiated many things: first, as part of the Matignon-Oudinot Agreements, it 
set up the Agency for Kanak culture development; later, it built the Tjibaou Cultural Centre, 
dedicated on 4-5 May 1 998 .  The Centre turned 1 0  not long ago. All this made up the early 
groundwork in the assertion of Kanak culture. The Centre is also a place of contemporary art 
creation, of encounters and exchange with the other Oceanian cultures.  In 2008 the State 
contributed 2 .6  million euros towards this budget. 
The Noumea Agreement, and the March 1 999 Organic Law that implements it, also created 
the Customary Senate, which determines its own assignments. The Senate is made up of 1 6  
members representing the eight customary areas. It has decision-making and consultative 
powers regarding issues dealing with emblematic markers and customary matters. I have 
recently convened this Senate, as the law empowers me to do, and I referred two issues to it -
one is about development of customary lands and the other about the integration of 
Melanesian youths into modem society. The agency for rural development and land planning, 
ADRAF, is another instrument that has been set up since 1 978 .  You know that the land 
problem is still a major concern in economic and social development. It also raises the 
sensitive issue resulting from the fact that people who are subject to ordinary French law and 
people who are subject to customary law live on the same territory. These are a few examples 
of how the French Government has been supporting identity-building and the recognition of 
and respect for a Kanak identity in New Caledonia. 
1 Haut-commissaire de la Republique (Representative of the French State) 
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Regarding external relations, the State stepped in as well to promote New Caledonia' s 
incorporation into its region, and as part of this policy, the State has been particularly keen on 
exchanges designed to make Kanak culture better known. We have an instrument called the 
Economic, Social and Cultural Fund for the Pacific, which is part of the Foreign Affairs 
Ministry; it has earmarked three million euros for the purpose of promoting the incorporation 
of French territories within the Pacific area. New Caledonia is one of the major recipients. 
Among the initiatives relating to Kanak culture, I will mention the following: A New 
Caledonia season was organized in New Zealand in 2007; it involved a tour by a dance troop 
and various bands, which the New Zealanders enjoyed very much. A fund was established to 
help cultural projects tour the region, and expressions of Kanak culture greatly benefit from 
the funds. A cooperation agreement was concluded with Vanuatu; it is jointly and equally 
funded by the French State and New Caledonia, with support from the Southern Province. 
This project, as we can see, relates to a country belonging to the Melanesian area. The purpose 
of these examples is to show you that the State not only accepts the incorporation of New 
Caledonia into its geographical area, and more particularly the Melanesian area, but the State 
fosters that incorporation. Indeed, the State wants New Caledonia as such to be present in the 
region, to be empowered to conclude agreements and set up cooperation with its neighbouring 
countries, and to be a member of international organizations as the Organic Law allows it to 
do, and this is just what it has been doing. We would like to make it possible for geopolitics 
and the region to be more substantially taken into account by New Caledonia and its 
Government; despite the discrepancies in political status and in the standard of living, we also 
want New Caledonia to join its region, and first of all its Melanesian environment. 
Some time ago I welcomed a technical delegation from the Melanesian Spearhead Group, and 
I was struck by how cordial the exchange was between them and the representative of the 
French State. Things went along in a peaceful atmosphere. I believe the process was initiated 
in 1 988 and enhanced by the 1 998 Noumea Agreement; it is considered in a positive light by 
all countries in the area, both the big countries such as Australia and New Zealand, and the 
smaller island countries. These realize that there is a new deal, that New Caledonia is being 
given more and more powers, that it is visible in its own right, and that it has its own life in the 
Pacific. They also realize that all this is strongly encouraged by the French Government. These 
were a few thoughts I wanted to share with you. Thank you. 
2 
2. New Caledonia is  not an u ncertai n p lace 
Professor Jean-Yves Faberon 1 
A few years ago, in 2002, Paul De Deckker and I organized in this very place a colloquium on 
the multicultural State. On that occasion, our colleague Francis Delperee, a Senator and Baron 
from the Kingdom of Belgium, pointed out the extent to which Paul and I complement each 
other by stating that this feature is present in our last names - mine being of Latin origin, 
faber, meaning a worker, and Paul' s  Flemish name meaning a roofer. In this context, no 
wonder we eventually built a house together, and so we introduce the Maison de la Melanesie 
- House Blong Melanesia - a multidisciplinary research centre devoted to the five Melanesian 
countries. 
As we were organizing the first event by this new body and defining a founding topic, we 
chose to start with the foundation, that is, to speak first of the land (and Paul is far from being 
interested only in roofing). 
More than in other parts of the world, in Melanesia land is the essence of being, and as we 
want to build up House Blong Melanesia in Noumea, we would like first and foremost to 
assert that New Caledonia is a Melanesian land. At present, many different human 
communities live on this land, not only Melanesians (we had analyzed multiculturalism in the 
conference mentioned above) ,  and this situation is not specific to New Caledonia since it can 
be found in Fiji .  For that matter, even the indigenous peoples on the Loyalty Islands have their 
roots elsewhere - in Polynesia. 
What we want to say with this colloquium as well is that not only is New Caledonia, a French 
land in Melanesia, part and parcel of the Melanesian region, but now it can also play a part in 
Melanesian unity itself. 
New Caledonia is not an uncertain place. 
This first House Blong Melanesia colloquium makes the case for the phrase which makes up 
its title - 'New Caledonia and Melanesian Unity. ' This is also a political line keenly advocated 
by the Governments of New Caledonia and France for over ten years and spelled out in the 
Noumea Agreement. 
It is not a matter of chance if we receive messages from the top governmental levels in France, 
Australia, Papua New Guinea, etc. 
1 Joint director of House Blong Melanesia 
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Our conference is made possible thanks to the presence among us of Fij ians, ni-Vanuatu, 
Papuans, Solomon Islands citizens, New Caledonians belonging to different ethnic groups, 
and many Australians and French people from the mother country. All Melanesian universities 
are represented, as are many Australian ones and French universities in Europe. I will not 
mention all of them. Allow me just to thank my own universities - the University of 
Montpellier and the University of Aix-Marseille; both have shown great consideration to me. 
On opening the 2002 colloquium I quoted the Belgian novelist Amelie Nothomb by saying 
that we had not been spared 'Fear and Trembling' as we were organizing the conference then. 
Nothing would have been possible without financial help; thus we have to underscore the fact 
that we would not be meeting for two days but for the immediate trust put in us by the French 
Government with the Fonds Pacifique; the New Caledonian Government, the Southern 
Province of New Caledonia with its indefatigable representative, Bernard Cheroux; the 
Agence Universitaire de la Francophonie; the University of New Caledonia as well as Societe 
Le Nickel and Goro Nickel. Thank you all for your trust and thanks to IRD for hosting our 
colloquium one more time in this superb auditorium. 
Thank you all for being here. 
New Caledonia, a French land for Melanesian union, is not an uncertain place: it knows what 
it is and it knows its own mind; this colloquium will explain. 
4 
3 . Prefatory Remarks 
tPaul De Deckker1 
It is up to me to provide some explanations regarding our two-day colloquium, which is the 
outcome of many months of work, of fruitful contacts, and of ambitions that are materializing 
today thanks to our contributors, whose high qualities and high skills I hereby salute. 
But first of all it is essential to know about the Maison de la Melanesie - House Blong 
Melanesia; today's  conference is its founding event. 
Jack Lang and the Minister before him at the Higher Education and Research Ministry wanted 
French universities to open up to the outside world in a pro-active way. As a result, they 
supplemented universities with 'Country Homes' and the Ministry would fund those to help 
them along in their development. That is how the Maison du Japon was created at the 
University of Strasbourg and the Maison de la Malaisie at the University of La Rochelle, 
among others. 
When I was President of my university I attended the University Presidents ' Conference on a 
very regular basis, and I became friends with many colleagues. One of them, Professor Gerard 
Binder, then President of the University of Mulhouse Haute Alsace, flew to New Caledonia 
and Vanuatu on vacation. I asked him over for dinner at my place, and during that meal in 
2003 he talked me into setting up this Maison de la Melanesie, in this instance not a 'Country 
Home' but a 'Region Home' .  In the report that Jack Lang had asked him to write on 'Country 
Homes ' ,  he gave a prominent place to the Maison de la Melanesie by recommending it be 
given special consideration both in terms of official recognition and funding. 
Governments change, as do also university presidents . . .  
When Sir Michael Somare, Prime Minister of Papua New Guinea, came to New Caledonia in 
2005 to be awarded an honorary doctorate from the University of New Caledonia, which he 
was very proud of, we discussed academic cooperation projects between our two countries. 
These projects did not materialize as we had expected, as politics and political conflicts are 
also part of Academe . . .  
I thought, however, that the official opening of House Blong Melanesia would be the doorway 
to setting up all sorts of cooperation projects. Its bylaws were published in the New Caledonia 
Official Gazette last January, and they specify its main objectives, namely further research on 
Melanesia. 
1 Joint director of House Blong Melanesia 
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At about the same time - and this shows how right we were - a foundation was set up in 
Sydney with a similar aim. On the dedication of that foundation, the Australian Parliamentary 
Secretary for the Pacific, Duncan Kerr, indicated that we should bear in mind that New 
Caledonia was also part of Melanesia, along with PNG, Solomon, Vanuatu and Fiji .  
I asked Mr Kerr to take part in our conference, but he told me he is very sorry he cannot 
because he plans to be in Noumea on 1 1  November to join our Minister, Yves Jego. Just as Sir 
Michael did, these two officials sent me a message and asked me to read it at the colloquium 
opening to wish good luck to the Maison de la Melanesie and full success to the conference. 
The proceedings will be published, and they will be extremely interesting to the political 
decision makers involved in Melanesian issues. 
This political endorsement and stamp of approval is not only a recognition but also an 
encouragement, and the Maison de la Melanesie will definitely show it is worthy of it through 
its research work. In this respect, the letter from the Prime Minister of Papua New Guinea will 
be part of the founding documents of the Maison de la Melanesie. Indeed, Sir Michael Somare 
gives our organization a road map. 
The Agence Universitaire de la Francophonie recognizes the Maison de la Melanesie, and it 
has incorporated it into a worldwide institutional network extending from Cairo to Luj in 
Romania, to Cantho and Hochiminville, to Dakar, to the Americas and to Pretoria in South 
Africa. 
Personally I am pleased to see that the President of the University of New Caledonia agrees to 
conclude an agreement between the Maison de la Melanesie and the Agence Universitaire de 
la Francophonie through our University of New Caledonia. House Blong Melanesia will work 
for the benefit of the University of New Caledonia. 
The idea for and the origin of the colloquium emerged during the annual meeting of the 
Pacific Forum in Tonga last year. In Tonga, the Speaker of the Congress of New Caledonia, 
Harold Martin, stated that New Caledonia will ensure continuity in implementing Mrs 
Themereau's  policy, and he planned to contribute to the development of the Pacific region 
through a range of expertise. My colleague and friend Jean-Yves Faberon and I decided there 
and then that the Maison de la Melanesie can play a part in this area by providing knowledge 
which is specific to Melanesia. That is what we will see during the coming two days. 
Our project benefited from the interest shown by several institutions, which contributed funds. 
I gratefully acknowledge their involvement, for it shows, as the French President and the 
Minister of Higher Education and Research Valerie Pecresse wish, that the public and private 
sectors can work together in the general interest. The financial support provided by the Prime 
Minister of Papua New Guinea is also remarkable. 
I can assure you that I have convened conferences in difficult times, at Paris 7-Jussieu 
University with Pierre Lagayette on 'State and Power in the Pacific' in 1 985 ,  even as the 
events in New Caledonia made discussion of this question politically incorrect; on 'Evolution 
of Indigenous Law and Custom' with Jean-Yves Faberon in Noumea in 1 994. The 
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proceedings were published both in French and in English and were used as a basis for the 
drafting of the Noumea Agreement. Also, and again with Jean-Yves, we published The 
Multicultural State, published in Brussels - with no subsidies - by the prestigious publisher 
Bruylant, and it is now out of print. 
For all these conferences we had very few no-shows among those who had been contacted and 
agreed to attend. In sociology, the Founding Father of the discipline, Emile Durkheim, set up a 
typology of suicides - spectacular suicide, honour suicide, suicide for love, anomic suicide, 
etc. In this instance, I have half a mind to set up a typology of withdrawals related to 
diplomatic illnesses - as early as the times of Ancient Rome, diplomatic illness was known, 
but it did not involve as many people as the one that is affecting our colloquium - backache, 
lovesickness, scientific inability to draft the paper, compulsory school attendance, etc. 
Some have told me, and still do, that the topic is too sensitive and it is not a good thing to be 
involved in it. . .  I had trouble believing this .  But if it were so, I would again think that the 
Maison de la Melanesie is blazing a trail which is clearing the way to serve the future of our 
people, their identities, their cultures and their children. 
In closing, the Pacific Islands has just lost one of those who have served it most. Greg Urwin 
passed away in Apia, the Samoan capital, on 9 August. Greg was an Australian diplomat 
appointed Pacific Forum Secretary General. He was the driving force behind the Pacific Plan, 
to which the Forum has turned for the last few years for its social and economic development. 
This diplomat worked all through his career for the peoples of the Pacific, whom he loved. 
Australian to the core and married to a Samoan woman, Greg was all for inclusiveness and 
would brook no exclusion; he was constantly moved by a constructive mind. We in New 
Caledonia are beholden to him for our place within the Forum with an associate member status 
now, and eventually as a full member. 
So we invite you to go along with my suggestion that our colloquium today and tomorrow be 
dedicated to the memory of this great diplomat who brought people together. 
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4. Statement from the Pri me Mi nister 
of Papua New Gui nea 
Rt Hon Grand Chief Sir Michael Somare GCL GCMG CH CF KStJ 
I sincerely regret not being able to make it in person to mark a great moment in the 
establishment of a permanent place for our Melanesian cultures that are some 50,000 years old 
and are at risk of being forgotten and lost. 
It would be a tragedy if we were to allow our rich traditions and customs to fade into oblivion 
and deprive our children and grandchildren of knowing who we are : Melanesians. 
I thank the Governments of New Caledonia and France for this worthy initiative to preserve, 
research and promote our Melanesian heritage as well as monitor the changes that are taking 
place to the Melanesian polity. 
This initiative complements the other collective efforts that are being undertaken to promote 
Melanesian identity under the auspices of the Melanesian Spearhead Group, the Melanesian 
Cultural Festival and the Melanesian Soccer Tournament. 
As one of the founding fathers of my country, Papua New Guinea, it gives me great 
satisfaction to see New Caledonia and the Government of France through Haus Blong 
Melanesia and the University of New Caledonia, leading the way in giving Melanesia a home 
dedicated to preserving our cultures and recording our customs and traditions in all their 
forms. 
In the past our legends, genealogies and customs were passed on orally from generation to 
generation. Fortunately today, this dialogue will continue and this time it will be recorded and 
housed at the Maison de Melanesie. 
May I also suggest that the Maison de la Melanesie considers including in its scope of 
activities the restitution of cultural property back to their rightful places. As you are aware, 
many of our most treasured cultural properties and sacred objects of art are stored in many 
museums and private collections around the world. 
The Maison de la Melanesie could serve as a vehicle to coordinate efforts among Melanesian 
countries to retrieve some of these precious artefacts under the aegis of UNESCO's  program 
on restitution of cultural property. 
Coming from a country that boasts a thousand Melanesian tribes, we have today 832 different 
languages among our many peoples. I know Fiji ,  Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and New 
9 
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Caledonia would be the same but in smaller proportions . I believe all of us would therefore 
also share the same views on this matter. 
While some work is being done in our respective countries of Melanesia to preserve our 
languages, our traditional ways of life are being confronted by modem ideas, technologies and 
thought. 
I therefore wholeheartedly appreciate the aim of this great institution that is being established, 
not only to preserve our past but to engage in constructive dialogue and research so we can 
continue our journey as Melanesians along side the other cultures in our region and in the 
world. 
I believe the progress of indigenous cultures in today's  modem environment can be greatly 
enhanced as a result of having institutions like this that gives us all an understanding of who 
we are and where we can add value to the world around us. 
I commend you for embarking on this noble enterprise and wish you every success in your 
conferences, research and the establishment of your directory and collections. 
For my part, I am humbled to have been invited to be an Honorary Committee Member of the 
Maison de la Melanesie. It gives me great pleasure to accept this honour. On behalf of the 
Government and people of Papua New Guinea, I pledge US$50,000 towards research at the 
Maison de la Melanesie. 
1 0  
5 . Melanesia - an i mportant region for Austra lia 
Anita Butler 1 and Stephan Bohnen2 
The islands of Melanesia are some of the most populous in the Pacific and are also some of 
Australia's nearest neighbours. Geographically, it is no surprise that Australia has had a long 
association with the countries of Melanesia - from early European explorers, whalers, traders 
and, in the case of Papua New Guinea, colonial administration, to our strong present 
involvement in development cooperation. 
Australia 's  bilateral relations with the countries of Melanesia have not always been rosy, and 
continue to experience highs and lows, partly because some of the most serious problems of 
governance and inter-ethnic tension in the region have been found in Melanesia. Our 
relationship with Papua New Guinea is made more complex by the history of Australia 's  role 
in administering that country from 1 906 to 1 975 .  
At present, our relations with Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu are 
particularly amicable, but those with Fij i  are obviously more difficult. Regardless, however, of 
the challenges that have arisen in our relations over time, we can see clearly that there has 
never been a period when Australia did not consider its engagement with its Melanesian 
neighbours to be of importance and was not strongly focused on developments in this region. 
Australian policy in relation to New Caledonia 
The same is true for New Caledonia, which is part of Melanesia both geographically and 
culturally through its indigenous population. The proximity which makes the other countries 
of Melanesia important to Australia applies equally to New Caledonia, even if its status as an 
overseas collectivity of France and its advanced level of development make it different. At 
only two and half hours from Sydney, New Caledonia is arguably the closest neighbour to the 
most populous region of Australia. We clearly have an interest in maintaining strong, 
constructive and friendly relations. And it is clearly of equally importance to us that this near 
neighbour is stable and prosperous, and a full participant in regional affairs. 
This has always been the case. Australia' s  interest in developing relations with New Caledonia 
and in the country's development and political stability have been at the core of our policy 
towards the collectivity for at least the last thirty years. But, as a consequence of changing 
regional and global contexts, our interest has not always been expressed in the same way. This 
is most evident in the evolution of our position on New Caledonian independence. To 
understand the path by which Australia came by its current policy in relation to New 
1 Australian Consul General 
2 Australian Deputy Consul General 
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Caledonia, and our attitude towards the subject of this conference (New Caledonia and 
Melanesian integration) it is helpful to cast our minds back to the start of the 1 980s and 
remind ourselves how the regional context and the international political environment have 
changed in the last three decades. 
Historical overview - the early 1980s 
It is no secret that the position held by Australia thirty years ago in support of New Caledonian 
independence brought us into conflict with a majority of the New Caledonian population and 
of course with France. 
It is important to understand that Australia took that position in the context of a regional 
environment in which many Pacific island countries, Melanesian as well as Polynesian, had 
only recently become independent. The future of these countries seemed promising, and they 
had not yet come face to face with the challenges of micro-state independence which are a 
regional preoccupation today. Australia, which had only given up its role as administrator of 
Papua New Guinea five years previously, was eager to demonstrate support for this new 
regional independence, and believed genuinely in the possibility of its success. For us, in this 
context, the situation of New Caledonia - largely dependent on and under the direction of 
France - seemed an anomaly. 
It also seemed to be an impediment to New Caledonia' s  full participation in regional affairs. 
In 1 98 1 ,  the South Pacific Forum (as the Pacific Islands Forum was then known) was only ten 
years old and had undergone rapid expansion to incorporate the newly independent states. It 
had become the pre-eminent forum for discussion of regional political and social affairs, and 
New Caledonia's relationship with France was excluding it from this discussion. The region 
considered independence a pre-requisite for Forum membership and thus for participation in 
dialogue on the future of the region and in the development of regional solidarity at the 
international level. Once again, New Caledonia' s  absence from these discussions and this 
process of regional evolution seemed like an anomaly or, at best, a transitional situation. 
To return to the subject of our conference, it is therefore reasonable to assert that Australia 's  
interest in seeing New Caledonia participate in regional affairs - to be integrated into the 
region - in part contributed to our position during that period in support of Kanak 
independence. For the Pacific at that time, independence was a priority before all else, so 
Australia took a position which, along with our stance in relation to French nuclear testing in 
the Pacific, distanced us from France and New Caledonia for a time. 
But times change, as do priorities and contexts. Thirty years is a long time for a country as 
young as Australia, where the first European colony was established only 220 years ago and 
which has been federated as a single country for only 1 07 years. 
The Matignon and Noumea Accords 
Australia 's  position had already changed considerably from that of the early 1 980s by the time 
of the signing of the Matignon Accords in 1 988 .  Just as 'Les Evenements ' pushed New 
Caledonians towards the handshake, Australia came to see that the most important objective 
for the future of New Caledonia was the re-establishment of civil security. 
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It was with this objective in mind that Australia wholeheartedly supported the approach of 
Michel Rocard which led to the signing of the Matignon Accords. Along with New Zealand, 
we lent our official support at the time and have done so in international fora since. We 
reiterated this support through the official attendance at the signing of the Noumea Accords in 
1 998 of the then Speaker of the Australian Parliament (the third highest Australian authority), 
Ian Sinclair. 
In short, our policy had become, and remains today, one of support for a democratic process 
put in place by the French State to permit increasing autonomy for New Caledonia, a process 
which is enabling New Caledonia' s  inhabitants to determine the future political structure of 
their country. 
The present 
The regional context in which this discussion takes place today is unrecognisable from that of 
the early 1 980s. Stability and prosperity are now the principal objectives of the majority of the 
independent Pacific island states, and political structures are of less importance. On the global 
plane, as Michel Rocard noted during his speech in Noumea at the end of May, countries are 
increasingly ceding elements of their sovereignty in response to the changing demands of 
globalisation. 
In this context, it is no longer necessary to know the future political status of New Caledonia 
to be sure that the country has a role to play in the region. Whether it retains significant 
autonomy while remaining a part of France or decides to take on the final sovereign powers 
will not change the fact that New Caledonia is geographically part of the Pacific region. 
There is no doubt that the New Caledonia of today, while of course having specific 
preoccupations of its own, already shares many interests with the other countries of the zone. 
It may not face the same challenges of governance and weak institutions, and the significant 
gap in living standards between New Caledonia and the Forum island countries may pose a 
challenge for bilateral and regional engagement, but the stability of the region as a whole, its 
ability respond to climate change and the challenges of geographic isolation - access to 
maritime and air transport, communications, and the importance of renewable energies - are 
of importance to all countries of the region. What happens in New Caledonia' s  neighbourhood 
is of relevance to New Caledonia, part of its population has strong cultural links with its near 
neighbours and, importantly, the country has something to contribute to regional discussions. 
Australia's support for the regional integration of New Caledonia 
Accordingly, Australia sees as crucial the Noumea Accord's insistence on New Caledonia' s  
regional integration and the undertaking by the French State to support this (which we  hope to 
see continue, even if France ' s  strategic interests in the region are no longer what they were). 
Australia has done its best to support this process, through words but also through action. It is 
predominantly to foster regional integration that we have, since 1 989, provided a modest 
number of scholarships in addition to our small grants program. The scholarships allow New 
Caledonian students to undertake tertiary studies in Australia, develop English language skills 
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that will facilitate their engagement with regional neighbours, and broaden their knowledge 
and understanding of one near neighbour - Australia. 
Increasingly, we are also promoting regional integration through facilitating the participation 
of New Caledonian officials and technical experts in regional workshops and seminars. This 
enables them to keep abreast of regional developments in their fields and build ties with their 
regional counterparts. We encourage this participation in full awareness of the significant gap 
in technical needs between well-developed New Caledonia and its regional neighbours, but 
see as beneficial the possibilities for mutual exchange. 
The particular case of Melanesia 
Our support is aimed at aiding New Caledonia' s  engagement with the region as a whole but 
the arguments in favour of broader regional engagement are even more pertinent in relation to 
Melanesia. It is no surprise that New Caledonia's regional outreach is most developed with the 
countries most geographically proximate to it and with which it shares cultural links through 
its indigenous population. 
These links have long been recognised by the other countries of Melanesia, including through 
the inclusion of the FLNKS in the Melanesian Spearhead Group (acknowledging of course 
that this was initially for political reasons relating to the demand for independence). The 
cultural links between the populations of New Caledonia and Vanuatu, both European and 
Melanesian, are undeniable. 
The joint engagement of the New Caledonian Government and Provinces and the French State 
on development projects in Vanuatu is an excellent example of the way in which the particular 
characteristics of francophone New Caledonia can benefit its regional neighbours. Australia is 
pleased to be cooperating with France and New Caledonia on some of these projects, for 
example in the area of public health. 
The role of New Caledonia 
There is no doubt that New Caledonia has much to offer. And the timing is right to push this 
regional engagement further. 
Discussion of regional integration has blossomed in the Pacific over the past few years. Most 
of the independent Pacific island states have now had 25 or 30 years to fully appreciate the 
difficulty of going it alone to confront the serious challenges faced by the region. As a result, 
there is an increasing tendency within the Forum and particularly in relation to the Pacific 
Plan, to speak of the pooling of regional resources and of working together; of regional 
integration. 
In this context, Australia's wish to see New Caledonia participate fully in the region, which 
we understand to be shared by the French State, is increasingly the wish of the independent 
Pacific island states. We all appreciate that New Caledonia is a regional neighbour with a 
contribution to make to regional debate, and a country which can bring a different perspective 
to the serious challenges the region must surmount. This new attitude was reflected in the 
Forum's willingness to accept New Caledonia as an Associate Member in October 2006. 
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We all wish to see New Caledonia play an active role in the future of the region; to participate 
fully in cooperative efforts to ensure broad regional stability and economic development, with 
the objective of improving living conditions for the people of the Pacific islands, so that we 
can all live in a region where peaceful and sustainable economic development can be 
envisaged by all. 
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THE MELANESIAN WORLD: SOME FIGURES 2007 
Area Population Population EEZ Fertility rate Life % urban GNP GNP/person 
Km2 (1 OOO) density 1,000 (children expectation population (billions of US dollars 
(persons/km2) km2 per woman) (years) US dollars) 
PNG 461,691 6,335 13.7 3,210 3.8 57 13.7 5.45 860 
Solomon Islands 28,796 495 17.2 1.340 3.8 64 17.7 0.36 722 
Vanuatu 14,763 226 15.3 680 3.7 70 24.3 0.39 1,741 
New Caledonia 19, 100 241 12.6 1,740 2.2 75 64.7 7.8 32,289 
Fiji 18,272 838 45.8 1,290 2.7 69 51.7 3.41 4,065 
Figures relating to some neighbouring countries 
Australia 7,686,848 21,005 2.7 8, 148 1.8 81 89.1 898.82 41,534 
New Zealand 270,530 4,235 15.6 4,083 2.0 80 86.9 128.14 30,253 
Indonesia 1,904,570 225,539 118.4 2,914 2.2 68 50.1 414.71 1,839 
Source: Christian Huetz de Lemps. Sources: Atlas Eco 2009, Images economique du monde, 2009 and other yearbooks 

I. Melanesia, the lands and the peoples 
6. Lan ds and seas: the Melanesian world , a 
geographical approach 
Christian Huetz de Lemps 1 
The expanse of Melanesia 
When my colleagues and friends Paul De Deckker and Jean-Yves Faberon assigned me the 
task of providing this cursory geographical introduction of the Melanesian area, I thought it 
necessary to ponder over the nature and limitations of the concept of Melanesia. 
The origin of the definition 
In its initial definition, that is, the one originating in the 1 830s, Melanesia was the island area 
where the 'Black Islanders ' lived - here we find the Greek root, melas, meaning black. It is to 
be distinguished from the Malay world further west, from Micronesia, the ' small islands ' area 
to the north, and from Polynesia 'the numerous islands' to the east. These last two words are 
only geographical words and do not refer to the nature of the people inhabiting these vast 
units, as opposed to the much more identity-oriented definition of the Melanesian space with 
its would-be anthropological claim. 
This division into vast areas was at one with observations made by European 
discoverers/explorers during the latter third of the 1 8th century and the early 1 800s regarding 
the existence of populations in the Pacific which are very different from each other. But it 
was the big French scientific expeditions of the 1 820s and 1 830s that brought a real spirit of 
classification of nature and peoples and a spirit of logical division of the world to those vast 
Pacific expanses. Freycinet, Duperrey, Hyacinthe de Bougainville and Dumont d'Urville 
made up a first group, followed a little later by Laplace, Vaillant, Dupetit-Thouars and 
Cecile . As a group, they achieved what might be called an intellectual appropriation of 
Oceanic expanses, long before those expanses were divided between the colonial powers. 
All this happened in the context of an excitement to attain knowledge, in particular 
geographical knowledge, in line with the establishment of numerous geographical societies, 
the oldest being that of Paris in 1 82 1 .  Regarding more specifically the name Melanesia, two 
French travellers and writers are responsible for its imposition, through their best-selling 
1 Emeritus Professor, Paris IV-Sorbonne University, Pacifica-Prodig-CNRS 
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accounts of Oceania that were considered authoritative for decades. The first was the great 
explorer Dumont d'Urville in his Voyage Pittoresque autour du monde, published in 1 834 in 
two thick volumes, and the second was Domeni de Rienzi, who travelled all over the Pacific 
and wrote three books summarizing his findings. They were published in 1 839 in the 
'Univers pittoresque' collection. In these books the bounds of Oceania were not clearly 
drawn, as it included Australia. But both Dumont d'Urville and Domeni de Rienzi sensed that 
Oceania was a heterogeneous whole and that it was necessary to distinguish between Papua, 
centred around New Guinea and extending eastward all the way to Fij i, and an 'endamenie' -
the word was coined by De Rienzi - centred around Australia, whose Aboriginal population 
was evidently very different from that of the 'Papouas ' or 'Papous ' (Papuans) . Gradually the 
name Melanesia came to be used to designate the first group, made up of the five big 
geographical entities - New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, the New Hebrides (now Vanuatu), 
New Caledonia, and Fiji .  Much more recently, the name Melanesia has been not only 
accepted but also taken up by the former colonies, the newly independent states which gained 
independence in 1 970 and thereafter. From then on, the name Melanesia has designated a 
vast area populated very long ago by groups belonging to a common and original pool. Thus 
a cultural approach superseded the original definition based on race or on racism. 
The boundaries 
To the east 
The issue of the limits to be assigned to Melanesia is still a current one; not toward the east, 
where the boundary between Melanesia and the vast triangle with Polynesian peoples is 
undisputed. From a physical standpoint, the small Polynesian archipelagos scattered in the 
vast expanses of the central and eastern Pacific contrast with the 'big islands ' to be found in 
the south-western Pacific. Their scattered distribution and their isolation have resulted in their 
flora and fauna growing poorer as we move eastward and in a very high level of endemic 
animal and plant species. Most of all, because the Polynesian archipelagos were populated at 
a much later period, probably between the second century BC and the 14th century AD, they 
feature a basic linguistic unity which makes them totally different from the linguistic 
diversity characteristic of the Melanesian lands which were populated much earlier. As a 
reminder, we will state that Papua New Guinea alone has over 800 different languages, and 
the Solomon Islands has 87 languages, and so on. This is due to the fact that these islands 
were populated very long ago - up to 50,000 or 60,000 years. During those remote eras, the 
low level of the sea corresponding to the last Quaternary glaciations (Wfum's) laid open the 
huge continental shelf at Sahul and made it easier for the ancestors of the present-day 
Papuans and Melanesians to migrate from Asia. It is to be noticed that the separation between 
Melanesians and Polynesians (who also originally came from Asia) is not absolute, even 
from a geographical standpoint, as in the course of their migrations some Polynesians 
managed to be isolated deep in the heart of the Melanesian area. Thus the Solomon Islands 
include both the Ontong Java Atoll to the north of the string of main islands, and the Rennell 
Islands to the south of these, and both places have a Polynesian population. 
To the west 
We have a problem with the western boundaries of Melanesia, not from a physical, human or 
cultural standpoint, but on account of political problems, the heritage of colonial history. One 
of the first problems is the issue of whether there exists a 'natural ' break between Asia and 
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the Melanesian world. With regard to fauna, for example, the field biologist Wallace ( 1 823-
1 9 1 3) had drawn a line west of Celebes separating Asia from Oceania. Oceania, as he saw it, 
featured specific animal families such as marsupials. The line was somewhat arbitrary; it was 
amended many times and replaced by a transition area (Wallacea) covering the major part of 
Moluccas. On the human level as well, we find from the east of Moluccas to New Guinea a 
number of islands whose populations evidently show affinity with Papuans. Today, however, 
the line has been moved much further east, halfway through New Guinea itself, as a result of 
a colonial distribution reaching far into the past. Indeed, the western part of New Guinea had 
been sighted very early by the Portuguese sailors coming from Moluccas, whereas the eastern 
part was sighted by the Spaniards, and then later by the French and the British sailing 
westward across the Pacific. 
As early as the 1 7th century, the Dutch, having ousted the Portuguese, settled in Moluccas, 
and thereafter included the western part of New Guinea in their colonial empire known as 
'the Dutch East Indies ' ,  whereas the eastern part was divided between the British and the 
Germans. This artificial break dividing New Guinea in two has only grown more pronounced 
ever since. Indonesia, which after independence acquired what was the Dutch East Indies, 
would not rest until in 1 963- 1 965 it recovered the western half of New Guinea. This part was 
integrated with some difficulty under the name West Papua; the outcome of the Indonesian 
government' s  population (transmigration) and development policy. 
I will not go further, but it seems to be more logical to restrict my paper to 'geopolitical ' 
Melanesia, consisting of the five big states and territories mentioned above, despite physical 
and human similarities in 'West Papua' . Even without the western half of New Guinea, 
Melanesia makes up a vast whole: the total area of the five states and territories is 542,622 
km2, or the area of France, or twice the area of New Zealand. Papua New Guinea has the 
lion's share, with 46 1 ,69 1 km2 (or 85 per cent of the total), far ahead of the Solomon Islands 
(28,796 km2, 5 .3  per cent), New Caledonia ( 1 9,000 km2, 3 . 5  per cent), Fiji ( 1 8 ,272 km2, 3 .3 
per cent) and Vanuatu ( 14,763 km2, 2 .7 per cent) . Thus it can be said that there is a 
'continental' Melanesia and an island Melanesia made up of archipelagos that are more or 
less fragmented. 
The oceanic expanse 
These archipelagos are scattered over vast ocean expanses, which as per the new sea law -
the Montego Bay Convention - enables them to control vast Exclusive Economic Zones 
(EEZ) within the 200 nautical mile-limit from the shore. 
For example, the ' sprawling' islands of PNG enjoy a 3 ,2 1 0,000 km2-EEZ thanks to its island 
extensions - the Bismarck, Bougainville and Buka archipelagos as well as the smaller 
Admiralty, d'Entrecasteaux and Louisiade archipelagos. PNG's  EEZ is seven times as big as 
its land area. But this ratio of EEZ to land area is much higher in the central and eastern 
Melanesian archipelagos, ranging between 46: 1 in the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu and 9 1 :  1 
in New Caledonia, including the Loyalty Islands. This is, however, a far cry from the 1 OOO: 1 ,  
and sometimes much more, in the small Polynesian and Micronesian archipelagos, where 
EEZ to land area ratios are extreme. 
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Overall, the five Melanesian States and territories enjoy an EEZ extending more that 
8,260,000 km2• This makes it easier to understand why the large powers interested in ocean 
development, such as the United States and Japan, pay close attention to them. One example 
is the multilateral agreement signed lately by the United States and a number of Pacific island 
states including Papua New Guinea. The agreement allows American tuna boats access to the 
EEZ of signatory nations that cannot afford to develop it on their own, in return for financial 
compensation. 
The features of Melanesia 
Melanesian expanses seem all the vaster as they are sparsely populated. In 2007, the five 
countries making up Melanesia had a population that hardly reached eight million, and six 
million of those live in Papua New Guinea. This amounts to a density of 1 5  per km2• It is true 
that there is a significant contrast between PNG ( 1 3  per km2), the Solomon Islands and New 
Caledonia on the one hand, and Fiji ,  with 47 people per km2, on the other. Fiji is a special 
case since an immigrant Indian population was brought in and added to the Melanesian 
population. Indians prospered to the point where, until a few years ago, the Indian population 
had caught up and even exceeded the indigenous population. Be that as it may, on the whole, 
the Melanesian world, on account of its low population densities, is set apart from both the 
overpopulated and congested Asian cities and the heavily populated Polynesian and 
Micronesian island states .  The Melanesian world, however, is also very different from the 
human void to be found in Australia's vast expanses, where the population density is just 2 .5  
people per km2• 
Perhaps we must link these low human densities to two major geographical features of the 
Melanesian world, the importance of natural hazards on the one hand, and the constraints 
stemming from their extremely dispersed character on the other. 
The importance of natural hazards 
First of all, the splendour and extreme diversity of landscapes in Melanesia should not set us 
to dreaming about mythical tropical paradises which are lush and peaceful as they are shown 
in tourist literature. Nature is often harsh to people in Melanesia. It threatens people in many 
ways likely to jeopardize their safety and even threaten their lives, but to a certain extent it 
also endangers the prospects for sustainable development. Melanesia is an unsafe world, and 
no part of it is hazard-free, as it has to face physical, weather and health hazards. 
The first hazard, which we will call the physical hazard, is the result of the inner structure of 
this south-western part of the Pacific. In this area, the plates making up the shell of the earth' s  
crust clash and collide with each other. They are mainly the Pacific plate and the Indo­
Australian plate. I will not dwell on plate tectonics; we must notice, however, that Melanesia 
is sideswiped by part of the huge Circum-Pacific Belt along which large scale tectonic 
movements occur. To make things simple, we will say that the contact between the plates 
takes place in New Guinea and in the Solomon Islands; it branches off in Vanuatu and runs to 
Fiji ,  and from there, it moves on to Wallis, Tonga and New Zealand. New Caledonia alone 
lies a little away from these particularly sensitive areas. 
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The most spectacular form of the violence of this physical hazard in Melanesia is volcanic 
activity along the line where the plates meet. While volcanoes are not to be found 
everywhere, and not all volcanoes are permanently active, nonetheless there are at least 1 6  
volcanoes regarded as active in New Guinea, 1 4  in New Britain, nine in New Ireland, several 
in the Solomon Islands, in Vanuatu (in Lopevi, in Tanna, in Ambrym), and so on. 
These volcanoes during eruption periods erupt into fiery clouds or spew huge quantities of 
gas and ash that lay waste the neighbouring areas and force people to flee. People in Papua 
New Guinea still remember the huge eruption that occurred with the reawakening of the 
Tavurvur and Vulcan volcanoes overlooking Rabaul, the provincial capital in the Bismarck 
Archipelago in September 1 994. They had not erupted since the 1 937  paroxysm which forced 
the transfer of the Papuan capital from Rabaul to Lae. By contrast, they have been in the 
news almost every year since 1 994, although their eruptions are not as intense as that of 1 994 
when huge amounts of gas and ash forced the evacuation of some 40,000 people from the 
area. On the other hand, there were few casualties unlike what happened during the explosive 
eruption of Mount Lamington in January 1 95 1  which caused over 4,000 deaths. It would be 
easy to find many other examples. This explosive and unpredictable volcanic activity is a 
serious threat, but luckily the threat is restricted to certain geographical areas. 
This, however, is not the case with seismic activity which develops in the areas where the 
plates clash, releasing gigantic amounts of energy in the form of abrupt earthquakes followed 
by less violent aftershocks. A major part of Melanesia is threatened by such destructive and 
deadly phenomena. Every year hundreds of earthquakes occur, but fortunately few with a 
dangerously high magnitude and an epicentre located close to heavily populated areas. 
Nevertheless, Papua New Guinea has suffered a number of serious earthquakes since the 
terrible disaster that occurred on 26 June 1 976, causing 6,000 fatalities as a result of a quake 
reaching 7 . 1 on the Richter scale. The Bismarck Archipelago area seems to be particularly 
prone, but other countries have also experienced these destructive phenomena, such as the 
Solomon Islands (in 1 988 and 1989) and Vanuatu (in 1 999). In addition, temblors (sea 
earthquakes) can cause tsunamis, which can wreak havoc very far from the earthquake 's  
epicentre. But in Melanesia' s  case, tsunamis usually hit the shores of areas or islands that are 
more or less close to the origin of the quake which does not leave enough time to warn the 
population as in the case of remote Pacific archipelagos which are equipped with the early 
warning system set up all around the Ocean. That is how a terrible tsunami was greatly 
responsible for the 8 ,000 casualties caused by the 1 7  July 1 998 7 . 1  earthquake. 
Of course, we should not picture the Melanesian world as living in perpetual fear of 
earthquakes, tsunamis or volcanic eruptions. Actually, judging from the fact that earthquake­
resistant buildings in fast-growing cities are very few, it may seem that people are not 
sufficiently aware of the dangers. But then, the lack of earthquake-resistant buildings is 
actually due to the fact that these countries cannot afford it. 
Not all Melanesia is exposed to those physical hazards in the same way. New Caledonia, for 
example, is mostly free from them. On the other hand, it has to face another type of hazard, 
'the weather hazard' . We will not use this term to cover ordinary hazards linked to weather 
fluctuations from year to year, with drought years in one area or torrential rain over long 
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periods in another, which may have terrible effects on crops, for example. This is a common 
feature of most climates in the world and it is often associated with general phenomena such 
as El Nino. Melanesia, however, being situated in the south-western Pacific, is subjected to 
tropical cyclones. However, cyclones do not occur everywhere, since, as we know, areas with 
equatorial climates are cyclone-free, just like a part of northern New Guinea. The devastating 
effect of these whirling low-pressure depressions is well known. They affect Fij i  and New 
Caledonia (see the excellent paper by Fabrice Fussy) , the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu, and 
we needn't  draw up a list of the disasters they have caused. 
In Melanesia the hazards that affect the populations' health are more insidious. We will not 
mention the HIV-linked hazards because they are recent and not specifically Melanesian 
developments. On the other hand, malaria is a major hazard throughout a significant part of 
Melanesia, except New Caledonia and Fiji .  For example, malaria has turned the coastal areas 
in New Guinea into a grave for Europeans, and it is a disastrous cause of infant mortality for 
the indigenous populations; that is because in New Guinea the four species of parasites that 
attack human beings can be found (p/asmodium vivax, falciparum, malariae and oval). This 
is how Father Dupeyrat (whose numerous books on Catholic missions in Melanesia are well 
known) speaks about malaria: 'This cursed dog which fiercely watches over the boundaries 
of Melanesia' .  Here, Father Dupeyrat reminds his readers of the very heavy death toll on 
European missionaries and, even before the missionaries settled, the horrendous casualties 
among the LMS Polynesian 'teachers ' who came from archipelagos in the Central Pacific 
which was free of the disease. Indeed, not all Pacific islands are infected with malaria, and 
the limit between the non-infected and the infected ones, which runs across the heart of 
Melanesia, is a moving boundary. In the Solomon Islands, for example, the disease recurred 
very abruptly in the 1980s after preventive measures - massive DDT spraying - were 
relaxed. Theoretically, altitude prevents the presence of anopheles above 2,000 meters, which 
accounts for the existence of the highest population concentrations in the high lands. 
Nevertheless, in that area nowadays we can find a certain number of Papuans who have 
developed the disease; they may have caught it in the lowland plantations or in the cities 
during their work-related migrations. 
We must add that from a historical perspective, during the century that followed European 
discoveries, the fact that the island populations were isolated from continental sanitary 
hazards has also made them very vulnerable to the 'germ shock' resulting from the outbreak 
of new diseases, such as smallpox, measles, whooping cough, influenza, and so on, with 
devastating demographic consequences. 
The constraints resulting from scattered dispersal 
Scattered dispersal is another geographical feature. It may be thought that it can go a long 
way to account for the essential and original character of the Melanesian world, namely the 
large number of languages, of ethnic groups and societies. This phenomenon can be observed 
both on the New Guinea 'mainland' and in the other Melanesian archipelagos. 
The widespread character of scattering 
a) First of all, on the ' small continent' made up by New Guinea, the division of space is the 
result of a dual logic: on the one hand, the contrast between the seashore and the hinterland, 
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and on the other hand, the contrast between highlands and lowlands. The two logics are 
closely intertwined. Nowhere else in the world, maybe not even in Black Africa, has a 
'hinterland' been ignored for so long as in New Guinea. Knowledge about the central areas of 
the main island did not grow in earnest until the 1 930s, or even the 1 950s. One must be 
aware, however, that this ' isolation' of the hinterland is a European view, and it is not at one 
with the Papuan civilizations, which were familiar with exchanges and contacts, even over 
long distances. One 'anecdotal' proof is the frequent use of seashells in men's  outfits all the 
way to the apparently isolated valleys, which implies long and complex exchange routes. 
More significant still, is the role played by the sweet potato in the hinterland highlands. 
Sweet potatoes have become a characteristic staple although, as they are originally an 
American plant, they were probably brought to the coast by travellers, possibly Portuguese 
travellers, in the 1 6th century. This could be one of the most impressive instances in world 
history of a civilization built around an imported plant, and it could bear out the extreme 
inventiveness of the Papuan horticulturalists. They may have achieved the very ancient 
domestication of those plants that have a paramount importance such as banana trees and 
sago palms. 
Besides, in New Guinea, space is also divided between highlands and lowlands, and in the 
huge central range, partition makes for deep valleys separated by extremely high ridges 
(4,694 m at the Wilhem peak) . That is where those surprising long-unknown landscapes 
developed, with a perfectly regular mix of woodland, farmland and pasture-land used for 
intensive farming of the major staples of sweet potatoes and pigs. It could support high 
population densities up to 200 per km2• On the other hand, in the lowlands by the big rivers 
and on the coastal plains, the vast swamp areas and mangroves which were hard hit by 
malaria left little opportunity for habitation in the forest mass, at least until the development 
of the plantations and the harbour cities. 
b) Secondly, in island Melanesia, scattered geographical distribution corresponds in the first 
place to the diversity of the islands and to the identity of each of them in complex systems of 
inter-island relationships. Each island tends somewhat naturally to develop its own 
personality, hence the existence of 'centrifugal forces' in the island countries, of which the 
Solomon Islands, even Vanuatu, constitute excellent Melanesian examples. Besides, in the 
larger Melanesian islands we can find, albeit somewhat attenuated, the spatial differentiation 
we found in New Guinea, namely a dichotomy between inland people, i .e .  those of the 
'bush ' ,  and the coastal people, that there is also an opposition between low-land people and 
high-land people in the valleys in the New Caledonia central range, for example. All this 
translates into territorial fragmentation which could account for the fact that in Kanak 
languages there is no name for the main island as a whole. 
The consequences of scattered island distribution 
a) It is worth asking to what extent this geographical fragmentation is the origin of the basic 
feature of Papuan and Melanesian societies, namely the existence of many languages, 
communities and territories that are different and even rivals to an extent not to be found 
anywhere else in the world. In New Guinea alone, there are over 800 different languages; in 
the Solomon Islands the number is at least 87, and New Caledonia has about 30, and so on. 
Some languages are spoken by only a few hundred or even a few dozen people and are 
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sometimes endangered. Of course, we will not revive an outmoded geographic determinism 
which sets a causal link between natural environments and societies. Many other ways of 
accounting for this situation can be suggested, such as how long the area has been populated, 
the small size and the scattering of human communities, the cultural bases of societies and, of 
course, colonial and post-colonial history, which introduces a major difference between the 
archipelagos with enough people of foreign origin to match the indigenous populations (Fiji ,  
New Caledonia) and those that did not experience a major change in their population. 
b) In any case, there is no denying the importance of nature in accounting for the scattered 
nature of space and societies which, for outsiders, is one of the most striking features of the 
Melanesian world. This feature makes for a kind of Melanesian paradox consisting in the 
conjunction of both an overall indisputable unity and a great diversity in details and in local 
features. There is a certain unity in the Melanesian world, based upon an ancient population, 
which is unevenly distributed and relatively sparse; upon societies with oral traditions, with 
little hierarchy, built around the rivalry between the 'big men' ; and, in the material field, 
upon a civilization based upon plants and upon an Oceanian food-producing system whose 
staples are roots, tubers, banana trees, coconut trees, sago palms and pigs. But besides this 
basic unity, there are so many partitions, divisions and oppositions ! The physical and human 
partitioning of space leads to a jealous and persistent attachment to a specific territory, 
exacerbated by the deep-seated and corporeal attachment to the land which is peculiar to 
populations in the island world. 
c) This scattered physical and human dispersal can be regarded initially as a very serious 
hindrance to the search for Melanesian unity on any scale. As a result, it is difficult, for 
example, to build coherent nation states that would not be constantly threatened by the risk of 
implosion and exempt from vulnerability to outside pressures and influences. The very large 
number of languages (the term 'Modem Babel' has been used in connection with Papua New 
Guinea) made it necessary to find in the blending of the colonizer' s  language and the 
indigenous language a lingua franca, a pidgin allowing exchange between communities like 
Bislama in Vanuatu. But what can be viewed as a crippling scattering can also be viewed in a 
very different way as an enriching diversity. First of all, there is diversity in resources; some 
are exploited and some are rather still untapped. Melanesia has a huge potential for 
agricultural development, vast EEZ areas that are not yet developed, and most of all energy 
resources (oil and gas) and minerals (copper, gold, nickel, etc .) .  These resources, in the 
context of high demand and high prices, are now at last likely to provide the financial basis 
for sustainable development. While the five archipelagos do not have the same potential - yet 
another instance of diversity ! - on the whole prospects are good. I will not dwell on these 
prospects, as other papers will be devoted to them. Further, human, social and cultural 
diversity is also a boon. Even the great number of languages - as noted above, Melanesia as a 
whole has more than 2,000 languages out of the 7,000 that exist on the planet! - can be seen 
as unequalled cultural riches. Diversity can be viewed not from the standpoint of the 
weaknesses that can result from it, but as providing many irreplaceable experiences. This is 
obvious to those who are interested in the art of indigenous societies. In the very individuality 
of artistic expressions there is a diversity, an inventiveness, a rich creativity which is 
astonishing if we consider the small size of each of the communities. 
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Conclusion 
Thus Melanesia appears to the geographer as a culture-area with both formidable challenges 
and prospects and potential for development that make it a region for the future. This implies, 
as Joel Bonnemaison stated ten years ago, that unbridled development should be discontinued 
and Melanesian nations should opt for less radical models softer models and sustainable 
development, set up democratic governments, and remain true to their history. In short, they 
should preserve an 'Oceanian' way which shows respect, among other things, for the 
remarkable geographical peculiarity of the Melanesian world. 
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7.  Po litical sociology: of men and cu ltu res 
Ian Campbell1 
The Melanesian people occupy the islands in the south-west of the Pacific Ocean, from Fij i  in 
the east to New Guinea in the north and west. Early impressions of their coherence as a single 
population and culture arose from the swarthy complexion, generally smaller stature than the 
Polynesians to the east, and their characteristically crimpled hair superficially resembling that 
of Africans. Closer examination revealed considerable diversity both in culture and physical 
types, and this diversity is what most attracts attention. There remains, however, a good deal 
in common which justifies classifying Melanesia as a culture-area. 
Ethnic origins 
Ethnologically, Melanesia is an uneven blend of two distinct peoples. In the beginning were 
those who came into New Guinea perhaps 40,000 years ago or more, when there was still dry 
land connecting New Guinea, Australia and the eastern end of the Indonesian archipelago. 
Their ultimate origin is obscure, their relationships with other populations lost in the darkness 
of remote antiquity, but they achieved three remarkable things: they crossed wider ocean 
distances than anyone had done before them or was to do for tens of thousands of years after 
them; they transferred domesticated plants and animals across those ocean gaps to New 
Britain, New Ireland and Buka and possible further down the Solomon chain; and third, they 
were among the first people in history to practice agriculture. There is nothing to suggest that 
any of these accomplishments was followed, as they were later and elsewhere in history, by 
occupational specialisation, the creation of towns, extended political units, or systems of 
writing. These people succeeded in settling the high valleys of New Guinea, adapting to a 
wide range of climatic and geographical conditions, and have become known to later ages as 
Papuans: short in stature, dark in complexion and vivacious and colourful in their artistic 
expression. 
The second people to come into the Western Pacific were a different group altogether: lighter 
in skin colour, straight haired and probably taller than the Papuans. Their movements have 
been traced back to southern China 5000 to 6000 years ago, and their descendants form the 
basic stock of the pre-Chinese populations of Taiwan, of most of south-east Asia and all of 
the Pacific Islands, including Micronesia, and to the outer extremes of the Pacific, Hawai ' i ,  
Easter Island and New Zealand. Anthropology has called these people the Austronesians and 
their principle distinguishing characteristics culturally were the use of a highly distinctive 
style of pottery, and relatively sophisticated outrigger and double canoes for ocean voyaging. 
These people visited the north coasts of New Guinea and settled on New Britain 3 ,400 years 
1 School of Social Sciences, University of the South Pacific 
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ago. Their maritime capacity was at the time the most advanced in the world, and the quality 
of their pottery and subtlety and regularity of its decoration were equal or better than pottery 
made elsewhere among pre-urban, pre-metallurgical societies. They were not a backward 
people. 
What impelled their movements is unknown, but it is unlikely to have been land shortage or 
rising sea-levels. Mobility was presumably a cultural tradition, and within 500 years they had 
spread through the island chains of the western Pacific, forming scattered settlements all the 
way to Tonga and Samoa. Subsequently colonists from these two places dispersed through 
the eastern Pacific where their descendants constitute a remarkably homogeneous cultural 
group identified as Polynesians. Having become distinctively Polynesian some of these 
people also colonised to the westward during the last thousand years, coming back into 
Melanesia whence their long-forgotten ancestors had come two thousand and more years 
earlier. 
Meanwhile, the Austronesian settlers of the archipelagos from New Britain to New 
Caledonia, had mixed with Papuan populations. The chronology of this process is unknown 
because of insufficient human remains from remote times, but the distinctive physical 
appearance of Polynesians in contrast to modem Melanesians suggest that the mixing was not 
well advanced at the time of the Austronesian dispersal. It therefore arose through subsequent 
contact. At all events, the mixing in Melanesia of Austronesian with Papuan was thorough 
and spatially extensive though possibly genetically uneven. The physical type or types that 
we regard as characteristically Melanesian, developed in Melanesia, and this type seems to 
have developed sometime before Austronesian Fiji was 'Melanesianised' by migrations 
probably from Vanuatu. The same might be said of the cultures and languages: thoroughly 
but unevenly mixed, and continuing in process up to the time of European contact. 
The 'ethnographic present' or Melanesia at the proto-historical moment 
One word describes Melanesian culture: fragmentation. It may be suggested that Melanesian 
society is so diverse, that the label is merely a negative definition: Melanesian cultures are 
those of the Pacific that are neither Micronesian nor Polynesian, nor Australian. Yet this 
negative definition ignores that fact that amid the diversity of Melanesian societies there are 
definite common features which distinguish them from cultures elsewhere. 
The diversity itself may be exaggerated, and is expressed in linguistics :  perhaps 1 200 
languages in Melanesia, one quarter of the world' s  total spoken by less than 0. 1 per cent of 
the world' s  population; 900 alone in Papua New Guinea; 70 or 80 in Solomon Islands, over 
1 00 in Vanuatu, 20 or so in New Caledonia. Linking some hundreds of them is the fact that 
they are Austronesian languages, all derived from the tongue spoken by the first 
Austronesians who came to New Britain in 3400 BP. The remainder are the majority, called 
Papuan, and once also considered a negative definition. Nevertheless, patterns and affinities 
between them have been found. Extraordinary multiplicity can therefore be reduced to a very 
small number of language families, perhaps no more numerous than the language families of 
Europe .  
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Early European travellers do not mention hierarchical socio-political units comparable to 
those of Polynesia or parts of Micronesia. Apart from small islands of an obviously 
Polynesian type such as Nukumanu or Tikopia which was home to a single socio-political 
unit, there were no island-wide or archipelagic political systems in which a single political 
order was universally recognised. Throughout the early contact period ship-based traders 
generally found that they could engage only with small populations and that to treat with the 
people of one bay was to incur the enmity of people in the next. By the time that literate 
settlers became established and early ethnographers were writing in the last third of the 
nineteenth century, the social reality that they described was one of small societies, generally 
lacking hereditary chieftainships, or at least not according such chiefs marked differentials in 
status or physical possessions. Societies were small. The first missionary on Aneityum in the 
Southern New Hebrides was clearly of the impression that small discrete communities were 
the norm. At the opening of a church in 1 854 when almost 1 OOO people gathered, he wrote 
that ' Such a gathering had never been seen in the island since the world was; for the people 
lived in such hatred and fear of each other that they seldom crossed the narrow boundaries of 
their own tribes ' .  2 
Twentieth century anthropologists reinforced this perception of Melanesia as a heterogeneous 
collection of small and antagonistic societies, and coined the term acephalous to denote the 
lack of clear hierarchy. This is not to say that societies were without acknowledged leaders, 
but in the distinction drawn by sociologists between 'ascribed status ' and 'acquired status ' ,  
Melanesian societies overwhelmingly and clearly fell into the latter. Even among those 
societies which appeared to have hereditary chiefs, what was inherited was not so much rank 
as the means of acquiring status : that is, possessions and ritual secrets ; in a word, mana.3 
Later, the term 'Big Man' was taken into the literature from the usage of many Melanesians 
themselves to describe the leadership system. Common in the New Guinea highlands, it also 
fitted many parts of the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu. 
Social and political leadership in small societies cannot be distinguished, and leadership or at 
least pre-eminence was attained by the competitive accumulation and distribution of wealth 
in what has been described as a caricature of capitalist society, revolving around the cyclical 
creation and consumption of wealth. A young man with social ambitions would make a start 
by borrowing a quantity of traditional wealth, including perhaps lengths of shell-money 
ropes, mats, and pigs. This would be borrowed at a known rate of interest. The borrowed 
wealth would be his working capital, the first use of which was to pay the bride-price to get 
married. Some of it would be given away to other young men, creating obligations. Favours 
would be called in when needed; but in the meantime, the young man' s wife would 
demonstrate her economic usefulness by work in the gardens and raising pigs. As the young 
man's  credit-worthiness increased with the industry of his wife, he could perhaps borrow 
more (still at interest) and obtain a second wife. Presently the accumulation of pigs and other 
wealth might enable him to repay some of his debts, or to become a creditor in his own right. 
2 FA Campbell, A Year in the New Hebrides, Loyalty Islands, and New Caledonia, Melbourne: George 
Robertson, [ 1 873], p 24 
3 RH Codrington, The Melanesians. Studies in their Anthropology and Folklore, New York: Dover Publications 
1 972 (first published 1 89 1 ), eh 3 
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Meanwhile, he would also apply his accumulating wealth to provide feasts for his village in 
order to pass through various hierarchically arranged initiation stages. The better his credit­
rating and better his connections with other men of standing, the more he could borrow; the 
more he could borrow the more he could invest in creating obligations and expanding his 
workforce (his wives) and thereby the greater his own consequence. By adroit application of 
these principles he might eventually become the greatest man in his village or district. Other 
criteria for leadership included prowess in war, expertise in ritual and arcane knowledge, and 
mastery of the ceremonial exchange within and between communities. The pre-eminence 
thus achieved depended on success, and was maintained through continued success. While 
such a man exercised real authority in his own community, and his reputation might spread 
far, it was not accompanied by the assertion of power over adjacent communities. 
The values that this system reflected were materialistic and utilitarian. It emphasised 
individual achievement through competition, but also drew on an underlying ethic of mutual 
assistance and reciprocity. 
This system has come to be part of the definition of 'Melanesian' in that it is characteristic of 
most of the region, and distinguishes Melanesia from other cultures.  Whether it derives 
ultimately from the Papuan or Austronesian heritage may be debated, and the extent to which 
it was constant throughout Melanesian history may be questioned. Archaeological evidence 
of complex settlement sites and large scale agricultural engineering - that is, elaborate 
terracing and irrigation systems - suggests a degree of social control and mobilisation of 
labour more consistent with hierarchical, territorial chieftainships than with acephalous 
societies of competitive individuals. Christophe Sand suggests that the prevalence of small, 
egalitarian societies was a nineteenth century adaptation to massive population loss and 
dislocation resulting from western contact.4 This might very likely be so in some cases. On 
the other hand, the multiplicity of languages and accompanying smallness of social scale 
implies a longer history of fragmentation. Similarly, the broad similarities and wide dispersal 
of the Big Man system across an extensive area, among inland and coastal people, highlands 
and low, suggests that the historical causes must be more remote than the last 1 50  to 200 
years, and is probably part of the original Papuan contribution to Melanesia. 
Whatever the antecedents, and whatever the causes, the twentieth century reality was of 
societies with limited geographical horizons, restricted manpower, and linguistic 
fragmentation. Notwithstanding these fissiparous characteristics, there are well known 
instances of collaboration of networking, marriage exchange, gift exchange or trade. 
Examples include the Kula cycle in the Trobriand Islands made famous by Bronislaw 
Malinowski,5 and the lakatoi fleet expeditions of southern Papua. In many parts of Melanesia 
different communities would assemble for festivals, sometimes ephemeral ones apparently 
inspired by a need to be sociable, whereas others were parts of complex ritual cycles which 
took many years to work through, and which brought people of different communities 
together for shared social or religious purposes. Communities that were traditional enemies 
4 Christophe Sand, 'Melanesian Tribes vs. Polynesian Chiefdoms: Recent archaeological assessment of a classic 
model of sociopolitical types in Oceania' ,  Asian Perspectives, 4:2 (Fall 2002) 
5 Bronislaw Malinowski, Argonauts of the Western Pacific. An Account of Native Enterprise and Adventure in 
the Archipelagos of Melanesian New Guinea, London and New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1 922 
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were also bound together in marriage partnerships which were repeated generation after 
generation. Melanesian society on the whole is mischaracterised as being totally atomistic 
and anomic .  It is more like an extended, somewhat dysfunctional family the members of 
which continually bicker or fight, but are joined by common needs, common traditions, and 
common blood, and who expend enormous amounts of human energy in competing, 
combating and collaborating. In such a family the members can neither live with one another, 
nor live without one another. 
The historical experience to the Second World War 
European observers have generally been more aware of the divisions in Melanesian society 
than the connections, and of the violence and warfare between them. There was certainly 
plenty of that and from many different parts of Melanesian are reports or anecdotes of one 
tribe driving out another, of tribes being totally exterminated in warfare, of constant raiding 
so that people seldom travelled beyond well established limits; where people alone on the 
reefs or in their gardens were not safe from being murdered as a payback killing or just to 
give an aspiring social climber a reputation as a warrior. 
In its encounter with the modern world this Melanesian reality was challenged and became 
obsolete. The encounter occurred in three dimensions: missions, plantations and government. 
Missions were opposed to violence on principle. They taught peace, respect for human life, 
the dignity of the individual, equal status for women and brought freedom from supernatural 
imperatives, the tyranny of sorcery, and the fear of neighbours and strangers. Missionary 
testimony from across Melanesia and throughout a century of evangelism is consistent if not 
unanimous on the point that the coming of Christianity made it safer for people to go about 
and allowed communities to expand their range of interactions with other communities. 
Plantations had a similar effect. Labourers were recruited from villages over a wide territory 
and different islands, with the result that traditional enemies and strangers who had no ground 
for friendship were brought together in large work forces and kept together in enforced peace 
and shared work, learning a common language, usually that of their employers or a creole 
variant of it. One of the defences offered of the plantation labour system was that this shared 
experience broke down enmities and made interaction safer and possible over a wider area. 
After the term of employment - usually three years - was over, labourers returned to their 
homes knowing that people from elsewhere could be and were friends. Their horizons were 
enlarged and their attitudes changed. With a new language, a barrier was taken away. Distant 
peoples were in a new sense, 'wantoks' .6 Finally, there was the direct role of government 
which in imposing an imperial peace, system of law and centralised administration opened 
new possibilities for Melanesian society and Melanesian lives and promised to transcend the 
restricted communal horizons. 
For most people during the colonial period this did not make an enormous difference, except 
to give people greater security and peace of mind. Most men would have had the experience 
6 The plantation system and its social dimensions before World War 2 are well described in SW Reed, The 
Making of Modern New Guinea, with special reference to culture contact in the Mandated Territory, 
Philadelphia: The American Philosophical Society, 1 943 , and HI Hogbin, Experiments in civilization: The 
effects of European culture on a native community of the Solomon Islands, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1 938 
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of working away from the village on plantations or for government for a period of time - but 
for most of those, that was a three-year episode in early manhood, and their lives were 
otherwise worked out in the village engaged in traditional activities but without the warfare 
and raiding of former times. This was the scenario until World War Two. 
The era of development colonialism and independence 
Colonial policies in the Pacific after the Second World War were founded on two principles: 
economic development to raise standards of living; and political education to prepare people 
for independence. This is not to say that there was a timetable for independence from the 
beginning, or that colonial powers had a definitive blueprint for the process. They were 
embarked on a process without precedent, and colonial development policies were hostage 
both to domestic politics and to international, geo-political pressures. In the end, the process 
was hastened to conclusion far earlier than people anticipated was possible, and far faster 
than many of those involved on both sides of the colour line thought advisable. 
In Anglophone Melanesia economic development had two main props that were common 
throughout, with local variations. These were education and the use of co-operative societies. 
Primary schools were begun where large numbers of village children would be able to attend; 
high schools followed in central places to which the most successful pupils from primary 
level would proceed; specialist tertiary institutions - teachers ' training colleges, trade or 
technical colleges, and administrative training programmes were instituted early in this 
process to create the class of skilled people on which the process needed to feed. At length 
the Universities of Papua New Guinea ( 1 966) and the University of the South Pacific (1 968) 
were launched. The first was national institution, the second a regional institution. A 
subliminal purpose, and sometimes declared hope was that school and university experience 
would bring together people of different languages and cultures and help to forge a new, 
national culture in which indigenous people saw each other not as strangers or enemies, but 
as fellow nationals and fellow citizens - and beyond that as fellow team members in the great 
enterprise of nation-creation. 
Cooperative societies were not quite the economic analogue of schools and colleges, but were 
intended to train people in entrepreneurship, building on the supposed communal, 
cooperative ethos of island society to enable primary capital formation, and to retain the 
ownership of resources in indigenous hands. There was also a proxy-nationalist purpose by 
colonial officials who were frequently hostile or at least unsympathetic to foreign investors 
and capitalism, and for ideological reasons wanted to see grass-roots development rather than 
capital intensive enterprises. Cooperative societies were initially village based; larger and 
more broadly-based societies were intended to follow. Like schools and colleges, this process 
would encourage the erosion of local identities and strengthen the development of wider 
ones.  
In political development there were likewise two main props: drawing indigenous 
representatives into national legislative institutions, and democratising local administration 
by creating local government councils which it was hoped would be both instruments of 
development and training grounds in the practice of democracy and responsible government, 
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from which experienced people would graduate to national politics. This was the 
evolutionary pathway characteristic of both British and Australian models of decolonisation. 
In all cases independence came before this process was complete, and it would have been 
utopian to suppose that perfect readiness could have been attained before the transfer of 
power. The compressed process however, did succeed in producing indigenous figures for the 
national stage who could be presented as nationalist; the rhetoric and symbols of nationalism 
were called on both by the departing colonial powers and the new leaders who accepted their 
mantle. In each case, except Fij i, independence was threatened by separatist movements 
showing that the forging of nationalist sentiments was only partially complete, but also that it 
had succeeded to the extent of creating regional identities in opposition to national ones. It 
might have been supposed that the process of national identity formation would continue 
after independence, but if it has the process is still awaiting completion. In Papua New 
Guinea the state is in retreat and local identities are reviving to the point of renewed tribal 
warfare; in Solomon Islands in recent years, civil war and political crisis have shown deep, 
unresolved animosities, and the thinness of the veneer of national unity has been exposed 
even within the indigenous Fijian population. Vanuatu remains an imperfectly integrated 
state in which there is limited engagement between peripheral communities and the central 
institutions. 
Assessments for the United Nations Development Program' s  Human Development Reports 
place all the Melanesian countries in the 'medium' category, all in the lower half of the total 
of 177  countries, and significantly lower than Samoa and Tonga.7 These statistics suggests 
that much more domestic development is necessary before concepts of integration below the 
level of the state and corporations can be very meaningful. 
HDI  Life Adult Educational 
GDP USS Human 
Country Ranking expectancy literacy enrolment 
Purchasing Development 
( / 1 77)  at birth ratio Power Parity I ndex 
Papua New 1 45 56.9 57 .3  40 .7  2563 0. 53 Gui nea 
Solomon Is 1 28 63 76 . 6  47. 6  203 1 0. 602 
Vanuatu 1 20 69 . 3  74 63.4 3225 0 . 674 
Fij i 92 68 . 3  [94.4] 74. 8  6049 0. 762 
In all parts of Melanesia very high proportions of the population have very little contact with 
the modern nation. Much as people travel for education, and rural people migrate to the 
towns and capitals, village life remains the backbone of support for the majority, along with 
the ideas and values characteristic of small, largely self-sufficient settlements. The political 
sociology of the past continues to shape the social and political horizons of the great 
majority. 
Implications for greater Melanesian integration 
On the whole the continuing fragmentation and isolation of Melanesian communities is 
irrelevant to the Melanesian integration project. Reciprocally, integration is largely irrelevant 
to them. They are members of imperfectly integrated states, and some of them so marginally 
7 See http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/ for the latest data 
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connected to those states as to be living independently of them. A change in the relationship 
between states is not going to draw these people any closer to their own state or to a regional 
counterpart. 
Further, whatever connection villagers might make across national boundaries through closer 
integration is not likely to be different qualitatively from becoming better integrated at a 
district, provincial or national level. Village producers will not find markets easier to find 
because tariff barriers between say, Papua New Guinea and New Caledonia are eliminated. 
Freer labour markets that enable a villager to move internationally are not really any different 
from national markets that allow movement to a factory or other facility in the same country. 
Closer relationships between the states will need to make a much greater difference to the 
overall level and character of economic activity before it has a significant effect on the 
predominantly village and subsistence experiences of most people. 
Closer integration might very well bring benefits to commercial farmers, to manufacturers, to 
transport and communications, revenue collection, policing and control of international 
crime. Individuals as individuals will be drawn into these activities but the fragmented 
political sociology of Melanesia is, as the distinguished French historian Fernand Braudel 
would have called it, 'a structure of the longue duree ' .  
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8 . Economy and the envi ronment:  which 
sustai nab le development for Melanesia? 
Paul Neaoutyine 1 
First of all, allow me, before I start my paper, to greet the distinguished members of this 
excellent assembly, the eminent academics, of course, but also the representatives of the 
different authorities, the intellectuals, the researchers and the decision-makers. 
Secondly, I would like to congratulate and thank the conference organizers, who have chosen 
to gather us together in order to exchange our insights on the theme New Caledonia and 
Melanesian Unity. This occasion is necessary to emich our thoughts, our visions and our 
actions for a better advancement and a better development of our societies. 
Which sustainable development for Melanesia? 
I do not claim to master all aspects of so vast a topic ; there is, however, a first point of view 
that I would like you to ponder - Melanesia should be a privileged area for sustainable 
development, for the cultures of the peoples of Melanesia are inseparable from the concerns 
which are currently called ' environmental ' .  
Sustainable development must meet the needs of the present without endangering the ability 
of future generations to meet theirs. 
I think we can contend that our Melanesian societies practiced sustainable development long 
before this definition was given. 
Indeed, the relation to nature is deeply rooted in our culture and our way of life. Regardless 
of living conditions, in J-M Tj ibaou's words, 'yams, like water taros, are planted, gathered 
and eaten on a permanent basis' .2 Our people have always known how to save natural 
resources and they have shown respect for nature and biodiversity. Our customs have 
developed a deep knowledge of nature ' s  rhythms and learned how to protect plants. As for 
animal species, the links customs set between totemic animals and the clans show that 
Melanesian cultures are aware of the unity of the living world. 
The second point of view I want to share with you is the following: Melanesian countries 
have embarked on economic development, and now they have to take up the sustainable 
development challenge; the preservation of their values in a different world is at stake. 
1 Chairman of the Northern Province Assembly, New Caledonia 
2 J-M Tjibaou, Ph Missotte, M Folco, C Rives, Kanake, Melanesien de Nouvelle-Caledonie, Paris: Hachette, 
Editions du Pacifique, 1 976 
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Our nations and our peoples have engaged in economic development at different periods and 
in different ways depending on available resources and our respective histories. Exploiting 
resources and enhancing products '  values are necessary to sustain a development that our 
peoples aspire and are entitled to in order to improve their living conditions through access to 
jobs and income generated by these activities. 
But as our economic development started later than in other parts of the world, we must and 
we can rise to the challenge of avoiding the ecological mistakes made, often through 
ignorance, by the countries that are now developed, and at the same time we must preserve 
the exceptional natural diversity of our islands even as we retain the traditional values of our 
culture. Our islands are a precious heritage that our ancestors have handed down to us. They 
are at the same time an asset with regard to economic development in some industries, and 
most importantly tourism. 
The danger is not really our conscious giving up of our culture, an essential element of our 
identity, but actually the fact that we accept more or less implicitly the notion that the 
economic world is a different, globalized world, with our culture having nothing to say about 
it. In that case, the issues of economic development would be disregarded and lost amid 
concerns for sustainable development resulting from our cultures; and because we are 
fascinated by the urgency of development, we would either consider that preserving the 
environment is a useless luxury - accepting places where custom is preserved and others 
where development is chaotic - or view sustainable development as just part of a concept 
which is alien to our culture, and our culture having nothing to say about it. If so, as 
Melanesians following our tradition we would be respectful of the environment, but as Homo 
Economicus we would be unmindful of the concerns caused by sustainable development. 
While sustainable development is dependent on science and technology, it is also a matter of 
mindset - and everybody is currently aware of that in the world' s  most developed regions. 
Since our culture prompts us to respect nature and therefore to have concern for sustainable 
development, let us rely on it to rise to the modem challenge of sustainable development. For 
that matter, this is more generally the challenge that our cultures have to take up. We must 
not repudiate any of our values but we must apply them to a new world, failing which they 
would turn into something like a mere enclave in our lives. 
I do believe that our objectives must be to preserve in our countries the exceptional level of 
natural diversity - biodiversity - and to raise the standard of living of our peoples in a 
sustainable way while being true to the values of our culture which is - and this is an asset -
traditionally endowed with the environmental value that industrialized countries are 
discovering belatedly because they are urged on by the pressure of circumstance.  
Thus - and this is the third idea I would like to submit - we in Melanesia must act without 
further delay in order not to lose the battle of sustainable development. 
Time is of the essence. In some of our countries the damage is already significant, as they are 
going through a rapid industrialization and urbanization process. The development of New 
Caledonia, which has relied on nickel since World War II, is an example. Damage caused to 
the environment and biodiversity is colossal, and as a result, people are now aware of it. 
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Techniques for management and exploitation of mineral resources are being developed to 
allow a better preservation of still extant biological resources but also to develop nickel, a 
non-renewable resource, in a more sustainable way so it could go on securing the country' s  
development. 
For this development to be sustainable, it has become urgent to incorporate the environmental 
values which underlie our Oceanian and Melanesian culture into the laws that regulate these 
activities and the urban development schemes. 
So please allow me to state again the objectives we must achieve in the matter of sustainable 
development and put forward some clues for success in our undertaking. 
The first objective is to keep a high level of biodiversity in Melanesia. 
This requires, first of all, being familiar with the present condition of biodiversity. From this 
standpoint, it is essential to: 
• Assess current knowledge about biodiversity in each country. There is a great deal of 
data, but it is often held by researchers and not always shared in a way that people 
would readily understand 
• Map biodiversity in every region; this is perhaps expensive but essential. It has been 
already done by BRGM [Bureau of Mineral and Geological Research] for mining 
sites in New Caledonia and French Guyana, for example 
• Complement this research with assessments covering the different areas. If rapid 
assessments are requested from international organizations such as Conservation 
International (CI)3 for example, authorities could require this organization to 
cooperate with well-established scientific institutions; some of these already operate 
in the region. 
Maintaining a high level of biodiversity in our countries must also be achieved through the 
promotion of the Agreement on Biological Diversity. In this connection, I think it is worth 
assessing the way this agreement is implemented. All Melanesian countries are parties to it, 
and as far as I know, those that signed it and as of now have completed their national 
strategies and action plans are the following: 
• Vanuatu ( 1 999) 
• Fij i  ( 1 997) 
• France (2004) for the Pacific territories and countries 
• Papua New Guinea (2007) 
• The Solomon Islands are reportedly working out their first national strategies and 
action plans. 
3 Conservation International is a non-profit organization seeking to protect biodiversity 'hot spots' .  It was set up 
in 1 987 and headquartered in Washington, D.C. It has a staff of over 900. 
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In particular, we must examine how Article 8J of the Agreement on Biological Diversity is 
implemented. This article relates both to access to genetic resources and sharing of 
advantages and to the protection of traditional knowledge. Regional cooperation with a view 
to implementing the Agreement could result, for example, in a common research laboratory 
for active molecules or in setting up - why not at the level of Melanesia? - a 'Conservatory 
of nature and local knowledge' .  
Lastly, I believe that the promotion and development of ecotourism can also be an important 
vehicle for biodiversity preservation and protection. In this way, the sale and trade in species 
protected by the Washington Agreement such as corals or endangered plants like wild orchids 
could be prohibited. Our customs officers could be better trained in recognizing protected 
species so they can prevent their export. 
The second objective, to which, in my opinion, Melanesian countries should aim, is one 
that makes sure our peoples' behaviour takes account of sustainable development. 
To this end, education is surely one of the best methods. In J-M Tjibaou' s  words, 'When 
walking in a garden while unable to tell a salad from a weed you' ll tread both the salad and 
the weed. Insofar as somebody explains to you what they are used for, you are more careful' .4 
We must use appropriate training to inform our elected officials, our decision-makers and 
people in authority about the possibilities that are available to us if we make up our mind to 
develop a sustainable economy taking the environment into consideration, and we must make 
those people aware of the consequences - especially the consequences on public health - that 
will result if the 'environment' component is not taken into account. 
We must start awareness-raising actions among newsmen and work out educative programs 
and play activities with local media. 
With the help of educative programs adapted to the culture of each country, people must be 
taught at all levels about getting familiar with ecology, and we must teach very young 
children the right steps. 
Another significant undertaking seems to be fighting the greenhouse effect. 
This concern leads us first to reconsider our energy policies. I think we are so far gone that it 
is becoming essential for our countries to base their respective national energy self­
sufficiency policies on the use of renewable energies . In this regard, it would be useful if 
each country in the area set up an inventory of its renewable energy resources, of its 
production capacity and of the required training needs for the purpose of operating and 
maintaining its equipment and its infrastructures for the production of renewable energy. In 
this respect, New Caledonia could share its experience. 
But the fight against the greenhouse effect also requires using modes of transportation that 
cause much less pollution. 
4 J-M Tjibaou, La Presence kanak, Paris : Editions Odile Jacob, 1 996, p 324 
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Our countries could set up plans and incentive measures favouring the importation and use of 
clean 'ecological' vehicles, notably in public transit. Fiji ,  whose soil lends itself to sugarcane 
growing, could be a bio-fuel producer. There is, however, one caveat - while bio-fuel is 
better than fuel obtained from oil, the environmental costs of producing bio-fuel from 
sugarcane must be lower than if oil were used. 
Finally, fighting the greenhouse effect involves our housing policies. In this area, it is not too 
unrealistic to think that our regulations could include provisions with requirements for any 
housing project: 
• Mandatory use of the HQE standard (environmental high quality), or its Anglo­
American equivalent, in the matter of building orientation, the use of renewable 
energies and the sorting of household waste. 
• A mandatory impact study taking into account biodiversity and the carbon print of a 
project. This implies common training for those involved on the condition that 
language problems are solved. 
Waste processing is also a concern, and we should strive to change our populations ' 
behaviour for the better. Imported merchandise generates waste. Our suppliers could be 
' invited' to produce more environmentally-friendly packaging. Recyclable packaging uses 
fewer raw materials and will always be cheaper to manufacture; besides, it would cut the cost 
of transportation to our countries. 
The question of waste treatment itself is a very complex one. Setting up a garbage collection 
network is often made more difficult and more costly on account of isolation and the distance 
between homes. But the growing urbanization of Melanesia and the change in consumers ' 
habits must prompt us to take care of this issue in a more proactive way. 
Through education and training, we have to deal now with the garbage sorting system and, 
wherever such a thing is feasible, set up the appropriate systems and plans. We are aware that 
waste treatment requires very heavy investments which are often too much for our national 
budgets. Unless each country can afford such investments to treat its waste on site in 
appropriate volumes, it is possible, as part of the cooperation process, to conclude agreements 
allowing trash treatment in recycling centres in the region' s industrialized countries. 
While the theory is a simple one, it always seems too costly. But do people know how much 
it costs to bum waste or dump it into landfills? In Melanesia we need a financial assessment 
and the carbon print of this practice. 
The last concern on which I believe it is important to take action in order to bring a change in 
our peoples ' behaviour is that of the preservation of water as a resource. 
This is a must for our island countries. It is essential to have a better knowledge of our water 
resources, and especially of water quality, in order to be able to manage it in a rational way, 
to limit waste, and master water-use to serve the fundamental needs of the population and 
development needs. 
43 
The New Pacific Review 
Educating people is necessary because water is vital for life; otherwise, sustainable 
development would not mean anything in our countries. 
Ladies and gentlemen, these are the ideas that I wished to share with you this morning, and in 
answer to the query, 'Which sustainable development for Melanesia? ' ,  I would be inclined to 
say, in closing, that Melanesia should let it be known that it wants to: 
• Preserve the quality of natural diversity, of local knowledge and culture, while 
developing them. 
• Promote economic development that is subjected to environmental standards. 
If we make ourselves aware of these common problems, if we exchange solutions and then 
reach a more structured cooperation, we make significant breakthroughs. 
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9 . Melanesia,  law and u nion : customs 
Laurent Chassot 1 
Projecting modem law into the Melanesian traditional systems has made it possible to point 
out four sources of law: legislation, imposed by authorities and applied to all; case law, set up 
by judges; legal theory, propounded by jurists; and custom.2 However, 'no document gives a 
definition of custom or delimits the extent within which it is to be enforced, its rules of 
procedure, or the system that applies in case customary rules conflict. [ . . .  ] Writings are also 
silent on being or not part of a customary group . ' 3 (Tabani, 1 995) What is the content of 
custom, and how do we characterize it in a multidisciplinary process? 
Custom can first of all be viewed as a research area for anthropologists, where populations 
are approached from outside in order to incorporate their laws into imported systems. Custom 
regulates social life in most agricultural self-sufficient societies which are ruled by a local 
leadership but do not have a central government. As components of the judicial system, 
customs make it possible to keep law and order and to settle litigation, taking into account 
interpersonal relationships, the value assigned to the land, or the physical environment of 
individuals. Thus customs are both traditional behavioural standards which can entail 
penalties imposed by one or more members of the community - generally a chief - on the 
local scale, but they also incorporate procedures for litigation settlement. 4 This brings us into 
an area of interest to lawyers. 
To some extent, custom and law are antinomic, because custom is based on criteria -
practice, tradition, observation - that are free from State control. Thus it is considered a 
complex system of relationships in which the law, the economy, management and politics 
commingle and self-manage depending on behavioural changes. Professor Faberon mentions 
the sacred role given to one ' s  word, because 'the customary world is a world of solidarity 
1 Teaching Assistant, Paris I University 
2 J Vanderlinden, 'Le Juriste et la coutume, un couple impossible? ' Centre Scientifique et Medical de 
l 'Universite Libre de Bruxelles, in Actes du Cinquantenaire du Cemubac, Brussels, 1 998, p 250 
3 The definition of custom in Dictionnaire de l 'ethnologie et de l 'anthropologie does mention a few features of 
custom ( 'a practice based on routine, and which is not mandatory'), but this definition has too many flaws. P 
Bonte and M Izard, eds, Dictionnaire de l 'ethnologie et de l 'anthropologie, 2nd ed., Paris: PUF, Collection 
Quadrige, 2007, p 1 82 
4 H Gire, 'Custom is used between individuals and the groups they belong to, . . .  as well as through litigation 
settlement' ,  in 'La Coutume en Nouvelle-Caledonie ' ,  RJP, 7, 200 1 ,  p 499 
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experienced by individuals . ' 5 The content of customary law, however, remains ' fuzzy' -
while people are vaguely aware that it is part of the heritage, 'depending on immediate 
personal interest' ,6 it is not really about clear and precise practices; it is merely a traditional 
practice.7 
Therefore there is an issue about its ' existence, its persistence despite so many conflicting 
currents . . .  and about the problems it poses to a conception of law which is opposed to the 
very notion of custom. '8 How often are customs actually used in litigation settlement, and is 
their preservation warranted at the present time? To what extent do they show recognition for 
legal standards? The exercise of endogenous law implies that people are sure it is both real 
and valid, so they can contemplate its incorporation into the modem legal system, and these 
criteria are often difficult to determine. 
The major hurdle that customs have to face stem from their peculiar nature. Their 
enforcement is not the same across a given territory because they vary considerably 
depending on where people are. Besides, it is possible to contend that value systems in the 
imported law and those in the non official law are incompatible - unusual notions such as 
individualism or globalization threaten the traditional balance and make contradictions seem 
irreconcilable. In this paper I will first analyse the role that custom still plays with regard to 
the evolution of law in Melanesia (I), and then study its delicate incorporation into the legal 
system of the region's countries, which endangers it and jeopardizes its future (II) . 
I. Custom as a component of ordinary law in Melanesia 
A. Custom as such 
Custom includes local practices, the behaviour of a group and anything that is opposed to 
colonialism. According to Keesing, it is when they faced colonial powers that Oceanian 
peoples were prompted to 'externalize the vision they had of their own culture' .  9 Therefore, 
custom is made up of 'the pre-colonial rights as they are still enforced by the populations ' 
outside formal institutions. It is different from customary law, which does not have the same 
meaning. Customary law is a framework of rules governing behaviour, 'pre-colonial rights 
recognized by the law' . 1 0  So customary law includes indigenous law as modified by case law 
and/or the successive codes, but the border line between the two is always difficult to 
determine. Customary law must also be distinguished from local law - ' law that is inspired 
5 J-Y Faberon, Evolution du droit et coutume autochtone dans les Etats et territoires du Pacifique, Paris: 
L 'Harmattan, 1 995, p 14 
6 R Calinaud, Evolution du droit et coutume autochtone dans les Etats et territoires du Pacifique, Paris: 
L 'Harmattan, 1 995, p 1 62 
7 E Le Roy, Les Africains et ! 'Institution de la Justice, entre mimetismes et metissages, Paris: Dalloz, coll. 'Etats 
de droits. Serie Regard sur la justice ' ,  2004, p 98 
8 Faberon, p 1 3  
9 E Witterscheim, 'Au-dela de l a  tradition' ,  in L a  Tradition e t  l 'Etat, 200 1 ,  p 1 4 ,  quoting RM Keesing, 'Kastom 
in Melanesia: a theoretical overview' ,  in RM Keesing and R Tonkinson, eds, Reinventing traditional culture: 
the politics of Kastom in Melanesia, Mankind Special Issue, 1 3  (4), pp 297-30 1 ,  p 30 1  
10  J Vanderlinden, 'A la rencontre de quelques conceptions du pluralisme juridique' ,  Revue de Droit de McGill 
(50) 2005, p 14 
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by the State model' - and from popular law - 'which came about outside of State authority' -
which are mere additional law sources. 1 1  
Custom's  existence is predicated on the concurrence of several features :  
• It  must be used repeatedly and on a permanent basis, which makes for some 
reliability. It must allow reciprocal procedures and be spontaneous so State agents are 
not needed; 
• It must be coercive; 
• It must be used universally and people subjected to it must enjoy self-rule. 
Norbert Rouland adds another feature: custom must have some 'plasticity ' ,  i .e., it must be on 
the move, because it is not just an archaeological testimony from the past. ' Jacques 
Vanderlinden adds that custom being found in individuals '  gestures and movements is neither 
oral nor written, but definitely predicated on actions. 'As a result, only through protracted 
observation of the group within which it is practiced can it be known directly without a 
mediating agent. The group members learn it themselves through practice, all along their 
lives through observation, and it sinks in gradually. '  Thus a knowledge of custom can be 
acquired continually, and when one has reached a certain age, 'one is familiar with the law 
that governs life ' .  1 2 
It is the issue of societies ' ability to conceptualize non-written traditional standards 
predicated on action and to identify them in a context that is peculiar to the Pacific region that 
will hold our attention, for this problem represents an exceptional sociological challenge, as 
we must always bear in mind the fact that Melanesian societies are founded on community­
based values in a limited area, where the impact of modern knowledge is still insignificant. 
Nowadays endogenous law remains one of the fuzziest and least understood components of 
the judicial system. Custom is not made up of general and impersonal standards and is not 
conceived of as a body of codified rules. Besides, it has no case law or theory. Nevertheless, 
customary standards will lay down the principles governing the activity and community life 
of the overwhelming majority of the region's  inhabitants. These standards are flexible enough 
to evolve according to behavioural changes. 
Besides, customary law operates in a well-nigh self-contained manner, and as a result, formal 
law enforcement officials - the police, the courts, lawyers, judges - are powerless and unable 
to enforce it and interfere in the way it operates. 1 3 
The influence of customary law remains a structural one because tradition is still inescapable. 
Rights and duties are still under the control of custom, which affects interpersonal 
relationships within all strata of the island populations. Each group has its own body of 
11 A Lajoie, op. cit., p. 686, picking up E Le Roy's analysis in his Encyclopediejuridique de l 'Afrique ( 1 982). 
1 2 J Vanderlinden, 'Contribution en forme de mascaret a une theorie des sources du droit au depart d'une source 
delicieuse' ,  RTDciv, 1 995, p 69 
13 M Ntumy, 'The Dream of a Melanesian Jurisprudence: The Purposes and Limits of Law Reform', in J Aleck 
and J Rannells, eds, Custom at the Crossroads, UPNG Law School, 1 994, pp 7- 1 9  
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' rules' ,  which are binding, and breaking the rules leads to local penalties. As a result, 
customary rights vary from group to group depending on various factors such as ' language, 
proximity, origin, history, . . .  or the economy' . 1 4 Yet, customary law will always adjust ' to 
new facts and different circumstances ' .  It is recognized and it will develop depending on 
social behaviour. 
This process fits into a dual perspective: 
• Protecting society through ancestral customs, which guarantee the physical integrity 
of individuals ; 
• Settling of litigation, but always while seeking group satisfaction in order to restore 
societal balance.  
That is why customary practice 'must be deemed essential by the group' . 1 5  
In  case of litigation, the customary process i s  gradual and measured: 
• First of all, it is important to identify the individual(s) who broke the rules within the 
group, both the victim and his/her family, the family of the accused, and the people 
who stand between the two families, so they can act as mediators; 
• The next step consists of identifying the customary standards that apply, given the 
nature of the infraction, the facts and circumstances of the case, etc. To this end, 
chiefs must be resorted to, as they are the only ones to determine the applicable 
customs accurately; 
• Last, a negotiation or mediation starts between the families in a broad sense. To put 
an end to the conflict, they may decide on compensation, public apologies or penalties 
in kind of all sorts. 
Etienne Le Roy singles out four arguments to vindicate custom: 
• The diminished part the law plays in drawing up law; 
• The importance of consensus to secure its effectiveness; 
• The dependence of the ruling powers on opposition forces; 
• Lastly, the concern for keeping the peace. 1 6 
14 P Kuruk, 'Le Droit coutumier africain et la protection du folklore' ,  Bulletin du droit d 'auteur, vol. 36, no. 2 ,  
2002, p 5 
15 E Le Roy, Les Africains et ! 'Institution de la Justice, entre mimetismes et metissages, Paris : Dalloz, coll. 
'Etats de droits. Serie Regard sur la justice ' ,  2004, p 35  
1 6  Le Roy, p 96 
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The writing of constitutions in the different countries in the region1 7  and the subsequent 
setting up of a legislative power - a tool for the standardization of legal norms - has not 
crowded out customary laws. The laws enacted by parliaments in the region' s  young nations 
have a national scope, but customs have survived in many fields where tradition still plays a 
major role, because the pre-existence of endogenous rights which have been firmly fixed for 
generations was implicitly recognized as a given fact. The question arose early as to the 
precise definition of the area to which they would apply and to what domains. These were 
readily confined to private law. Melanesians do not readily distinguish between civil law and 
criminal law and between private and public penalties. ' It is suggested here that what matters 
is not so much the term that designates misdemeanours in a given legal system as the extent 
to which these are recognized and punished as such. ' 1 8 Yet, this recourse to custom remains 
limited and exceptional, since local customary rights that govern these areas of law apply 
only when national legislation is lacking. 
Customary law can be found mostly in the following limited areas : 
• Problems related to landholding, which is of major importance in the South Pacific; 
• Family matters; 
• The settlement of minor litigation; 
• Exceptionally in all criminal issues when sentences are being handed down. 1 9 
B. Traditional penalties as guarantees of respect for customary standards 
Modern society has a system that makes law coercive through judges and law enforcement 
organizations, and it inflicts legal penalties - fines, imprisonment, etc. - whereas customs 
'have no mandatory, intrinsic or ontological character' .20 
Yet, relations within groups lead to 'a  series of laws and obligations for members, and 
members have to abide by those rules and obligations in their relations with other members. 
Compliance with all traditional norms is secured thanks to a system of penalties depending 
on the degree of kinship. ' 2 1 For the overwhelming majority of the region' s  inhabitants, these 
penalties are extremely serious ones because their effects, both unpredictable and 
inescapable, may have a permanent influence on their lives. The traditions that are firmly 
fixed in people ' s  consciousness show a society ruled by custom, but the way it represents law 
17 This observation does not take into account the peculiar status of New Caledonia, which is ruled by the 
French Constitution. Yet, since the Noumea Agreement was signed on 5 May 1 998, New Caledonia has been a 
so-called sui generis community, a part of France, and no longer an overseas community. The Noumea 
Agreement provides for a local referendum between 20 1 4  and 20 1 8  on whether New Caledonia will gain 
independence or remain within the French Republic. 
1 8 T Elias, La Nature du droit coutumier africain, presence africaine, 1 960, p 14 1  (quoted in Le Roy, p 73) 
19 In actual practice, customary law does not make a distinction between civil and criminal law. All through the 
proceedings, there is no reference whatsoever at any time to their civil or penal character. The notion of 
'mitigation' encourages judges to take into consideration the customary penalty before they inflict a criminal 
penalty. In Vanuatu, it can be found in the Island Courts Criminal Procedure Rules, r26. 
20 B Saura, 'Les Regles coutumieres en Polynesie franyaise ' ,  in P De Deckker, Evolution du droit et coutume 
autochtone dans les Etats et territoires du Pacifique, Paris: L 'Harmattan, 1 995, pp 95- 130  
21 Kuruk, p 9  
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evolves, and nowadays it tends toward a process of acculturation in which the change in 
mores and aspirations upsets the system' s balance. There are: 
• Religious sanctions: These are based on 'the concept of the clan viewed as a 
continuum made up both of the living and the dead, all of whom are concerned with 
full compliance with the law. The fear that an ancestor' s  spirit will inevitably inflict 
penalties on offenders secures compliance with the rules of society. When an offense 
has been committed, the offender is earnestly asked to make compensation in order to 
avoid the spiritual punishment that could strike him; ' 22 
• Divine, supernatural punishments: 'Punishments related to superstitions are similar to 
religious sanction, as they too apply when a taboo has been violated. Thus the mere 
mention of a public magic ritual or even the threat of an evil spell can lead to such 
fear of punishment as to prompt the obstreperous to make amends ' ;  
• The notion of group responsibility: The community is essential, so much so that any 
offense committed by a member of a family or a clan will be visited on the 
community. It is a joint responsibility for the action of others in order to guarantee the 
group's  safety. 'Custom's  concern is that the community must not be sacrificed for 
the benefit of the individual. ' (Saura, 1 995) 'The concept deters individuals from any 
senseless wrongdoing given the fundamental belief that any offense committed by 
members of the clan leads to revenge against any of those members. [ . . .  ] Further, this 
rule strengthens the deterring effect of exclusion as a form of punishment, for an 
offender who has been excluded can no longer rely on the support and protection of 
his group . '(Kuruk, 2002) The fear of being rejected from the group is certain to make 
the individual aware that he runs an economic risk if he is separated from his group; 
• Fear of being ridiculed and ostracized: The offender is in danger of losing his status. 
As a result, he is barred from any activity that is linked to life in a community and 
branded until he atones for his offense. 
The cooperation principle is vital to foster social harmony to avert threatening the family, 
and, broadly, the group to which one belongs . One member of the community may happen 
not to abide by any coercive step taken against him despite efforts by traditional authorities to 
pacify relations and settle differences. The chief could therefore convene the whole village in 
order to bring ignominy on the seditious individual. He can also mortgage his lands, and even 
refer the litigation to the formal courts as a last resort. Currently, this premise tends to be 
more common in villages that are in contact with the official judicial system. The reference to 
'modem' law in this instance acts as appellate jurisdiction and reflects the glaring failure of a 
traditional justice in the process of losing its legitimacy. 
II. Custom viewed as a component of an incorporating and unifying dynamics? 
As societies develop, the state emerges as the institution controlling the country at the 
expense of the family, the village or the clan. The direct consequence inherent in this 
22 Kuruk, p 1 0  
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development is that the 'archaic'23 and the new society coexist side by side, just as moral and 
civil order, custom and law intermingle. The issues relating to the incorporation of customary 
law into common law in force in Melanesian countries raise the question of the place 
customary law has now and of its recognition by the judicial system of Melanesian countries. 
The genuine will of lawmakers to assign custom a significant role in the judicial systems of 
Melanesian countries translated into many provisions tending to this end, but traditional 
customs cannot run counter to the fundamental principles stated by the constitution and to 
laws enacted by parliament. Custom would then be a mere substratum of national laws and 
would play only an accessory role to offset the legal voids left by lawmakers. 
Courts of original jurisdiction are the ones most in a position to refer to customary rules 
depending on the facts in the case . Besides, it has been found that it is not easy to access 
lower courts' judgments such as the islands' courts insofar as these judgments are seldom 
printed, unless one party requests printing. There are no archives, no written record of the 
cases that were dealt with and of the rulings handed down by these courts. As a result, it 
proves difficult, if not impossible, to accurately assess the place of customary law and the 
influence it may exert on judicial decisions, as these decisions reflect that influence quite 
poorly. When a file deals with the customary aspect, if this customary issue is not a 
subsidiary one but actually at the heart of the problem, it takes time to analyse and determine 
custom. The judge is not necessarily capable of mastering the ins and out of each custom, and 
therefore he has to lean on customary associate judges. These can help him in his assessments 
and in the way custom is enforced. The cases referred to high courts require a real 
introspection of the customary system, which in practice is very complicated. 
Because there is little encouragement to appeal to conciliation, because of the permanent 
references to English law due to the adversarial nature of debates or the well-nigh systematic 
recourse to British case law - in the case of a legal void - there are formidable obstacles to 
the development of customary law and its inclusion in the legal system. The potential failure 
is caused as much by insufficient financial means as by a restriction of the jurisdiction of the 
lower courts. These structural, institutional or administrative barriers prevent the inclusion of 
customary law in the legal system. 
Yet, the recognition of endogenous law as a source of law incorporated into the judicial 
system serves two major purposes: 
• Respect for customary law, which reflects the significance of this final national 
echelon which is sanctioned by the constitutions of each of the Melanesian states. We 
find that the overwhelming majority of the preambles to the constitutions of the 
Pacific island countries regard traditional values as part of the foundation of the 
nation; 
• The will to incorporate customary law into the legal systems in force in the region. 
23 Not in the sense of decadent but in the old meaning, i.e., opposed to modernity. This is the definition of Le 
Nouveau Petit Robert, Dictionnaire alphabetique et analogique de la langue franr;:aise, Paris, 2004 
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In practice, these objectives have proved very difficult to achieve considering the overall 
peculiar situation that the legal systems have to face. Whenever traditions and standards of 
modern law conflict how are they to be reconciled without offending people? Customary law 
sometimes seems to be impervious to any notion of equality of the sexes or gender equality, 
and the constitutional principles as well as the international standards reasserting those 
principles are systematically torn apart by customary courts. 
For customary law to be valid it needs to meet the dual conditions of certainty and relevance, 
because lacking those, it can be subject to interpretation. The problem stems from the fact 
that customary law is forever changing: How are courts certain they are enforcing the original 
custom? Because they lack transparency, customary norms and procedures are very difficult 
to interpret. Their non-written nature ' includes such a margin of error that it is impossible to 
reach the same level of clarity and precision that is sought in Western legal concepts. The 
lack of precision and the uncertain nature of the rules of customary law are further reinforced 
by the different objectives of the traditional judicial systems, which emphasize negotiation, 
and negotiation in turn leads to a compromise and the reconciliation of the parties, rather than 
to applying hard-and-fast rules to a factual situation. ' 24 
Hence, customary law is enforced by the courts on three conditions to be met concurrently: 
• Customary law must not conflict with a current law; 
• It must not conflict with natural justice, with equity and with good conscience; 
• Most of all, it applies only in the case of a legal void. 
This caution on the part of the courts is necessary in order to diminish the risks inherent in 
customary law. These risks are essentially linked to the great variety of customs, but also, to a 
lesser degree, to witnesses ' prejudice, to ignorance, corruption or repeated abuses by the 
chiefs. So prior to allowing custom to take precedence over common law, it is appropriate to 
establish with full certainty the existence of the custom in question in relation to a given 
factual situation, for populations keep moving and customary law applies to very limited 
geographical zones, and as a result, the rules that are specific to each island or each 
community are not well known. This confusion about the applicable customs and their 
intrinsic nature requires unequivocal evidence of their existence.  The party invoking 
customary law must therefore ' support their petition by assertions and sufficient evidence to 
allow the court to apply customary law' (Kuruk, 2002). Two assumptions exist: 
1 .  Custom can be perceived as a factual given. This means that it is regarded not as an 
element of law but as a mere fact, and that it is up to the victim to state whether he or she 
wishes to claim its existence.  Asserting the existence of the custom entails a dual constraint: 
• For the judges - they must make sure it does exist and is relevant; 
• For those who deal with justice - if they want the customs they invoke to be 
recognized and obeyed they must, if necessary, use indirect means or strategies to 
bring evidence of those customs' existence and substance. 
24 Kuruk, p 24 
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This situation makes customary law subordinate to an adversarial legal system, which is in 
total contradiction to the consensual and community-based values prevailing in Melanesian 
culture. So it is legitimate to understand judges when they are little inclined to favour 
traditional norms, as this is an area they do not master which is very difficult, if not 
impossible to comprehend. Is custom a norm, a value, a practice, or is it merely behaviour? 
How old is it and what is its scope? Does it apply to 1 0, 1 00 or 1 OOO people? The judge, 
through testimony, elders ' intervention or any other mode of evidence (stories, tales, legends, 
etc.) asks the parties to establish the existence of the custom by applying it to the individual 
case. Besides, the fact that custom is action entails uncertainty, and the uncertainty translates 
into wariness on the part of the judge. While the judge may be in a position to be familiar 
with the customs of his village, of his community or his island, he cannot claim to be 
proficient in those of the other tribal groups. Thus, because he is afraid he cannot 
comprehend the custom, he had rather refer to laws enacted by Parliament. Formal law 
affords him the safety and the guarantee of an even and egalitarian justice across the territory, 
a justice that customs tends to weaken. 
2. By contrast, if customary norms are assimilated to rules of law that are well established 
and recognized in the hierarchy of norms, the courts will be in a position to decide whether or 
not to base their decision on a customary 'rule ' rather than on a legal norm. This hypothesis 
implies an undisputed legal certainty as opposed to the fact that customary law relies on 
actions. But the artificial place given it on the hierarchy of norms clearly shows how poorly 
this hypothesis fits in with the political and judicial wills of the last decades. 
At present a conviction is shared in the Melanesian area, namely that a common synergy 
must be set up in terms of identity, economy and law. Notions of collectivism and of 
government assistance fade away by the day and are superseded by individualistic concepts 
dear to our culture. This vanishing of the social fabric makes the islands ' populations more 
and more confused about values and knowledge. Preserving custom is predicated on a 
collective awareness among the states in the region, because custom guarantees the balance 
of Melanesian societies and remains an essential factor allowing them to be close-knit. If 
custom were granted legal validity and a real place in the hierarchy of norms, it would be 
institutionalized and legally recognized so that the Constitution could give it more weight and 
a larger role. The dissimilarities inherent in the current system have to do mainly with the 
lack of the chiefs' commitment to the judicial process, which they deem too far from the 
actual life of the people. The dissimilarities are also about the uncertainty that custom brings 
or about the fact that decisions are imposed, which is contrary to the community-based spirit 
founded on conciliation. To that end, several measures can be contemplated: 
• A more appropriate training for judges and court personnel so they can better 
comprehend custom; 
• Identifying the chiefs who would be specifically part of everyday justice and trained 
in current laws so they are incorporated into the judicial system; 
• Gradual and concerted drafting of the major customary principles across the area, 
which makes for a better recognition; 
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• Setting up a regional case law by sanctioning the landmark decisions based on custom 
so these will be in a position to be used as models for future judgments. 
Alain Sohier considered that custom allows societies to develop freely because it 'affords a 
peculiarity, a soul, and because it adjusts to new situations' .25 Law must take into account 
this development, the populations ' mores, their economic situation, and their aspirations. To 
that end, as noted above, custom enjoys a recognition and a legitimacy peculiar to Melanesia, 
but the perception of a cultural and religious identity is on the decline, as it is confronted with 
an ever-growing Western influence. We are witnessing a gradual erosion of the vitality of 
customary law, and this disintegration can be ascribed to various factors. Customary law, 
which had judicial monopoly for centuries, now has only a secondary place, or maybe an 
illusory one, within normative rules. The difficulty that is associated with its identification, 
the distrust of judges toward custom and the growing place granted to the Western model 
make it more difficult by the day for custom to survive. Custom is now confined to private 
matters and is less influential as days go by; it must innovate if it is to survive.  Therefore it is 
urgent for all players to take concerted action, and me_asures must be contemplated for this 
purpose. That is a prerequisite if Melanesian unity on customary issues is to be achieved. 
25 A Sohier, 'Le Droit coutumier au Congo Beige' ,  in Traite elementaire de droit coutumier du Congo Beige, 
Editions Larcier, 1 954, pp 1 - 1 5  
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1 0 . Democratic i ntervention , Bi ketawa and the 
2006 Fij i Mi litary coup 
Richard Herr 1 
Introduction 
On 5 December 2006, Commodore Voreqe (Frank) Bainimarama ordered the Republic of Fiji 
Military Forces to depose the Government of Laisenia Qarase. This was the fourth coup in 
Fiji since 14 May 1987.2 The 'events of December 2006 ' ,  as this military coup is frequently 
described locally, set in train a series of international responses to restore parliamentary 
democracy in Fiji .  Regional relationships have been a significant factor in organising and 
legitimating the reaction of the international community. The region's  leadership through 
their principal political association, the Pacific Islands Forum, took the lead in imposing 
sanctions under the Biketawa Declaration. Although the international reaction to the 2006 
coup was based on the specific circumstances of that event, the strength of feeling was 
undoubtedly grounded in long standing images, both within and outside the region, of the 
presumed fragility of the Melanesian states, which had originally led to this Declaration. In 
particular, there is a perception that the maintenance of democracy is an ongoing challenge 
within these developing economies where state building remains a critical priority. This paper 
considers the role of the regional community and its approach to the restoration of 
parliamentary democracy in Fiji as a facet of contemporary Melanesian politics. Particularly 
important to this assessment are the grounds provided by the regional system for democratic 
intervention by imposing sanctions on the military-backed interim Government to promote 
the restoration of democracy in Fiji .  
The Biketawa Declaration by the leaders of the Pacific Islands Forum broke significant new 
ground with regard to the protection of democratic values within the South Pacific region and 
perhaps even globally when first promulgated in 2000. Since the end of the Cold War in1 989, 
there has been increased worldwide emphasis on 'good governance' in aid relationships. 
While, the concept of good governance has caused some controversy both with regard to its 
intent and its impact, there have been aspects of the concept that support important elements 
of democracy. However, coups in Fiji and Solomon Islands in 2000 provoked the Forum 
leadership to go further in asserting protection of civic values by drafting the Biketwawa 
1 Honorary Research Associate, School of Government, University of Tasmania and Adjunct Professor of 
Pacific Governance and Diplomacy, Centre for International and Regional Affairs, University of Fiji 
2 The first coup was conducted on 14 May 1 987 by Lt Col Sitiveni Rabuka and was wholly a military affair. The 
second occurred on 25 September 1 987 when recently promoted Brigadier Rabuka intervened again when he 
believed the draft arrangements under the Deuba Accord did not go far enough to guaranteeing Fijian control of 
the country. The third, on 19 May 2000, began as a civilian attempt to seize power but was later aided by rebel 
military forces. 
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Declaration to add 'democracy' to regional obligations. Since then, the Declaration has been 
used by members of the regional community as a basis for non-coercive intercession in Papua 
New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, Nauru, Tonga and Fiji .  Nevertheless, the application of 
the Biketawa-based sanctions against post 2006 Fij i  is substantially different in character 
from other regional usages. The intercessions in the other cases were with the compliance of 
the affected states sometimes regarded as 'cooperative intervention' ,  at least by Australia, the 
country that has been in the vanguard on these occasions . 
The current sanctions against Fij i  are imposed against the wishes of Fiji and not based on the 
cooperative engagement with the interim Government. Indeed, the interim Government of 
Commodore Bainimarama has repeatedly railed against the sanctions and sought their 
removal or, if this was not forthcoming, a reduction in their severity. Yet, it is especially 
evident in the wake of the 2008 Niue Forum that support amongst the Forum Island countries 
(FICs) for maintenance of the sanctions has only strengthened. The substantial nature and 
duration of the sanctions regime against Fij i  raise significant questions about these measures 
at a number of levels. What legitimates the sanctions as a form of democratic ' intervention' ?3 
Is the international community supporting democracy or merely the return of the previous 
Government? Are the sanctions fair? And, are they prudent in terms of a politically cost 
effective intercession? These four questions on the influence external actions including the 
suite of sanctions and their value to the restoration of parliamentary democracy in Fij i  
provide the primary framework for the following analysis. 
Setting the scene: simplified complexity 
This short paper cannot present a complete review of the events leading up to 5 December 
2006. Thus, given the complexity of these events and the contested status of claimed 'facts ' ,  
the following should be  regarded as  an attempt at a brief setting of  the scene. 4 The 
Government of Laisenia Qarase was installed as the result of a coup in May 2000 that 
attempted to overturn the election of Fij i ' s  first Indo-Fijian Prime Minister, Mahendra 
Chaudhry, a year earlier. The tortured path and the basis for its ascension to power are as 
complex as they were disputed. At least two critical features of these events impacted on the 
events of 2006 through their influence on Commodore Bainimarama. The disloyalty of the 
troops who mutinied in November 2000 and attempted to kill him made Bainimarama deeply 
suspicious of the sway of ultra-nationalist politicians and led him to demand an oath of 
personal loyalty to him by the senior officers. Those who did not accept this condition were 
purged early in 2004.5 This purge appears to have been fairly effective as a civilian-based 
attempt to remove Bainimarama in weeks before the coup failed in the face of military 
3 The word ' intervention' as used in this work is used more broadly and in a conventional sense, which is 
probably closer in meaning to the word ' intercession' than in the more restrictive, limited international legal 
usage which implies a coercive intrusion into the internal affairs of a state. 
4 An extended coverage of the events leading up to, and culminating in, the 2006 coup can be found in: Jon 
Fraenkel and Stewart Firth, eds, From election to coup in Fiji: The 2006 campaign and its aftermath, IPS 
Publications University of the South Pacific and Asia Pacific Press, The Australian National University, 2007 
published electronically at: http://epress.anu.edu.au/fiji/pdf/whole_book.pdf. 
5 Fraenkel and Firth, op. cit., p. 35 .  
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solidarity.6 Secondly and more importantly in motivational terms, these series of events 
served as a ' learning curve ' that appears to have entrenched in Bainimarama's  mind a 
personal responsibility for the actions of the Government he put into power. He undertook a 
close watching brief on the Qarase Government and increasingly felt alarm at the direction it 
began to take shortly after he installed it. 
Rumours of Bainimarama' s  dissatisfaction with the Qarase Government emerged publicly 
from 2003 and deepened in succeeding years. The military campaigned against this 
Government' s  return in the May 2006 elections and was seriously disappointed when Qarase 
won by one seat in results deemed by some to have been suspicious . Civilian critics also 
regarded the Qarase Government's agenda as having swung around to Speight 's  ultra­
nationalist objectives and that these were basically racist (tending toward the 'apartheid')  in 
their aims. Bainimarama had a number of specific areas of grievance. He believed that the 
Qarase Government had been too merciful to those involved in the 2000 coup and indeed 
allowed some back into public life prematurely. He was strongly opposed to proposed 
legislation, the Reconciliation Tolerance and Unity Bill, which would formalise this. 
Similarly, Bainimarama saw in the Qoliqoli Bill and the Land Tribunal Bill as advancing the 
ultra-nationalist agenda of the 2000 coup plotters. Indeed, the Qarase Government had 
already presided over the return of a small but politically significant amount of land into the 
indigenous Fijian land system. It passed legislation in 2002 that had the effect of increasing 
Fijian ownership of land from 84 to 87 per cent thus positioning Qarase to build on his ultra­
nationalist base and extend his support amongst Fijian voters for the 2006 general elections.7 
These factors and a perception that cronyism and corruption characterised the Qarase 
Government led Bainimarama to present his action in overthrowing the Government as a 
'clean-up campaign' ,  or, in the view of others, as a counter-coup, to restore Fiji to democratic 
order and one that would be non-racial in its character. 8 This argument was to be an 
important factor it the post-coup Government' s  reaction to the international sanctions. 
However, as critics point out, Bainimarama was accused of sedition and was facing charges 
prior to coup so his motives for acting were considered suspect. The divide within Fiji 
regarding the complicated path to the December 2006 coup has driven so deeply into 
contemporary Fij i  that it would be difficult to find anyone who did not prefer one 
interpretation of the circumstances to the other. And yet, the perception of whether there was 
just cause for the coup profoundly influences the willingness to find justice in the subsequent 
sanctions under democratic intervention. 
The international status of democratic intervention 
Historically the state as a sovereignty was deemed to have virtually complete autonomy 
internally; a norm of international law known as the doctrine of non-intervention. Over the 
6 In October 2006 Prime Minister Qarase persuaded President Iloilo to sack the Commander and replace him 
with Colonel Saubuliniyau while Bainimarama was overseas but Saubuliniyau declined the Presidential 
nomination when his brother officers backed Bainimarama. 
7 Biman C Prasad and Clem Tisdell, Institutions, Economic Performance and Economic Development: A Case 
Study of the Fiji Islands, New York: Nova Science Press, 2006, pp 8 1 -82 
8 See, for example, Serafina Qalo and Reijeli Kikau, 'Fiji army sets new demand deadline' ,  The Fiji Times 
Online, 22 November 2006, http://www.fijitimes.com/story.aspx?id=5209 1 
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years since the Peace of Westphalia in 1 648,  the doctrine of non-intervention has proved 
neither absolute nor unchanging. However, the establishment of the United Nations in 1 945 
has significantly revised the degree to which the doctrine could allow a state to remain 
inviolate within its own borders. Threats to international security (including an ill-defined 
notion of 'good order')  can give rise to international authorisation, normally through the 
Security Council, to circumvent the general norm of non-intervention. Potentially more 
limiting to the concept of non-intervention is a new principle known as the 'responsibility to 
protect' .  The case for embracing the new principle was made in a report of the same name by 
the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty in 200 1 sponsored by 
the Canadian Govemment.9 The 2005 World Summit endorsed the concept and in 2006 the 
Security Council passed a resolution reaffirming elements of the World Summit ' s  statement 
regarding the obligation of states to protect their own people from crimes against humanity. 
Essentially, the concept argues that every state has an obligation to its own members to 
provide some fundamental protections from abuse including from the state itself. The basis 
for the responsibility to protect hangs on a view that sovereignty is a 'gift' of the international 
community. Thus, the international community has a right and, even more a duty, to protect 
people from their own Government if necessary by coercive international humanitarian 
intervention. Although it is not yet a norm of international law, the growing positive response 
to the concept of a 'responsibility to protect' demonstrates the change in attitude by the 
international community toward restricting the doctrine of non-intervention when human 
rights are violated. In time, its logic could come to be used to support a stronger and more 
general validation of the concept of democratic intervention. 
Nevertheless, democratic intervention is not yet a component of the somewhat better 
established principles of humanitarian intervention. 1 0 While it is true that there are 
international treaties that assert elements of rights that support democracy and political rights, 
these have not coalesced into agreed international norms nor do they provide guaranteed 
rights for international intervention to protect them. Thus, bases for democratic intervention 
are even less clear and less well implemented than for the inconsistently applied norms for 
humanitarian intervention. And, as with humanitarian intervention, there is arguably an issue 
of timing since the 'ounce of prevention' would be worth much more than the 'pound of 
cure ' if early intercession were possible. A preventative engagement to preserve an existing 
democracy, albeit fraught with myriad practical complexities, could be easier to achieve than 
restoring one overthrown by a coup. It would be necessary to know that the external 
influences were forestalling a coup rather than merely interfering in the internal affairs of a 
sovereign and democratic state, of course, just as it would be to identify the precise moment 
to intervene. There are relative few clear cases where the opportunity for a pre-coup 
intervention could be made out. One such occasion was the Solomon Islands in early 2000. 
Had Prime Minister Bart Ulu'falu' s  request to Australia for a small number of police to 
stabilise the situation in Honiara been honoured before the June 2000 coup there, the coup 
9 Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun, 'The Responsibility to Protect' ,  Foreign Affairs, Vol.  8 1 ,  November/ 
December 2002, pp 99- 1 1 0  
1 °  For a survey o f  these issues, see Morton H .  Halperin and Mirna Galic, eds, Protecting Democracy: 
International Responses, Lexington Books, 2005 
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may have never occurred. If successful, a modest pre-coup intercession might have obviated 
the damage of the following three years and the vast expense of the RAMS I intervention. 
Public opinion often appears to be in front of the international legal practice with regard to 
democratic intervention, at least in western democracies. Increasingly, the public appears 
willing to accept, and even expect, that the international community will react to resist anti­
democratic coups. Perhaps this explains why so many in democratic states appear to believe 
that 'democratic intervention' is self-justifying and so reactions to anti-democratic coups 
should be automatic. Both opinion and international practice tend to be limited, however, to 
restoring overturned democracies rather than intervening to impose democracy where it was 
not previously present. This orientation now may be more accentuated in the public ' s  mind 
especially since the neo-conservative debacle in Iraq and a broader awareness that 
democracy, as a system, can be restored much more easily than it can be imposed. Overall, 
for the present, the reality is that there is no international norm for democratic intervention 
and, consequently, there is considerable inconsistency in the response of the international 
community to specific anti-democratic events raising doubts about the legitimacy of such 
intervention. 
Legitimating democratic intervention in Fiji 
While the general international basis for democratic intervention may be ambiguous, the 
regional sanctions against Fij i ' s  interim Government do rest on more solid political, if not 
legal, foundations. Current regional sanctions against Fij i  appear based largely on the 
Forum's  'Biketawa Declaration' ,  which asserts a claim to, and provides a procedure for, 
democratic intervention. Under the Declaration issued by the Forum in the wake of the events 
in Fij i  and the Solomons in 2000, the Forum leaders committed themselves inter alia to, 
'upholding democratic processes and institutions ' . 1 1  The Declaration also contains options for 
sanctions including ' if necessary, targeted measures ' .  Since 2000, the Biketawa Declaration 
has been used as a basis for military and police intercessions in the Solomon Islands and to a 
lesser extent elsewhere in the region. It has been employed as well to legitimate monitoring 
activities in support of good governance. Nonetheless, the Biketawa Declaration, being a 
declaration, is essentially a diplomatic statement of agreement not a treaty. Thus, it does not 
carry legal weight but rather is a political agreement amongst the Forum members. The non­
legal status of the Biketawa does not lessen its political force but it means any activities 
carried out in its name are acts of political will not legal obligation. 
Just how legitimate this makes the Biketawa sanctions is open to speculation. States can 
impose sanctions as acts of 'retaliation' or retorsion that serve as a penalty for some 
offending action against the state imposing the sanction. These activities are not illegal acts 
but are 'unfriendly' even if there is presumed cause. Nevertheless, the use and value of 
sanctions of this type very much depend on power relationships irrespective of their 
legitimacy in international law and politics. The powerful can impose sanctions with little 
risk since retaliation with counter-sanctions or other measures would be imprudent and 
impractical . The weak must endure their imposition because they have little or no capacity to 
resist or threaten counter-measures. All the same, the powerful prefer to have their actions 
1 1  http://www.forumsec.org/ _resources/article/files/Biketawa%20Declaration.pdf 
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accepted as legitimate and therefore international authorisation is a useful mechanism for 
reducing the resistance to the use of their strength. Thus, the legitimacy of the regional 
sanctions as a form of democratic intervention under the Biketawa Declaration has been very 
important diplomatically to Australia and New Zealand. Yet, while legitimacy may not be in 
question for the Forum states regarding the sanctions, the fairness of their application may be. 
Sanctions applied 
Following the execution of the coup, Australia and New Zealand reacted swiftly to impose 
the sanctions threatened in the months leading up to December 2006. Amongst the targeted 
measures were ' smart' sanctions inflicting travel bans not only on members of the interim 
Government but on their families as well. The inclusion of family members was particularly 
harsh on a number of accounts . Perhaps most important was that a relatively large number of 
Fiji Islanders have family members living or working abroad in Australia and New Zealand. 
In addition, Fij i  has long placed a high reliance on these two economically advanced 
neighbours for educational and professional training. Thirdly, countries such as the United 
States did not include family members in their travel bans. Links with the RFMF were cut 
and New Zealand' s  Prime Minister Helen Clark sent a request to the United Nations to cease 
using RFMF personnel in its peacekeeping operations. Many, but not all, donors reviewed 
their aid to Fij i  and some programmes or projects were cut, frozen and/or had new conditions 
imposed on them based on a return to democracy or progress in this direction by the interim 
Government. 
The Biketawa Declaration provided the primary justification for Forum members to 
legitimate the regionally based sanctions against the interim Government but its reach was 
not limited to just these states. The United States, the Delegation of the European 
Commission, the Asian Development Bank and other missions and agencies also acted to 
review and restrict their assistance to Fij i  largely in the wake of the regional sanctions. 
However, without the institutional leadership of Australia and New Zealand, none of the 
extra-regional responses were as vigorous as those within Forum framework. Indeed, even 
within the Forum, the sanctions under the Biketawa Declaration were unevenly applied. No 
FIC appears to have applied travel restrictions on Fiji officials or acted independently on any 
regional assistance projects or other activities. As far as the FICs were concerned, the 
primary use of Forum mechanisms under the Biketawa Declaration were those used to 
establish monitoring arrangements including a Fij i-Forum Joint Working Group and Forum 
Ministerial Contact Group to assess compliance and progress toward the restoration of 
parliamentary democracy. These mechanisms were important as part of the regional 
approach, of course, but, critically for the other Forum Island members, these elements of the 
process were not overtly punitive toward Fiji .  They could even be seen as supportive of the 
interim Government insofar as they assisted with the lifting of punitive sanctions in the long 
run. 
Fairness of sanctions: the vulnerability of small states 
As ambiguous as the concept of 'democratic intervention' may be, it is clear that such 
intercession can only be used against small states. Thus, power is always a factor in the 
application of sanctions to support democratic values.  The fact that power determines when 
sanctions in this cause are enforced necessarily undermines their 'fairness' just as it does 
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their consistency. This is not to assert that sanctions to resist anti-democratic coups are unfair 
by definition. Rather, the motives of those willing to apply power to protect democracy need 
to be carefully scrutinised and assessed. The powers applying sanctions need to be mindful of 
their obligations not to use power arbitrarily as much, if not more, than other states in the 
international community that help to legitimate sanctions but are unable to apply them. 
Small island states are vulnerable to international pressure to an extraordinary degree for two 
main reasons. Perhaps the primary basis for this observation is that they have been highly 
dependent on a favourable international climate for their political existence. The reality of 
this became evident in 1 983 when the United States invaded Grenada ostensibly to preserve 
democracy and to protect it from foreign intervention. The action sent shockwaves around the 
globe as the issue of small island state vulnerability became an instant cause celebre for 
international organisations, security analysts and students of sovereignty. Secondly, and very 
pragmatically, the asymmetries of power are a fact of life for the very small. These 
inequalities affect their relations with virtually every other state at every level and in every 
way. 
Since Fij i  is a small state rather than a microstate, 1 2 it is not as vulnerable to external pressure 
as most of its FIC neighbours in general terms. Nevertheless, the interim Government has 
increasingly argued that the FICs' vulnerability has impacted on Fiji through their 
acquiescence in the Forum to sanctions imposed under Biketawa Declaration. The supporters 
of the interim Government as well as the interim Government itself have sought to blame the 
two Forum powers, Australia and New Zealand, for these sanctions. Interim Prime Minister 
Bainimarama made this a theme of his address to the 63rd General Assembly in 2008. 1 3 In 
addition, Fij i ' s  scholarly Acting High Commissioner in Canberra, Kamlesh Arya, attributed 
the use of regional mechanisms to pursue sanctions to 'cheque-book diplomacy' implying 
that the support of the FICs against Fiji was purchased. 14 Prior to the 2008 Niue Forum 
meeting, a contrast was drawn between the Forum statements and the generally more 
supportive line amongst FICs when the two regional powers were not present as, for 
example, at the Melanesian Spearhead Group meeting in May 2008 in Port Vila, Vanuatu. As 
noted above, the interim Government's  complaint against sanctions as being a result of 
Australian and New Zealand pressure through the Forum is not unfounded. Beyond 
monitoring arrangements, the primary sanctions have tended to be bilateral in nature and 
centred on the actions of Australia and New Zealand. Moreover, the energy and effort in 
initiating and promoting both the case for sanctions and sanctions themselves have come 
from the two Australasian states. The uncompromising language used by these two to vilify 
the interim Government and its leadership have not been adopted by FICs even after the 
disappointment of Bainimarama' s  failure to attend the 2008 Niue Forum. 
One of the more significant and provocative misuses of the asymmetry of power, from the 
interim Government' s  perspective, was New Zealand' s  approach to the post Niue Forum 
12 Microstates can be variously defined but this paper uses the 500,000-population benchmark, which basically 
only finds two FICs as being well above microstate status - Fiji and PNG. Another definition, sometimes used 
by the UN sets the threshold at one million, a metric that would include Fiji in the ranks of microstates. 
13 http ://www.fiji.gov.fj/publish/page_l 3023 .shtml 
14 http://www.radioaustralia.net. au/programguide/stories/200808/s234946 l .htm 
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bilateral talks. In 2006, PM Qarase noted the importance of the bilateral talks when 
welcoming participants to the Post Forum Dialogue in Nadi. 1 5  This arrangement had been a 
part of the annual Leaders ' Meeting since the arrangement was inaugurated by the Forum in 
1 989.  Admittance to a partnership relationship was by agreement of the Forum leaders and 
attendance arrangements were administered by the Forum Secretariat and the host 
Government of that year 's  meeting of the Forum. However, at the 2006 Forum it was agreed 
that the following year in Tonga there would a plenary meeting between the Forum and the 
dialogue partners. Nevertheless, a press release by the Forum Secretariat after the 2007 
Forum in Nuku'alofa showed that this plenary mechanism had not replaced the bilateral 
arrangements. It noted that the 'Post Forum Dialogue Partners welcomed the new process of 
engaging with the Pacific Islands Forum as a region and indicated their support in developing 
it further including through strengthened bilateral consultations with the Forum. ' 1 6 New 
Zealand's  offer to provide a venue for the post-Forum bilateral talks but to exclude Fij i  from 
them on the basis that it would only transit visas for Fij i ' s  delegation was a breach the 
meeting practices within the comity of the Forum. These talks were the responsibility of Niue 
and New Zealand' s  assistance was a continuation of the obligations that Niue accepted when 
it agreed to host the 2008 Forum. The interim Government did have a legitimate grievance at 
New Zealand' s  abuse of the Forum process but its critics appeared both unaware of the slight 
and unwilling to accept it as sufficient grounds for Fiji to refuse to attend the Forum. 
Australia 's  Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd, continued the name-calling referring to 
Bainimarama as not being a 'person of substance '  and that his failure to attend was to 
'chicken out' . 1 7  
However, unlike the previous year in Nuku'alofa where Bainimarama was present, the 
Australia and New Zealand criticisms did enjoy some genuine resonance with the FIC 
participants. Whatever reservations there may have been in the strong position taken by the 
two Australasian powers, the general position of the FICs moved genuinely closer to 
Australia and New Zealand after Niue. The interim Government had an opportunity to build 
on a relatively favourable reception at the May 2008 Melanesian Spearhead Group 's  Summit 
where Bainimarama did make an appearance to deliver a strong speech in favour of the 
country' s  right to chart its own path for returning to parliamentary democracy. 1 8 The failure 
to attend, and to confront its critics, has clearly eroded the interim Government' s  standing 
within the Forum and therefore diminished its capacity to challenge the legitimacy of the 
sanctions imposed by the Forum. The consequence for the interim Government is that its 
attempt to play the victim in a regional power play has also been undermined significantly. 
The issue of the asymmetry of power that enabled the pursuit of the sanctions has not been 
sidelined entirely as a result of Bainimarama's  tactical error ofjudgment in absenting himself 
from the Niue Forum but its utility to Fij i  as a foreign policy lever appears less effective. 
1 5  http://www.pacificleadersforum.fiji.gov .fj/news/4 1 .html 
16 http://www.forumsec.org/pages.cfm/newsroom/press-statements/2007 /pif-plenary-with-post-forum-dialogue­
partners.html 
17 http://australianetwork.com/news/stories _ to/2340590.htm 
18 Interim Prime Minister Bainimarama's  address to the MSG summit can be found at 
http://www.fiji .gov.fj/publish/page_l 1988.shtml 
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Pre-emptive intervention:  a failure to act? 
In light of the asymmetrical power relationships within the Pacific Islands region, it might be 
argued that some form of pre-emptive intervention to support democracy in Fiji before the 
events of December 2006 might have been possible and effective. It is always difficult to 
establish that events would have taken a different course had Governments made different 
choices and pursued another course. Certainly, in the case of Fiji ,  there was nothing as 
explicit as there was with regards to the Solomon Islands in 2000. Then the Australian 
Government refused a request for assistance from the Prime Minister Bart Ulu'falu for a 
modest number of police. Had that request been honoured, the need for the massive RAMSI 
intervention three years later might well have been avoided. It is arguable that there were 
opportunities for the regional international community to act to prevent the 2006 coup 
whether any single act or moment could have been decisive is moot. Nevertheless, it is 
arguable that some careful intercession by friendly democratic powers would have been more 
useful than what actually occurred in the years leading up to 2006. 1 9  The Australian 
Government, for example, was well aware of the tensions between Bainimarama and the 
Qarase Government yet it appears that the Howard Government did not attempt to moderate 
Qarase' s  'apartheid' policies despite fears from 2003 of a coup by the Commander of the 
RFMF due to his opposition to these policies. Some critics have even intimated that there are 
grounds to believe Australia contributed to growing tensions between Fiji  police and the 
RFMF in 2006 through political interference. Certainly the RFMF felt the warnings by the 
two Australasian powers that it would lose its UN peacekeeping opportunities if it overthrew 
the Qarase Government. Concern that these Governments were far more anxious to prevent a 
coup than serve as intermediaries willing to broker an acceptable solution to Fij i ' s  domestic 
political impasse was confirmed for senior members of the RFMF when, days before the 
coup, three Western ambassadors - Australia, UK and US - allegedly attempted to foment 
military mutiny during a visit to Queen Elizabeth Barracks while Bainimarama was absent in 
New Zealand at an ill-fated last ditch meeting with Qarase.20 
If the diplomatic efforts to avert the December 2006 coup were relatively weak, other steps 
actually appeared to raise tensions. The RFMF was suspicious of some of the activities by 
external powers prior to the coup some of which they regarded as intimidation or even pre­
positioning to forestall a coup. Australia brought additional military resources into Suva 
shortly before the coup. This was subsequently attacked as heightened tensions by pre­
positioning an intelligence capacity to assist Australian troops if needed to counter a military 
overthrow.2 1 Another focus for complaint was the sending of a small naval contingent to the 
area. More than 800 navy, air force and army personnel were sent as a taskforce made up of 
the HMAS Kanimbla, HMAS Newcastle and HMAS Success to waters near Fiji by the 
Australian Government in early November 2006. The RFMF regarded the presence as a show 
of strength that was intended to intimidate. However, Canberra maintained that it was merely 
prudent preparation by having an immediate capacity to evacuate Australian citizens should 
19 RA Herr, 'External Influences and the 2006 Fiji Military Coup' ,  Harvard Asia Pacific Review, Vol. 9 no. 1 ,  
2007' pp 1 0- 13  20 This intention is hotly denied by the W estem powers involved and they have argued that their purpose for the 
visit has been mischievously misrepresented. The visit was merely to ascertain whether there was to be a 
military coup. 
21 http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2008/04/02/2206 1 63 .htm 
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the need arise. Tragically, a Blackhawk helicopter training accident on the HMAS Kanimbla 
cost the lives of two Australian servicemen during this exercise. 22 
Do sanctions support democracy or the previous government? 
The issue of whether the post-coup sanctions are intended to support democracy generally or 
are acts of subversion to support the ousted Qarase Government is a critical point of 
departure for the interim Government in responding to these punitive measures. In theory, 
sanctions in support of democratic change are intended to undermine a post-coup regime but 
it is not essential that this change be specifically directed to restoring an ousted Government. 
Nevertheless, Fij i ' s  interim Government has generally regarded the sanctions from 2006 as 
support for the deposed Qarase Government. Such external support for Qarase would have 
been expected and accepted initially by the interim Government. However, Bainimarama 
appears to have also anticipated that, as with previous coups, a more pragmatic attitude 
would emerge over time to allow Fij i ' s  traditional friends to work with the new Government 
on a return to an election-legitimated successor. In the event, the international community has 
declined to follow the path of returning quickly to a pragmatic engagement with the post­
coup Government. Resident diplomats from Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom 
and the United States have been reported in the local media from time to time offering 
opinions on the path to restoring parliamentary democracy in Fiji .  These have included 
demands that the interim Government adhere to the 1 997 Constitution, that the overturned 
Parliament be reconvened and that the existing electoral arrangements be used in any new 
national elections. These interventions have been taken as clear signs of continuing support 
for restoring the Qarase Government. Naturally, the sanctions imposed in aid of these 
demands made them appear designed to achieve the same outcome. 
Perhaps one of the more hurtful lines of intervention by some Western missions, from the 
perspective of the interim Government, has been the use of the local media to discredit the 
People ' s  Charter.23 This perception of injury inflicted to assist the previous Government is 
linked to the importance interim Prime Minister Bainimarama attached to the People' s  
Charter. Although the Peoples Charter i s  intended to b e  his means for returning Fij i  to 
parliamentary democracy, it is not just a procedural issue for Bainimarama. The Charter has 
always been meant to embody a substantive content since it is to reverse or preclude 
discriminatory aspects of the 1 997 Constitution including anti-democratic features such as 
race-based voting. That this banner of democratic reform failed to attract the comprehensive 
public support early expected for it begged some explanation especially as the People ' s  
Charter' s  success depended on the legitimacy of  general community endorsement. The 
interim Government found it easy to associate the unwillingness of the international 
community to provide an independent funding base with the opposition of the Qarase ' s  
Soqosoqo Duavata n i  Lewenivanua Party (SDL) and other political parties to  participation in 
the Charter process. Thus, the interim Government could perceive its local difficulties in 
selling the Charter as stemming, in part, from the international community' s  failure to be 
more supportive. Had external funding been extended to the Charter process then the ties to 
the interim Government would have posed fewer issues for the SDL and other parties that 
22 Nicholas Stuart, 'Poor links with Fiji part of wider Pacific problem' ,  Canberra Times, 7 October 2008 
23 This can be found at www.fijipeoplescharter.corn.fj/ 
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refused to become participants. This circular argument made backing of the SDL and taking 
an anti-Charter position mutually compatible. 
The Charter is to be a result of the deliberations of a specially constituted National Council 
for Building a Better Fiji (NCBBF) and the consultations the NCBBF would undertake with 
the people of Fij i  on the proposed Charter.24 The NCBBF itself was established under 
authority of President Ratu Josefa Iloilovatu Uluivuda to separate the Charter process from 
the interim Government. The Charter has pursued a comprehensive review of Fij i ' s  
governance, economic and social systems to restore democracy and end the 'coup culture' .  At 
the time of writing, a draft Charter had emerged from this process and is being subject to 
public consultation. Initially, it had been proposed that the Charter would go to national 
referendum for confirmation. This seems to have been quietly dropped for a variety of, 
perhaps, mutually reinforcing reasons. The risk of re-opening political divisions once the 
Charter was drafted, the absence of demonstrated overwhelming public support during the 
period of drafting of the Charter, a fear that this could be used to amend the 1 997 constitution 
and the need to secure broader political support from Fij i ' s  party elites are amongst the 
rationales mooted for the apparent disappearance of the referendum option for legitimating 
the Charter. 
Without international financial support, the Peoples Charter process was forced to depend 
upon the interim Government for funding. This factor, along with Bainimarama as co-chair 
(alongside Archbishop Petero Mataca) and a large minority of members of the interim 
Government serving on the NCBBF convinced many critics that the process was essentially 
an interim Government device to build support for the regime and its agenda. These concerns 
were underscored at times by maladroit actions of interim Government in dealing with its 
critics .25 Thus, it mattered little to its opponents that the NCBBF had reserved seats for them 
to participate or that the agenda for its various deliberations was reasonably open. The 
interim Government has taken a strongly different view arguing that it has sought to restore 
'real ' democracy. The agenda of the People ' s  Charter and the extensive consultations leading 
up to the Charter and the subsequent public consultations are designed to make Fiji more 
democratic and participatory than at any time in its modern history. Reforming the electoral 
system to ensure that voters do not need to declare their race in order to obtain a ballot, that 
seats in Parliament are not dependent on race, and that all votes are counted and distributed 
fairly are, the interim Government argues, thoroughly democratic by any standard. So too are 
the abolition of reserved seats, of constitutionally mandated power-sharing, and of the 
excessive influence of unelected and unaccountable traditional chiefs. Thus, the interim 
Government holds to the belief that international sanctions are not intended to restore 
democracy to Fiji but rather return the previous Government to power that maintained a 
highly discriminatory and divisive political system that embraced many elements that were 
anti-democratic and, often, violated basic human rights. 
24 Details of the NCBBF, its membership, structure and operations can be found at 
www.fijipeoplescharter.com.fj/. The author assisted the NCBBF as an honorary, part-time adviser on 
parliamentary and electoral reform from January-June 2008. 
25 The unceremonious expulsion of two foreign media figures were amongst the more celebrated cause celebres 
serving as a focus for national and international concern over the interim Government's claims for democratic 
credentials. 
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Cost benefit of intervention: the effectiveness of sanctions? 
Thus far, the post-coup sanctions do not appear to have assisted with the return to 
parliamentary democracy. Indeed, it is difficult to discern any direct positive impact from the 
international sanctions on Fiji  since December 2006. The interim Government has failed to 
respond to any of the demarches by its critics. Interim PM Bainimarama has disavowed the 
promise made at the 2007 Nuku'alofa Forum to hold elections by March 2009 claiming it had 
been extracted by 'ambush' .  By July 2008, he was prepared to announce publicly that he 
would not meet the March 2009 deadline but it was widely suspected that this would be the 
case several months previously. Bainimarama subsequently insisted that he would not hold 
elections until the changes proposed under the Peoples Charter were complete. The interim 
Prime Minister was particularly explicit on this during his address to the United Nations 
when he advised the 63rd General Assembly that his Government would proceed to elections, 
'only after we have achieved broad consensus in Fij i  for a non-racial and truly democratic 
electoral system, and agreed on a Constitutional and legal way to introduce the changes. ' 26 
There were other grounds for taking a somewhat jaundiced view of the efficacy of sanctions 
as an element of democratic intervention in the case of Fij i .  The lack of consistency and 
comprehensiveness undermined their effectiveness and, some might argue, their legitimacy. 
The UN declined to move on the NZ proposal to exclude RFMF troops from participating in 
peacekeeping missions. Although the regional Biketawa Declaration was the justification for 
democratic intervention against the coup, it does not appear to have been whole-heartedly 
supported by the FIC membership of the Forum. Indeed, the failure of the FICs to impose 
their own bilateral sanctions under the Biketawa Declaration raises questions of how 
'regional ' was the adherence to the principles of the this agreement or the actions taken in its 
name. The touted ' smart sanctions ' hurt the interim Government but did not alter the 
Government' s  course. Moreover, they may have been dysfunctional, as they have interfered 
with making timely progress toward a return to parliamentary democracy. It seems many Fiji 
citizens living abroad or with families living overseas were unwilling to accept positions with 
the interim Government even though their participation may have helped to speed the return 
to democracy.27 As noted above, internally, sanctions have been seen by the interim 
Government as encouraging Qarase not to engage in the People ' s  Charter process so 
undermining the capacity of the interim PM to implement his 'exit strategy' .  
Is there a way forward? 
At the time of writing, there are several ' irons in the fire ' with regard to finding a political 
accommodation to ease the path in restoring parliamentary democracy. These have included 
the 'moli tea' private talks between interim PM Bainimarama and the deposed PM Qarase 
that began in May 2008. Somewhat earlier, the Secretariat of the Commonwealth of Nations 
offered good offices to provide Sir Paul Reeves as an international mediator but this 
subsequently ran afoul of those critical of his previous involvement in the process leading to 
the 1 997 constitution of which the interim Government opposes. Possibly an extension of the 
26 http ://www.fiji .gov .fj/publish/page_ 1 3023 .shtml 
27 Australian and New Zealand officials are inclined to dispute this consequence of the smart travel sanctions on 
the grounds that positions related to elections were exempt. However, even some internal critics of the interim 
Government believe there was an effect that was unhelpful. 
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Commonwealth' s  initiative but rather separate in practice is President Iloilo ' s  'political 
dialogue' process which has yet to get underway. None is entirely promising at this stage in 
the process but hopes are still held that at least one might bear fruit despite the evidence so 
far and the obstacles that will beset any political dialogue that might take off. 
Certainly, the way forward has become more problematic since the Niue Forum both because 
of the threat of elevated sanctions as well as the hardening of support amongst FICs for 
sanctions. Niue Forum has set in train a process to expel Fij i  from the Forum if it does not 
adhere to the 'promise' made by interim PM Bainimarama to hold elections by March 2009 
despite the clear statement by the interim PM subsequently he would not do so. The present 
situation plainly cannot persist. The existing sanctions are hurting Fiji but not enough to force 
a change in direction by the interim Government. It does not appear that intensifying these 
will be any more effective. The interim Government' s  desire to secure the changes embodied 
in the People' s  Charter may present an obstacle to flexibility on its side. On the other hand, if 
the Charter becomes a sine qua non for admission to a political dialogue, the price is likely to 
be perceived as too high with the result that much of the useful and constructive aspects of 
the Charter will be de-legitimised. 
The prospects for the future appear highly fraught with all parties manoeuvring for advantage 
in an increasing uncertain international economic climate. As one knowledgeable Australian 
official remarked recently, the status quo in Fiji ' is not the worst that could happen there ' .  
There are no guarantees o f  a peaceful transition back to parliamentary democracy. Shortly 
after the Niue Forum, New Zealand's  Defence Minister, Phil Goff, canvassed the possibility 
that civil disorder could occur, requiring direct military intervention to extract New Zealand 
citizens from a disintegrating Fiji .  The deaths that occurred during the George Speight coup 
in 2000 were a result of a breakdown within the RFMF when rebel troops attempted to 
support the coup. A mutiny by elements of the RFMF at some point in the future against the 
interim Government could be an even bloodier affair. The risks of violent civil strife would 
escalate if civilians became involved directly or in the wake of subsequent military purges 
seeking retribution. These scenarios appear extreme on the basis of what has occurred 
historically but then it would take something on the scale of these for Goffs concerns to have 
any validity. 
Former Vice President of Fij i, Ratu Joni Madraiwiwi, made one telling observation on the 
way forward in an address in New Zealand when he said, ' In spite of the divisions that have 
been exacerbated by the December coup, it is absolutely critical that the next government is 
one of national unity. '28 Many thoughtful observers believe he is correct but the means for 
securing such a Government require some prior political dialogue and accommodation. 
Whether these will require an intervening election is not yet clear although it appears that 
Ratu Joni expects that it should. There has been some speculation that there may be a 
'transition Government' established to follow the interim Government without necessarily 
the complication of an election. Such an arrangement might appeal as a way of securing some 
28 Ratu Joni Madraiwiwi, 'The Challenges in Building A New Fij i ' ,  Annual Pacific Co-operation Foundation 
Address, Press Release: Pacific Cooperation Foundation, 1 3  May 2008. 
http://www.fijilive.com/archive/showpdf.php?pdf=2008/05/Challenges%20in%20Building%20New%20Fij i%2 
0-%20Rt%20Joni.pdf 
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power-sharing while the knotty legal and constitutional problems were worked out in a more 
leisurely pace. Even this will require the revival of the political dialogue that seemingly has 
been stalled since the promising moli tea talks in May 2008 . A politically negotiated, and 
agreed, means to restoring parliamentary democracy can be the only way forward but how 
long it will take to get this process back on track is impossible to predict. 
What does seem clear at this time is that the use of international sanctions as a form of 
democratic intervention has not worked the way its sponsors had hoped. These can scarcely 
been seen to have been efficacious or timely in their influence on the internal politics of Fij i  
to return to parliamentary democracy. From an Australian and New Zealand perspective, the 
application of these sanctions may have created a long-term impediment to good relations 
with the single most regionally significant island member of the Pacific Islands Forum. Links 
with the RFMF have been damaged severely and the RFMF have replaced training and other 
ties with the ANZAC defence establishments to some extent with support from China, India 
and Malaysia. Weaknesses in the Biketawa Declaration have been exposed. It can really only 
be employed effectively where the target state is supportive as in the case of the Solomons or, 
perhaps, where it is too weak to resist. The impact on regional relations and cooperation on 
intra-regional security and good governance may only be clear when Fiji is fully restored to 
parliamentary democracy and diplomatic relationships amongst all members of the Forum are 
on an even keel again. However, if democratic intervention is to be practical at the regional 
level, especially within the large and complex societies of Melanesia, the sanctions regime 
will have to operate more smoothly than it has in the case of post 2006 coup Fij i .  
Postscript 
One of the difficulties that occur when analysing current events is that they are subject to 
rapid change. As this paper was in its final revision for publication, the Fij i  High Court 
delivered its verdict in the case of Qarase and Others v Bainimarama and Others. 29 The courts 
verdict that the President had the authority to legally empower the interim Government has 
changed the dynamics of Fiji politics. Just where this will take Fiji has yet to be seen but 
already it has made the interim Government more confident in dealing with its critics despite 
the very real likelihood that the decision will be appealed. On the positive side, the judgment 
appears to have encouraged all parties to engage with the interim Government, which may 
augur well for a negotiated settlement to the domestic political impasse since December 
2006. Critics, on the other hand have predicted that interim Prime Minister Bainimarama will 
be tempted to hold onto power for a longer period. 
29 The decision of the court is available at: 
http://www.fijilive.com/archive/showpdf.php?pdf=2008/1 0/Qarase%20vs%20Bainimarama%20Judgment.pdf 
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1 1 . The i ncorporation of h u man rights by 
Melanesian states 
Daniel Dormoy 1 
Laurent Tesoka2 
The incorporation of Human Rights as binding standards in the different legal systems of 
Melanesian states3 is a recent process, and it has many particular features. It is recent by 
reason of the fact that the states are 'young' ones. The Fiji Islands gained independence in 
1970, Papua New Guinea in 1 975,  Solomon Islands in 1 978 and Vanuatu in 1 980. Besides, 
this incorporation is to some extent homogeneous. The basic rights proclaimed are few and 
must coexist with practices and customary law which may run counter to them. This poses 
the usual problem of conflict of standards, especially because proclaiming Human Rights is 
essentially done through written sources, whereas in those societies, the oral process is an 
important means of communication and a vector for the communication of standards. 
Lastly, talking about the incorporation of standards raises the major question of their 
effectiveness and of respect for them. In this connection, there are great discrepancies among 
the different territories .  The practices of incorporation differ widely from state to state. 
Moreover, domestic political developments in some of those states regularly lead to 
violations of Human Rights. Assessing the incorporation of Human Rights in the different 
Melanesian states presupposes the study of international and regional incorporation sources 
(I), domestic incorporation sources (II), and an appraisal of the effectiveness of the practices 
that are followed (III) . 
I. International and regional sources of human rights incorporation 
In the matter of Human Rights, the large number of declarations of principle, whether at the 
domestic or international level, is not significant, as the protection of Human Rights can be 
achieved only by a positive legal order providing for appeal proceedings. This order can be 
an international, regional or internal one. While Melanesian states are a party to some 
1 Universite Paris XI 
2 Universite Aix-Marseille III 
3 New Caledonia not being a state, it is theoretically subject to commitments by France in the matter of Human 
Rights. As a component of the French State, it is thus subject to commitments, and notably to the protection 
mechanism provided by the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR): See M. Levinet, 'Coutumes et 
droits de l 'homme. Universalite et pluralisme dans la Convention Europeenne des droits de l 'homme, '  in J-Y 
Faberon and G Agniel, eds, La Souverainete partagee en Nouvelle-Ca!edonie et en droit compare, Les etudes de 
la Documentation Fran9aise, Paris, 2000, pp 89- 105 .  This paper, therefore, will deal only with Melanesian states 
as subjects of international law. 
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international instruments of Human Rights set up within the framework of the United Nations 
(A), they scarcely have compelling commitments at the regional level; however, they have to 
take into account the commitments binding them to the European Union (B) .  
A. Taking part in multilateral international agreements 
The proliferation of international documents proclaiming Human Rights must not delude the 
public, for their real scopes are very much varied indeed. We will deal here only with 
conventions. After they gained independence (Fij i  on 13 October 1 970; Papua New Guinea 
on 1 0  October 1 975;  Solomon Islands on 1 9  September 1 978; and Vanuatu on 1 5  September 
1 98 1 ) , the Melanesian states adhered to the UN Charter, and consequently to its provisions 
regarding Human Rights. But they have made few other international commitments to 
protecting those rights : 
• Fiji  ( 1 1 January 1973), Papua New Guinea (27 January 1 982), and Solomon Islands 
( 1 7  March 1 982) are bound by the 7 March 1 966 International Convention on the 
Suppression of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,4 in force since 4 January 1 969. 
• Fiji  approved on 28 August 1 995 the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women adopted on 1 8  December 1 979,5 which came into 
effect on 3 September 1 98 1 .  Papua New Guinea approved it on 1 2  January 1 995,  
Vanuatu on 8 September 1 995 and Solomon Islands on 6 May 2002 . 
• The Convention on the Rights of Children adopted on 20 November 1 989,6 and which 
came into force on 2 September 1 990, was ratified by Fij i  on 1 3  August 1 993 ,  by 
Vanuatu on 7 July 1 993, and by Papua New Guinea on 2 March 1 993 .  Solomon 
Islands approved it on 10 April 1 995 .  Vanuatu was the only Melanesian country to 
ratify (on 1 7  May 2007) the optional Protocol to the Convention on the rights of 
children, regarding the sale of children and pornography staging children, which was 
approved on 25 May 20007 and came into force on 1 8  January 2002. Fij i  approved the 
protocol on 1 6  September 2005 , but has not yet ratified it. 
• Regarding the International Pact on Civil and Political Rights adopted on 1 6  
December 1 9668 and in force as of 2 3  March 1 976, only Papua New Guinea adhered 
to it, on 2 1  July 2008.  Vanuatu signed it on 29 November 2007. 
• Papua New Guinea also adhered on 21 July 2008 to the International Pact on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights adopted on 1 6  December 1 9669 and in force as 
of 3 January 1 976, and Solomon Islands adhered to it on 1 7  March 1 982.  
• Lastly, only Vanuatu signed, on 6 February 2007, the Convention on the Rights of 
Disabled Persons adopted on 20 December 2006. 10 
4 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 660, p 1 95 
5 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1249, p 13  
6 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1 577, p 3 
7 Doc. NRES/54/263 ; C.N. 1 032.2000.TREATIES-72, 14 November 2000 
8 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 999, p 1 7 1  and vol 1 057, p 407 
9 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 993, p 3 
10 Doc.A/6/1 /488, as yet not in force. 
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B. The lack of regional compulsion and the influence of agreements with the European 
Union 
Regional organizations are increasingly taking care of proclaiming Human Rights and they 
are eager to see them put effectively to work. Generally speaking, the regionalization of 
Human Rights enables states in the same geographical area claiming they belong to the same 
culture to set up more efficient legal protective systems than those with a universal scope. 
That is the case with the protective system set up within the framework of the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 
With regard to Melanesia, however, there is no strictly speaking regional prescriptive 
conventional instrument for Human Rights. Thus, among the objectives of the Pacific 
Community, none really concerns Human Rights in general. This does not mean that there is 
a lack of political will to promote Human Rights within the Community. Within the Secretary 
General 's  office there is, for example, a 'Human Development' department one of whose 
purposes is to promote women's  condition and women's  rights. Anyway, these are public 
policies meant to raise Melanesian societies' awareness, not obligatory standards. At the level 
of the Asia-Pacific Forum, the office of Commissioner for Human Rights has been set up. 
But in this instance too, and although we do not mean to downplay his action, we must say 
that the norms are not binding on the states. 
Overall, Melanesian states do not have laws or regional Human Rights protection 
mechanisms allowing appeals before a court (unlike the provision of the European 
mechanism in the European Convention for Human Rights or that of the American 
Convention on Human Rights). 
However, the incorporation of fundamental rights into the legal systems of Melanesian states 
can be influenced by the agreements between the European Union and ACP countries. The 
third Lome Convention, adopted on 8 December 1 984, for the first time referred to Human 
Rights in its preamble, in particular in Articles 9, 1 0  and 1 14. Article 1 14 provides that 
'Cooperation contributes to autonomous development of the ACP states, focused around Man 
and rooted in the culture of each people. '  This concern can be found in the partnership 
agreement signed at Cotonou on 23 June 2000. 
But unlike international treaties that are specific to Human Rights, here the commitments are 
actually economic rather than legal. Indeed, through these conventions, the European Union 
clearly means to predicate payment of its financial aid on the different states '  advancement in 
the field of Human Rights. In this respect, the European Union's  stance toward Fiji is 
commendable. 
Following the political and constitutional troubles in Fiji in 1 999, the Council of the 
European Union, in its 9 April 200 1 decision, clearly stated, 'The European Union attaches 
the highest importance to the provisions of Articles 9 of the ACP-EU partnership agreement. 
Respect for Human Rights, democratic institutions and the rule of law are essential 
components of the partnership agreement and they make up the basic principle of our 
relationships. '  The Council specified thereafter that the EDF endowment would be notified 
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only when free and regular elections had been held and a legitimate government taken 
office. ' 1 1  
II. Partial incorporation of human rights through internal sources 
The guarantee of rights and freedoms should first be sought in the Constitution and its 
potential interpretation by a constitutional judge regardless of the title he holds. 
Constitutions are very important in pluralistic societies as is the case in Melanesian societies, 
for during the nation-building period they lay down a general framework for developing 
relationships between the various communities, and most of all, they reveal the thought 
processes and the attitudes of the autochthonous majority group towards other groups as well 
as the problems inherent in community-based societies and nation building. 
Among Melanesian nations, Fiji is the one whose domestic law affords the greatest protection 
for fundamental rights. Since it gained independence from the United Kingdom in 1 970, Fij i  
has had three Constitutions ( 1 970, 1 990 and 1 998) all of which include provisions regarding 
the protection of Human Rights. 
The 1 970 Constitution included several provisions relating to the protection of fundamental 
freedoms and rights in a specific chapter. They were close to those of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and to those of the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms; the Constitution defined in great detail rights and 
freedoms and the exceptions attached to them. For instance, Article 1 5  explicitly prohibited 
any discrimination based on a law or through a practice by any public authority because of 
race, national/geographical origin, political opinions, colour or beliefs. But curiously enough, 
gender was not listed among the reasons for which any discrimination was prohibited 
although is appeared among the reasons for which the exercise of other rights could not be 
denied, such as the right to life, liberty, personal safety, the protection of the law, freedom of 
conscience, religious freedom, freedom of assembly and association and the protection of 
private life as well as the right not to be deprived of one 's  property without compensation. 
Most of all, Article 1 7  granted to all citizens the right to appeal to the Supreme Court against 
any government decision restricting their guaranteed constitutional rights. 1 2 
The second Fij i  Constitution ( 1 990) retained most of the rights sanctioned in the 1 970 
Constitution but extended their scope. It reasserted the prohibition of any discrimination on 
account of race, colour and national/geographical origin and added the prohibition relating to 
sex. At the same time, however, it made it legal to use discrimination in certain situations 
1 1  Regarding this provision in the Cotonou Agreement and the criticism that can be levelled at it, see M Gallie, 
L 'Accord de Cotonou et les contradictions du droit international: ! 'integration des regles de / 'Organisation 
mondiale du commerce et des droits humains dans la cooperation A CP-CE, Doctoral dissertation, Universites 
de Montreal et de Paris, Faculte de droit, Universite Paris-Sud, 7 June 2006. 
1 2  Paragraph 6 of Article 1 7, however, provides that the Supreme Court can decide not to consider an appeal if it 
thinks that the appeal by the wronged person is frivolous or improper. The rulings based on the provisions of the 
Constitution relating to fundamental freedoms and rights are few. The Supreme Court, in Fiji Waterside 
Workers Union v. Reginam ((1 997) 23 FLR 196) ruled that 'public interest' could warrant a restriction of 
freedom of speech, although this possibility did not appear in the article protecting freedom of speech. 
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(emergency situations; tax allowances; appointment in government jobs; the exercise of 
judicial power ) . 1 3 
The current Fiji Constitution dates back to 1 997. It includes a Bill of Rights which sets out 
many fundamental freedoms, 14 making up a specific chapter (chapter 4) . As per this 
Constitution, enjoying those rights and freedoms is inherent in being a member of society and 
can be restricted only by virtue of a democratic decision by the Parliament. 
While asserting the principle of equality between citizens, however, the Constitution allows 
the adoption of discriminatory measures tending to ensure good governance for Fij ians and 
Rotumans or the Banahan community. Likewise, it authorizes adopting laws or 
administrative measures that may restrict the right to equality with a view to allowing the 
enforcement of Fijian, Rotuman or Banahan customs in many areas (imprisonment, the use or 
conveyance of land rights or fishing rights or the distribution of derivative products; the right 
of each individual to the title or rank of chief; the imposition of a restriction regarding the 
transfer of land rights or fishing rights held in compliance with Fijian, Rotuman or Banahan 
customs, or the temporary transfer of these lands or rights against the owner' s  will) . 
Similarly, pursuant to Article 42 of the Constitution, the Human Rights Commission was 
created in 1999. It is the first Human Rights Commission in the South Pacific. The 
Commission is in charge of raising the public ' s  awareness of Human Rights and of making 
recommendations to the government regarding compliance with these rights. It is also in 
charge of any commission that parliament can entrust to it; of investigating and ruling on 
arbitrary discrimination and of investigating allegations of breaches of the Bill of Rights 
included in the 1 997 Constitution. 
The Constitution also provides for an Ombudsman. The Ombudsman is authorized to 
investigate any measure that allegedly or apparently constitutes a breach of the fundamental 
rights and freedoms guaranteed to individuals by the Constitution. He can remedy such a 
situation by recommending that the official bodies involved study the complaint more 
closely; he can recommend an omission be redressed or the decision be cancelled, struck 
down or changed, or he can recommend that the applicable law be reconsidered. The 
Ombudsman also investigates complaints of administrative abuses directed against 
government employees. 1 5  
1 3 The provisions o f  the 1 990 Constitution relating to fundamental rights have seldom been invoked in court. 
14 The rights protected by the Bill of Rights of the 1 997 Constitution are: individual freedom; the right not to be 
subjected to servitude or to forced labour ; the right not to be subjected to cruel or degrading punishment; the 
right to freedom from unreasonable searches and seizure; the rights of arrested or detained persons; the rights of 
charged persons; access to courts or tribunals; freedom of expression; freedom of assembly; freedom of 
association; labour relations; freedom of movement; the right to vote using a secret ballot; the right to privacy; 
freedom of religion and belief; the right to equality; the right to education; protection against compulsory 
acquisition of property. 
15 The 1 998 Ombudsman law specified the system of law and the framework in which he acts. He has 
jurisdiction in investigating complaints against the Board that administers autochthonous lands and the Banaba 
and Rotuma boards. The 1 997 Constitution provides that the Ombudsman, unlike the President, is appointed by 
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After examining the sources of the incorporation of Human Rights norms, it is clear that 
these rights are far from being effectively and securely protected. 
III. The effectiveness of human rights incorporation practices 
Obviously, in this area too there is great variety among Melanesian territories. The fact that a 
body of law and safeguards for human rights exist, although these rights are tenuous, does not 
necessarily guarantee that this protection is effective. 
So in even the most contemporary history of these countries, some circumstances have 
played havoc with the internal code and ended up restricting Human Rights. Governmental 
instability and repeated coups have not allowed Human Rights to be effectively protected, not 
to mention, for some people, a difficult economic and social situation. For that matter, some 
fundamental state texts have no hesitation in viewing these circumstances as 
'constitutionally' warranting the restriction of fundamental rights. 
But beyond these 'exceptional ' situations in which the proclaimed fundamental rights are 
disregarded or flouted, practice in those countries is characterized, in the matter of Human 
Rights, by the prevalence of customary practices and customary laws which often conflict 
with these international protective norms. 
Indisputably, Fij i  is the independent and sovereign territory in Melanesia which has set most 
mechanisms and proclamations to protect Human Rights; yet, it is a state where breaches of 
these rights are common and exposed on a regular basis. 
This situation can be best illustrated by the apposite example of the effectiveness of the 
women's  rights issue in these states. The International Convention on the Elimination of all 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women approved on 1 8  December 1 979 has been accepted 
by all Melanesian states. Yet, their domestic laws have numerous provisions that run counter 
to the rights proclaimed in this convention. 
That is the case in Solomon Islands. They ratified the convention on 6 May 2002, but 
ratification has not prompted the authorities to change the internal law provisions that conflict 
with those of the Convention. For example, the minimum age for legal marriage, although it 
is the same for both bride and bridegroom, is 1 5  while in the convention it is set at 1 8 .  
Likewise, custom requires the father' s  explicit agreement. More generally, a s  o f  today, there 
is no legal or institutional mechanism to guarantee and ensure equality between men and 
women in the job market for example. 
In this respect, the situation in Fiji is also typical. Fij i  adhered to the Convention on 28  
August 1 995 . Thereafter, i t  gradually brought constitutional and legislative changes in  order 
to incorporate the convention' s  directions. 
the Constitutional Offices Commission in compliance with the provisions of the 1 990 Constitution, and sets the 
Ombudsman' s  retirement age at 65. 
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The 1 997 constitutional amendments allowed Fiji to sanction the principle of equality 
between men and women, of equality in the matter of elections, and the principle of non 
discrimination between the sexes. 
At the legislative level, a law on women's  night work was enacted in 1 996 and a major 
family law was enacted in 2003 that allowed for a married person to go to court in order to 
request protection, notably through the emergency ruling procedure. Similarly, it includes 
many provisions which protect women in cases of divorce. 
At the governmental or administrative level, a Minister for Women, Social Welfare and 
Poverty reduction was established, and a national consultative committee for women was 
created whose purpose is to promote equality between men and women and to implement an 
action plan in favour of women. 
However, while this normative incorporation of the provisions of the international convention 
for women' s  rights is significant, so far it has been limited - no law protects women or 
prohibits discrimination in the case of pregnancy. Similarly, there is no protection allowing 
women to be able to raise their child while keeping a job. The sexual harassment law is 
incomplete. Whereas the international convention sets for marriage the principle of a legal 
minimum age of 1 8  both for men and women, Fij i  law is still not egalitarian, as the legal age 
is 1 6  for girls and 1 8  for boys, and in case an under-age girl marries, the father' s  mandatory 
consent prevails over the mother's .  
Most of all, the Fiji Constitution does not guarantee the primacy of the equality principle 
between men and women over customary law. The landownership system is still governed 
according to custom and does not provide for equality between men and women. In matters 
of rape and sexual violence, mitigating circumstances based on the 'bulu bulu' custom still 
apply. Similarly, the 1 944 colonial law, which punishes prostitution only among women, is 
still in force. 
The 1 997 Constitution does not include a definition of discrimination against women. 
Procedural law has many provisions that are discriminatory against women, notably with 
regard to evidence. The restrictive divorce law leads women to desperation, and sometimes to 
suicide. Likewise, despite political initiatives taken by various governments to reduce 
violence against women, it is evident that there is still a high level of sexual or ethnic 
violence against women, especially in times of social unrest. Domestic violence and sexual 
abuse against girls and women is still a reality, as they are fostered by customary practices. It 
must be said that customary law grants husbands a right to punish their wives; the 'bulu bulu' 
custom socially legitirnizes and legalizes violence against women. 
Papua New Guinea ratified the Convention on Women' s  Rights on 12 January 1 995.  Internal 
law, however, in particular customary law, has been changed only lately in order to take the 
convention into account. Thus, the penal code was amended in 2002 in order to include 
misdemeanours and crimes of a sexual nature against children and women. Likewise, 
conjugal immunity, which had hitherto protected husbands from rape charges, has been 
abolished. 
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Conclusion 
The normative incorporation of fundamental freedoms can be successful only if each 
Melanesian state achieves it not only in its body of law, especially in its guiding principles, 
but also by setting up efficient instruments for control and punishment. Through the findings 
regarding the effectiveness of women' s  rights, we can see that the issue of the interaction 
between customary practices and Human Rights remains an essential one. But we should not 
forget that Melanesian states are young states and their situation is compounded by numerous 
specific features (such as the fact that they are island states, scattered territories, the presence 
of numerous communities, etc.) In this matter, time and constant international pressure can 
only be beneficial. 
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1 2 . Discussion : is Melanesia homogeneous 
enough to contemp late a u nity p lan? 
Jean-Yves Faberon, Laurent Chassot, Jacques Ziller, Christian Huetz 
de Lemps, Christophe Sand , Pierre-Yves Le Muer 
Jean-Yves FABERON 
Does Melanesia have sufficiently homogeneous objective features to contemplate a Unity 
Plan? Is it possible to answer this query at the end of this session? I admit that all through the 
conference program we have used the words Melanesian unity while thinking of European 
unity. So if we hark back to pre- 1 954 Europe, when the first European community emerged, 
and if we see the present situation in Melanesia, if we look at geography, sociology, men and 
their cultures, here, they have practically the same religion, at any rate Christianity, which, 
after all, is conducive to unity, if we look at the economy, the environment (the road map 
provided by President Neaoutyine can only lead to total consensus), I believe that Unified 
Melanesia has objectively got off to a good start. But subsequently, about democracy, the 
situation is not exempt from criticism. . .  There remains the custom issue developed by 
Laurent Chassot. If we understand you right, you have not made any distinction within 
Melanesia. But are there any differences in this respect? If a New Caledonia customary chief 
goes to Fiji or Vanuatu or Solomon Islands, will those seem to be familiar places to him? Is 
there already any unity with regards to custom? 
Laurent CHASSOT 
That 's  an excellent question insofar as my personal experience as a young researcher is 
limited to the last four years in Vanuatu. There I studied customary law and the place custom 
occupies within the legal system of that country. Unfortunately, for lack of time and money, I 
did not have the opportunity to travel to Papua New Guinea or Fiji ,  for example. Therefore, 
my findings relate only specifically to Vanuatu. I spent many weeks at Tanna, Pentecost 
Island and Santo and of course several years on Efate. Given the variety of the countries that 
make up the region, claiming that such notions as coherence and uniformity exist could 
prompt suspicion. Yet, I feel that there is a very strong consistency across Melanesia. I got 
that feeling from reading numerous books and articles by authors who are mostly Australian, 
by New Zealanders or by Frenchmen, dealing with such complementary areas as law, 
ethnology or anthropology. Their analyses and their descriptions of chiefdoms tend to show 
that customs are drawing much closer to each other, and they show common customary major 
principles, focusing on dialogue, the quest for compromise, and the vision chiefs have of their 
role in their villages, although - as I said, and Dr Tesoka also took this question up on the 
issue of Human Rights - we can find considerable traditional diversity from village to village 
and from island to island. So it is a very heterogeneous and vey complex group, but I believe 
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that some main directions stand out revealing many similarities. At any rate, this is the way I 
feel, but I am rather optimistic: setting up a Melanesian Case law, recording and creating 
Melanesian codes are achievable ambitions likely to foster a Melanesian dynamics. I was re­
reading a letter Professor Vanderlinden had sent me early this year; in it he told me to what 
extent his vision as a jurist and an anthropologist had changed between the time of his first 
research in Africa 50 years ago and his present conception of customary law. Maybe I will be 
in a better position to answer the question a few years from now or maybe I ' ll have a totally 
different approach to it. 
Jacques ZILLER 
Good question. I think we should extend it: Does Melanesia Have Sufficiently Homogeneous 
Objective Features to Contemplate a Unity Plan? Jean-Yves Faberon has in mind European 
integration; I might talk about it tomorrow but I think it is important to keep in mind other 
situations, and what comes to my mind right now is what is going on in Latin America. This 
will prompt two questions. The components for regional integration in Latin America are 
particularly interesting because they show characteristics we also find in the Pacific, that is, 
different levels of unity, at the level of the whole American continent and in regional areas. 
And this brings to mind, of course, the distinction between regional unity in the Pacific and in 
Melanesia. There are many types of regional unity experiences in Latin American. Some 
have been utter failures; some others were restarted after they had been stalled for a while. 
Some are said to be likely to be achieved, but none has so far. I think there are at least two 
major questions in this connection if we want to be able to compare experiences. The first 
one relates to communication and exchanges between the different nations, the difference 
being that in Latin America there are certain groups with existing exchanges, which came 
prior to attempts at integration, and other groups do not have those exchanges. And it is also 
possible to contend that exchanges between countries that are geographically more or less 
close are a prerequisite for regional integration; or we can upend the proposition, that is, 
precisely because there are no exchanges in a neighbouring geographical area, integration, 
with all the caveats that could be introduced, is useful because it develops exchanges which 
do not exist now and may not exist for historical or geographical reasons. In this respect, I 
have a question to ask of Professor Ruetz de Lemps: What are the exchanges, or lack of 
exchanges, between these different groups that are significant for the relevance of a regional 
unity plan? 
A second fact is also very interesting in Latin America, and that is imbalance - Brazil is a 
giant, and besides Brazil there are little smaller states, and others which are really small. And 
of course, in the Pacific, there are two types of imbalance, on the one hand at the level of the 
whole Pacific, between Australia/New Zealand and the others, and on the other hand, within 
Melanesia. My question is: Are the geographical and demographic differences between 
Papua New Guinea and the others at the root of a significant imbalance which could be either 
a hindrance to unity in Melanesia or, on the contrary, something that can give it a little more 
life? 
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Christian HUETZ DE LEMPS 
It all depends on what we mean by unity and the extent of economic unity. The issue is to 
know whether on the whole Melanesian countries have complementary resources. Now I 
think this is the case although at present Melanesian countries are metal and energy exporters, 
etc . Is that being economically complementary? This issue can be debated, and I think there 
are some possibilities. After all, European economies were said not to be complementary, and 
eventually the system worked and is still working in large part through exchanges within the 
European community. 
Christophe SAND 
I think one aspect was not mentioned this morning, and that is the research achieved in 
archaeology, linguistics, and genetics in the area called Melanesia. I am not challenging the 
notion of Melanesia which has been taken up by the region' s  people today. Nor am I 
criticizing the work done by anthropologists and ethnologists over the last 1 50 years. This is 
not my purpose. We must, however, bear in mind some essential points. While New Guinea 
and the Solomons were populated forty thousand years ago, Vanuatu, New Caledonia, Fij i  
and Western Polynesia were peopled only about three thousand years ago. Genetic studies 
have shown that what could be defined as a 'Melanesian ethnic group ' does not exist. A 
Kanak and a Wallisian are genetically closer to each other than a Kanak and a Papuan from 
the highlands of New Guinea, and for one very simple reason - the Papuan has been here for 
40 thousand years whereas the others, who have Austronesian languages and origins, have 
been in the region only for a little over three millennia. Mind you, this in no way means that 
there is an Austronesian genetic 'unity' . In the oldest Lapita cemetery found in Vanuatu, 
which has been excavated for a few years in Efate, we can find men, women and children 
who show differences in phenotype (that is, in what remains of the skeletons, which enables 
us to reconstruct faces). This does not mean there is no difference between 'Melanesians' on 
the one hand and 'Polynesians' on the other hand. Polynesians are just one of the 
Austronesian entities that developed genetically in a peculiar way with a certain number of 
minor characters, in their area, at the eastern border of the Lapita area between 3 ,000 and 
1 ,500 years ago, making up a specific whole. At the same time, in the south-western Pacific, 
in the region we now call Melanesia, people kept moving and diversifying, and what struck 
the first Europeans, such as the Spaniards, who came at the very end of the sixteenth century, 
is not that people are black in the south-western Pacific, but that people are different from 
island to island. That was the real situation of Melanesia at that time. That is why there are so 
many languages, so many traditions, customs and ways to organize. But what everybody 
seems to forget is that this region, like many others elsewhere, during the last centuries, lost 
between 80 and 95 per cent of its population because of the germ shock. Anatom, the 
southernmost island in Vanuatu, lost 96 per cent of its population. Out of an initial group of 
100 people 400 years ago there remained only four at the end. This data showing a massive 
drop in population challenges the stereotype of Melanesians who no longer have any 
hierarchy on the one hand - small tribal groups roaming around in Big Man societies - and 
on the other hand the 'brilliant' Polynesians (let 's  be clear about it, I have nothing against 
Polynesians) who are organized in kingdoms, chiefdoms, etc . This is NOT historic reality. 
There were complex, complicated societal and political groups with hierarchies in Melanesia 
until the 1 9th century. But what with the loss of the overwhelming majority of the Melanesian 
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population, not to mention land spoliation, etc . ,  Melanesians had to adjust to the new 
situation thereby experiencing political evolution. 
Pierre-Yves LE MEUR 
Thank you for giving me the floor. I 'm Pierre-Yves Le Meur, an anthropologist at IRD. I 
wanted to respond, somewhat indirectly, to what Christophe Sand has just said. We can see 
clearly that in the same word Melanesia - because it seems to be the topic of this colloquium 
- the very definition of the word has evolved. I think that at the beginning - and this has been 
more or less stated in one of the papers - we were in an Orientalist and Western-centred 
world view, with a series of Western fantasies projected onto societies that Westerners had 
gradually encountered. But the word, in this meaning, operates only through the Melanesia­
Polynesia divide. What is interesting is that this dichotomy between a Big-Man, segmental 
society in Melanesia, and a 'chiefdom' -based society in Polynesia was in some ways 
strengthened and hardened at the tum of the twentieth century through scientific studies, 
including anthropological studies, although it has been questioned since. Here we have an 
extremely tautological modus operandi of the Melanesia-Polynesia divide. To get out of this 
bind, two ways are available: The one that Christophe Sand suggested, namely practicing 
science in the most rigorous way possible. The various sciences can contribute to the 
undertaking - anthropology, which we must know how to question, archaeology, and 
genetics. The other way of getting out of this tautology or vicious circle is, I think, the one 
that the Melanesian political leaders have chosen. And here we can use the notion of 
Melanesia as being closely related to the 'Melanesian Way' and what is very interesting is 
that in this dispensation we no longer have a Melanesia-Polynesia dualism or opposition; we 
are in this 'Melanesian Way' ,  with no reference to anything else. For that matter, using the 
phrase 'Pacific Way' in the same meaning was not done by chance, I think. If we get away 
from the dichotomy and the tautology, I believe that we move a little forward. Now in this 
Melanesian discourse, in the political sense of the word, we have the notion of custom, and in 
this connection I would like to respond to the paper about custom, which actually was not a 
paper on custom but on 'how law seizes upon custom' :  how law constructs custom as its 
obverse side, in an extremely dualistic and evolutionistic way, hoping all the while that 
custom is a sort of law in the making, an implicit, potential law. And eventually - and the 
paper was indeed extremely clear and had an undeviating purpose toward this end - we end 
up with the usual recommendations, namely codifying custom. This is exactly the 
recommendation that was prevalent in 1 930s colonial policy: there is a colonial history of 
custom codification. The other very enlightening aspect, and maybe more so than the mere 
use of ' colonial' to describe the procedure, is that these policies have invariably been failures: 
in western Africa, where they have been attempted, and in southern Africa as well. We must 
also point out that there have been few attempts at codifying custom in the Pacific. I cannot 
account for that difference; it is only a question, but still the fact is that in order to discuss 
custom, we must not tum it into law, because by doing so we might totally miss the point. 
Rather, we should wonder how Melanesians seized upon the word - custom, kastom, 
coutume, etc. - to tum it into a political and identity argument, an argument for independence 
and sovereignty. Otherwise, we would revert to tautologies, contradictions or illogicalities, 
which in New Caledonia are related to the question that in itself is a very complex one, the 
issue of customary cadastre, a sort of uncertain oxymoron - how can we yoke together the 
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terms ' cadastre' and ' customary' in the same phrase and the same process? I think that much 
here is at stake, and if we are willing to try to think about the definition of a possible 
Melanesian space - this is one of the key objectives of this conference - we must start with 
the standpoint of Melanesian politicians, as these are the ones who are building it. 
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New Caledonia, 
a Me lanesian land 

I. The Past 
1 3 . The works of Jean -Marie Tj ibaou,  a Kanak 
permanent reform u lation 
Hamid Mokaddem 1 
In my view, what is cultural is of major importance; it is what gives flavour to life. You can set 
up the most profitable economic systems in the world, but we are not robots with the ability to 
have a good life based on those systems. We have a human dimension, and as a result, even as 
we enjoy the most modem, the softest and the most satisfactory comfort, we are still an 
aggregate of needs and transcendence always seeking to grow better, if not bigger, and into 
something different; and this is inscribed in what is cultural. 
Jean-Marie Tjibaou2 
The gradual emergence of a plan which gives meaning to the changes Kanak society is 
undergoing is necessary in order to provide an alternative choice to the undefined social change 
produced by the dominant model, and it is necessary in order for the development imperative 
not to achieve in a few years what colonization could not do in more than a century - wipe 
Kanak society off the face of the earth. 
Jean Freyss3 
Tjibaou is the name of what? 
It is paradoxical to try to talk about Jean-Marie Tjibaou's  political works amid a conference 
whose topic is the incorporation of New Caledonia into the Melanesian region. These words 
betray the meaning and the course followed by the Kanak politician who has permanently 
been at variance with the republican concept of incorporation by proclaiming that the name 
of the ultimate political sovereignty is neither New Caledonia nor Melanesia but Kanaky.4 
1 Agrege in philosophy, Noumea 2 An excerpt from an interview with Jean-Marie Tjibaou by Walles Kotra in 'Explication' ,  a talk show on 
Radio-France Outre-Mer (RFO), 30 September 1 988 (quoted in Alban Bensa and Eric Witterscheim, eds, La 
Presence kanak, Paris: Odile Jacob, 1 996, p 283) 
3 Jean Freyss, Economie assistee et changement social en Nouvelle-Caledonie, Paris: PUF, collection 'Tiers 
Monde, !EDES ' ,  1 995, p 442 
4 So formidable a politician as Fran9ois Mitterrand had clearly noticed this in La Lettre aux Fram;ais, written in 
1 998, in order to win re-election as President: 'He [Tjibaou] fights for New Caledonia independence, and in his 
view, New Caledonia is first and foremost the Kanak people. I may be oversimplifying his thought. Mr Tjibaou 
and his party are not asking to kick out those of French origin and the others. They merely want, if l may say so, 
to make their own decision about it, for they alone are universal suffrage. I am familiar with this theory. I have 
been meeting him for the last 7 years, and Jean-Marie Tjibaou does not change. ' 
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It is comical and paradoxical to claim that we are speaking not in Tjibaou' s  name but 
speaking to name what the signifier 'Tj ibaou' 5 relates to. 
It is comical because the purpose of the whole life and work bearing the name Tjibaou was 
for the autochthonous, indigenous, Melanesian people identified as the Kanak people, to be 
able to appropriate on its own the exogenous models originating in the W estem cultural basis 
and carried to New Caledonia: schools, the Christian monotheist religion, politics,  the 
capitalistic economy, industry as well as the system unifying the parletres - beings that are 
chained in the signifier's  logic - namely the French language.6 
It is paradoxical because despite the handshake with his erstwhile political enemy Jacques 
Lafleur, Tj ibaou never betrayed the cause of the Kanak people, its sovereignty, or the name 
of his country, Kanaky, but there was a new Kanak exercise of power compelled to come to 
terms with interdependence systems.7 
In June 1 988 ,  Jean-Marie Tj ibaou used a metaphor to illustrate the necessity for entering the 
'Rocard' political process and sign an agreement with the French State and the RPCR (the 
Gaullist party in New Caledonia: the Organization for New Caledonia in the French 
Republic) : 'We are not going to get out of France through the main door and come back later 
begging through the window. ' 8  
5 Kanak culture hardly ever designates individuals by their first or last names; instead, as a sign o f  respect, it 
uses their place name, their place of residence. In Hyeehen country (in the northeastem part of New Caledonia) 
Jean-Marie Tjibaou is called Kama pa Kaavac, the master of Kaavac. The names of the households and of 
residences make up the entrances to the paths linking the two big houses, or the Huts, the chiefdoms, Goa and 
Bwarhat. Distribution and exchange networks move through these chiefdom entrances. The name plays the role 
of entrance doors and of capitalization of relations and paths. Besides, Kanaks in the other Kanak countries view 
Jean-Marie Tjibaou's  contribution as very significant to the identity and the emancipation of the Kanak people. 
The name of Jean-Marie Tjibaou relates to this political contribution (compare with Elie Poigoune's  discourse). 
Although we are familiar with these relations to the name, we have decided just the same to use the signifier 
'Tjibaou' to name the peculiar and universal political work by Jean-Marie Tjibaou. The signifier refers to the 
historical contribution and to the Kanak emancipation movement. Readers will guess that the title of my paper 
refers to the famous pamphlet by the philosopher Alain Badiou, De quoi Sarkozy est-ii le nom (Sarkozy Is the 
Name of What?) Circonstances 4, Paris: Lignes, 2007. 
6 On the specific question of the French language, allow me to refer the reader to my essay, Litteratures de 
Nouvelle-Caledonie. Autour d 'une question: la litterature francophone d 'Oceanie est-elle fran9aise? Marseille, 
Transit/ La Courte echelle, 2008. 
7 The signifier Tjibaou expresses the Kanak revolutionary movement whereas the signifier 'Lafleur' retraces the 
New Caledonian counter-political movement. Jacques Lafleur's narrative is explicit regarding this status qua, 
L 'Assiege, 25 an de vie politique, une histoire partagee avec la Nouvelle-Caledonie, Paris: Pion, 2000. I print 
' interdependence systems' in italics because these are concepts used by Tjibaou. Above, in the main text, I 
emphasize these uses and quote a series of concepts which are specific to Tj ibaou's  discourse: identification 
scheme, permanent reformulation, sovereignty as the specific power the Kanak people has to choose its partners, 
independence as the art of negotiating interdependences in an adequate way, etc. Alban Bensa and Eric 
Wittersheim have explained and analyzed the content of Jean-Marie Tjibaou' s  political thought in their article, 
'Nationalisme et interdependence: la pensee politique de Jean-Marie Tjibaou' ,  Revue Tiers Monde, vol. 38,  no. 
1 49, January-March 1 997. 
8 Jean Freyss quotes the motto thus: 'We do not want to get out through the main door and come back begging, 
begging through the window' .  Jacques Violette, in an oral piece of news, told me that the exact phrasing was 
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In Kanak oral literature, the saying, the Hwanfalik (a proverb from Tjibaou's native region, 
Hyeehen) means that entering a country or a hut compels the guest to practice the ritual 
consisting of bending over to make oneself shorter to show one 's  face to the host. The Hut is 
the place name and the metonym of the Country to be built.9 
But, however paradoxical and comical the situation may be, we must, like the politician's 
genius, come to terms with it. 
We will talk here about an invention devised by a politician whose name is Tj ibaou. 
'Permanent reformulation ' is a concept and a motto set up by Tjibaou but it belongs 
specifically to the Kanak historical movement. Today, we must alter the author' s  phrasing 
and change one word of the utterance. We will say a Kanak permanent reformulation instead 
of the permanent reformulation. Today, 20 years after the politician' s  death, we are justified 
in asserting that a Kanak reformulation remains permanent and is carried on into the 2 l st 
century with the new generations taking over. 1 0 As a result, through recurrence, we are now 
compelled to name and define Tjibaou' s  work as one Kanak permanent reformulation among 
others. The 2 1 st-century Kanak generations in turn, in their own way, and facing new 
challenges, will reformulate the Kanak permanence. 1 1  The purpose of this article is to prove 
that Tjibaou was the first to name this Kanak popular groundswell. He coined this word to 
counter the traditional objections which created the Western-modernity-versus-traditional­
Kanak-custom dilemma. 
'We do not want to get out of France through the main door and come back begging through the window' .  The 
quotation by Jean Freyss appears in the conclusion 'Divert the diversion' to the first part, 'Le Developpement, 
pour quoi faire?' in Economie assistee et changement social en Nouvelle-Caledonie, op. cit., p 67. 
9 Gilbert Kaloonbat Tein, Hwanfalik. Dictons de la vallee de Hienghene, Noumea: ADCK ( 1 987), 1 992. The 
Hut is the metonymy for the Kanak country. Eloi Machoro, in the midst of a revolution ( 1 984), stated: 
' Independence is like the Big Hut; only those who have contributed to building it will be allowed to get into it' 
(quoted in Marc Coulon, L '/ruption kanak. De Ca/Monie a Kanaky, Paris: Editions sociales, 1 985). 
1 0  The concept of 'permanent reformulation' WAS devised by Jean-Marie Tjibaou. We come across the phrase 
in Les Temps Modernes, 'Entretien avec Jean-Marie Tjibaou' ,  pp 1 587- 1601  in Nouvelle-Caledonie : pour 
l 'independance. Les Temps Modernes, 4 1 e  annee, no. 464, March 1 985. I have analyzed and detailed the whole 
content of the political phrase in line I 'La reformulation permanente kanak' on pp 29-47 of my book, Ce 
sou.fjle venu des ancetres . . .  L 'oeuvre politique de Jean-Marie Tjibaou ( 1 936- 1 989), Noumea-Koohne, 
Expressions-Province Nord de la Nouvelle-Caledonie, 2005. Alban Bensa and Eric Wittersheim published the 
interview on pages 1 73- 190 in La Presence kanak, op. cit. Here is an excerpt from the interview (p. 1 85): 'The 
reversion to tradition is a myth; I strive to say it and repeat it. It is a myth. No people has ever experienced it. 
The search for identity, the model for me, is ahead of me, it is ahead of us, never behind us. It is a permanent 
reformulation. '  
1 1  That is what Raphael Pidjot did and said some time ago, in a concise, dense and compelling article, 'Une 
societe en devenir' , in Chroniques du Pays kanak, vol. 4, 'Mutation' ,  Noumea: Planete Memo, 1 999, p. 1 1 , and 
now Paul Neaoutyine, with a style which is all his own, L 'independance au present. Identite kanak et destin 
commun, Paris: Syllepse, 2006. Raphael Pidjot's article is hard to come by; here is an excerpt: 'In the early third 
millennium and at the outset of the globalization of exchanges, how do traditional societies, like the Kanak 
society, play their game well and secure social survival? ' The author was not one to be content with words. He 
was a major economic and political player, notably in Kanaky's  emancipation through building Kanky's  
economy. I t  is not possible to  prove i t  here for lack of space. 
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Anthropology in action 
Tjibaou's  path was determined by one decision; that of studying ethnology and sociology at 
age 32 in the midst of the May 1 968 revolutionary situation. 1 2 Tj ibaou acquired some 
ethnological and sociological knowledge and traveled to France to get tools for analysis1 3  in 
order to make the complex colonial reality clear. Tj ibaou did not use applied anthropology, a 
subject that was brought into academic prominence by Roger Bastide, but anthropology in 
action. 14 The purpose that this type of anthropology had set for itself was to provide an 
immediate reformulation of the Melanesian identity which had been confiscated and alienated 
by the European system. 1 5 One of the most elaborate texts that we are aware of was written in 
1 975 and published in 1 976 in the form of an article entitled 'Recherche d' identite 
melanesienne et societe traditionnelle ' by ethnologist Jean Guiart in the journal Le Journal de 
la Societe des Oceaniens. The titles of written or oral contributions are always inapposite, 
and they reformulate the Kanak ancestral lore into something contemporary. Among the 
available examples we will quote two contributions : in 1 975 ,  Melanesia 2000, and in 1 98 1 ,  
'Being a Melanesian Today' . 1 6  
Tjibaou wanted neither a reactionary return to an imaginary past (which is  outmoded, even 
mythical) nor a blind projection into an uncertain future ( 'The West is like an out-of-control 
machine. They have to ride the brakes ' 1 7) but Kanak permanence updated into modernity. 
Let us emphasize this first point: the shibboleth, the motto, the planned action are neither 
integration nor adjustment by Melanesians to the modern world. Tj ibaou's  quest, which is at 
the basis of his political career, was to understand how the Kanak people could, and therefore 
should, build their own way of life and social model. 1 8 It is not about integrating the people 
12 The word 'path' is used in a sociological and not a historical sense, for in a historical sense we would have to 
retrace the path not to 1 936, the year Tjibaou was born in the Central Range reservation, in the Hyendamit 
(Tiendanit) tribe, but to 1 9 1 7, in Thoven, the name of the place where the 1 9 1 7  insurrection, led by Dui Ma 
Nea, ended. 
1 3 This phrase was used in the interview mentioned above in Les Temps Modernes, in La Preesence kanak, op. 
cit. , p. 1 85 
1 4 Roger Bastide, Anthropologie appliquee, Paris: Stock, ( 1 97 1  ), 1 998. 
1 5  Among the writings between 1 969 and 1 975, I thought it interesting to quote an excerpt from Recherche 
d 'identite melanesienne et societe traditionnelle, which illustrates Tjibaou' s  mental process: ' I 'm not seeking to 
know if Melanesians adjust or not to the industrial world, but if they assimilate the cultural models that are alien 
to them and what type of new society they show in their morals as they grope for a new coherence and a new 
dynamics . '  La Presence kanak, op. cit. , p 62 
1 6 With Philippe Missotte, 1 976, Kanake, Melanesien de Nouvelle-Caledonie, Papeete: Editions du Pacifique, 
and 1 98 1 ,  'Etre Melanesien aujourd'hui ' ,  a lecture given at the University of Geneva and printed in the journal 
Esprit, no. 57, September, and in La Presence kanak, op. cit., pp 1 0 1 - 1 1 6  
1 7  Interview with Jean Chesneaux, Poindimie, 2 8  May 1 98 1 ,  in La presence kanak, op. cit. , p 1 1 9 
18 Although this may deeply shock purists, there is really a Kantian flavor in Tjibaou 's  practice: 'You can, 
therefore you must! ' In 1 977, Tj ibaou won the Hyeehen (Hienghene) city hall by setting up a Maxha list. 
Maxha, in the fWiii language means 'hold one 's  head high ' .  Tjibaou, in an interview devoted to Lionel Duroy 
who was working on his book Hienghene ou le desespoir caledonien, mentioned the revolution by the Kanak 
slave against the European master. Here we think of Marx's admiration for Spartacus. In 1 977 there was a 
Kanak miniature revolution which was much more subversive and efficient than that of 1 984. Kanaks could 
decide about their own fate and manage their town themselves. Non-Kanaks stayed until the 1 984 revolutionary 
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into a whole or applying an outside model to Kanak society. It is about knowing how 
Melanesians can appropriate industrial models. Here we mention two authoritative sources: 
I. Gilbert Blardone, a former professor of economics at the Institut catholique in Lyon, 
confirmed that the thesis written in 1 968 by Tj ibaou discussed 'Fitting the Indigenous 
Population into the Industrialization Process. ' It would be a serious mistake not to pay 
attention to the word 'process ' ,  which evokes the dynamics of the situation in which the 
Kanak people are involved in spite of itself. This thesis was written in one year although the 
institution had granted Tjibaou a scholarship to write it in two years. He had the second-year 
scholarship granted to another student and left for Paris to attend ethnology classes at the 
Ecole des Hautes Etudes. 1 9 
2. Philippe Missotte, a close aide to Jean-Marie Tjibaou on the occasion of the first 
Melanesian Cultural Festival, Melanesia 2000 - the first Pacific Arts festival dates back to 
1 972 and took place in Suva, but it is Tjibaou who organized the first Melanesian cultural 
festival - explained Tjibaou's sociological concern in this way: he wanted the indigenous 
population, endowed with endogenous cultural models, to appropriate the exogenous models 
by enhancing the indigenous practices and knowledge. It was about enhancing an image, 
which at the time was a negative one, in order for the indigenous people to be able at last to 
recognize and discover their own identity in their own productions and cultural models (see 
Elie Poigoune' s  contribution, infra). Tjibaou was actually achieving an anthropology in 
action. He was providing a new definition of cultural practice : culture is expressed in politics 
provided politics is grounded upon the ancestral cultural basis by reformulating it. This 
practice of permanent reformulation we call an anthropology in action. 
This is not enough. Tj ibaou's action directed the Kanak grassroots towards economic bases 
and foundations. 
Economy and politics: Kanak governance 
We cannot provide a demonstration and expound with transparency - with documents to 
support it - Tjibaou' s  actual ability to manage and rule the institutions that he was in charge 
of:20 the Hienghene City Hall from 1 977 to 1 989 (the year he was assassinated), the 
Government of New Caledonia from 1 982 to 1 984, and the Northern Region from 1 985 to 
1 987. During the latter period, the possible political conjunction between Kanaky and New 
Caledonia had already been put to the test by economic, legal and social construction. That is 
what the Noumea Agreement later, starting in 1998, called 'Le destin commun - Shared (or 
Common) destiny ' .  
events. At that time most o f  them fled and took refuge o n  the west coast or i n  Noumea. The interview with 
Lionel Duroy appears on pp 257-264 in La Presence kanak, op. cit. 
19 On these biographical points, see, among other sources, the excellent interview with Jacques Violette, with 
Claude Wedro present, whose full text is printed in the Kanak separatist journal Bwenaando, 1 989, 'Le message 
de Jean-Marie Tjibaou' .  
20 Besides my own essay mentioned above, see the study by Eric Waddell, Jean-Marie T]ibaou: Kanak Witness 
to the World, An Intellectual Biography, Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press, 2008. 
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The names 'Kanaky' and 'New Caledonia' , before they became common in linguistic usage 
and practices - that is, since the Matignon-Oudinot and Noumea (starting 1 998) meetings -
had been already used officially and in an institutional context by Tjibaou as early as 1 985 ,  
after a civil war between supporters of Kanak independence and pro-French loyalists . Indeed, 
we can notice that the names 'Kanaky' and 'New Caledonia' appear in the inaugural address 
for the chairmanship of the Northern Region.2 1 Tj ibaou practiced, implemented and gave 
impulse to governing bodies (whether Kanak or non Kanak) in order to work toward building 
a nation where every individual could find his or her place and have a good life. The 
analytical tools that Tjibaou developed thanks to the social sciences enabled him to provide a 
whole array of practical concepts. We provide a list but it is not possible to develop all their 
content here: 
• The interdependence relational system, drawn from the hierarchical network models 
detailing the structures of Kanak societies and chiefdoms. Tjibaou's  work and 
practice reformulate these political models, and devise a new governance system 
adjusted to take account of global space, tribal space, national space. 
• The identificational scheme: whereby Kanak identity develops and feels its way, 
trying to adjust the Pacific way governing relations of time and space to a capitalistic 
production model. 
• Political sovereignty formulated as the power to decide and choose partners with 
whom to exchange and negotiate, and independence as the art of managing 
interdependences well in a small island nation. 
All these concepts in Tjibaou's discourse are devised to emphasize a political practice. On 
the whole, the practical interest was to ensure that traditional Melanesian society and the 
European social system could combine and live together through their relationships.  It was 
less about building a new New Caledonian society than setting up a political space where 
people would feel good and live comfortably. So a political question about living well was 
raised, by following a Pacific way of living.22 Thus reformulating the de-structured Kanak 
society was inescapable through coming to terms with modern technical, scientific and 
industrial advances. 
Managing did not mean managing only financial flows but most of all managing 
interdependency systems which take into account human and social relations. A capitalist 
2 1  All references are provided in the annex to my book. Some documents that were not filed were simply thrown 
into the fire. A part of the fuzzy memory vanishes without the New Caledonia institutions being concerned 
about it. Jean-Marie Tjibaou's  speech: 'Seance inaugurale d 'investiture, le vendredi 4 octobre 1 985 ' ,  is an 
unfiled 8-page document. 
22 Jean-Marie Tjibaou's  answer to a question by newsman Walles Kotra in the talk show 'Explication' on RFO 
on 30 September 1 988, which has already been quoted, is explicit as regards the meaning of political service: 
'W.K. : When you examine the record of your political action, of your statements, of your achievements, of your 
plans, what is essential? In short, what makes you tick? J.-M.T: It' s  mostly the hope that people in our country 
may enjoy a greater welfare, a better life, and I would add the power to be able to die in peace and amid joy. 
That is why we are fighting every day, that is why we keep on the move hoping that people some day will smile 
back at you because you have already helped them be in the best situation they could be in. ' La Presence kanak, 
op. cit., p 284 
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economy is based upon the competition between individuals to make profits and the best 
return from hired labour. The real economy (it is worth reminding the reader that oikos in 
ancient Greek meant 'the household' )  is an economy that lasts, an economy that does not shut 
people out; it is an economy that secures the people' s  welfare. 
The signifier Tjibaou 
We must conclude and answer the question we asked at the beginning of this paper. For 
Tjibaou, when all is said and done, every decision is a political decision. The other drivers, 
such as economic, technical or financial decisions, only extend the power of decision through 
other avenues. This has a name: sovereignty, whether it is shared or not,23 whose essence lies 
in the act of being, namely the power to choose trade relations with other countries, and also 
the power to balance the distribution of wealth, transportation, communication, and the media 
among Noumea, the hinterland and the islands. Tj ibaou practiced this new form of 
governance. 
Both in foreign and domestic relationships, the logical framework did not place permanent 
reformulation action within integration (a part in the Whole) into the Whole as in the Tout­
Monde concept, a concept that we borrow from Patrick Chamoiseau and Edouard Glissant.24 
The meaning of Kanak permanent reformulation is this:  Situate the sovereignty of the people 
in the political space from which it had been removed by the colonial order and reorder 
sovereignty by sharing it with the other communities living in New Caledonia, with or 
without France. On plate no. 26 of the ORSTOM Atlas (Office de la recherche scientifique et 
technique pour l 'outre-mer), renamed IRD (Institut de Recherche pour le Developpement), 
the authors called New Caledonia the 'most complex cultural case in Oceania' .25 In these 
complex interactions, Tjibaou' s  task was to come to terms with the interdependency systems 
and to ensure that political liberty combines shared sovereignty and the people' s  welfare. It is 
nothing less than a reformulation of the links and the sovereign space encompassing the 
Kanak people and the communities living in New Caledonia. The political way of action, 
lying between marginalization and the risk of watering down Kanak identity, took winding, 
steep and difficult routes. 26 
Now we can see his face better - a concept that Kanaks use during customary ceremonies -
and say what the name Tj ibaou is about. 'Tjibaou' is the name or signifier encompassing a 
real cultural revolution.  Revolution, performed under the Tjibaou flag, is achieved virtually 
23 Shared sovereignty is the core concept in the Noumea Agreement, and through it the whole evolution process 
in the matter of transfer of powers is implemented. The whole process will be judged by a referendum on the 
issue of the transfer of sovereignty rights. On this subject see Jean-Yves Faberon's  paper and Fran9ois Garde's  
book, Les Institutions de la Nouvelle-Caledonie, Paris: L 'Harmattan, collection 'Mondes oceaniens ' ,  200 1 .  
2 4  A friend, Nicolas Kurtovitch, a New Caledonian writer and poet, drew my attention to this writing, co-signed 
by Patrick Chamoiseau and Edouard Glissant, Quand les murs tombent. Cantre une identite nationale mise en 
carte, Paris, Institut du Tout-monde, 28 August 2007. 
25 Joel Bonnemaison, with J. Fages and J.-C. Roux, 'Planche 26: Migrations ' ,  a 2-page sketch in Atlas de 
Nouvelle-Caledonie, Paris/Noumea: ORSTOM, 1 98 1  
26 In the general conclusion to Economie assistee et changement social en Nouvelle-Caledonie, Jean Freyss 
analyzes this political risk which is still a current risk: 'Development, without prior or simultaneous 
decolonization, may lead to two types of change or to a combination of these: a "marginal integration" or an 
"institutionalized dualism"' ,  Economie assistee, op. cit., p 432 
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without violence. The peculiar feature of this revolution is that it was a real permanent 
reformulation. I am positive Jean-Marie Tjibaou purposely reversed the meaning of the title 
of Trotsky's  book, Permanent Revolution. Permanent reformulation brought the ancestral 
link into the present by providing it with material (economic), ontological (the identity of the 
Kanak being now recovered), and political substance (setting up of Melanesian indigenous 
groups within the Kanak people) . 
It is doubtful whether the uninitiated will ever reach any cognition and recognition of the 
magnitude and the scope of Tjibaou's political work. As a disciple of Hegel would put it, the 
good that is known because it is well-known is not known. The comical aspect mentioned in 
the introduction lies in the fact that this has been achieved. Today, the contemporary political 
space and the route the country is taking owe much to Tj ibaou's  work and action. From his 
ancestral fastness, he must see as through a looking-glass and most certainly burst out 
laughing . . .  for joy. 
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1 4 . Kanak identity i n  law 
Jean-Yves Faberon 1 
Introduction 
Eloi Machoro ' s  axe is forever falling on Canala' s  ballot box. There is nothing more to say 
about this act, and among the things that have been said we can mention the fact that some 
people contended it was only a gesture, a publicity stunt, a dramatisation to put things in 
perspective, a mere contrivance, or at best, an aesthetically inappropriate act. 
Others interpreted the action literally and were deeply shocked by a tale entitled 'The Ballot 
Box and the Axe' ,  a new occurrence in the fight between good and evil, between democracy 
and violence, in a version wherein the savage' s  terrible axe smashed the civilized man's 
fragile ballot box. Thus people could only be scared of this hopeless scenario and lament the 
arrogance displayed in this dramatisation. 
The latter interpretation simply meant that people were not aware that Eloi Machoro was by 
no means a savage, although the ballot box is indeed a symbol of civilization and of majority 
democracy. But even as Machoro was expressing himself in this way, it was a democracy 
wherein separatists were always the ones who played a losing game. Machoro wanted to cry 
out about the fact that his indigenous people had become a minority on their own land; he 
realized that the Enlightenment had not foreseen this dispensation and that this kind of 
democracy shut him out. Machoro ' s  axe falling on that ballot box spells out the despair of a 
people that considers they were betrayed by majority rule, and these people were sickened by 
the fact that the legitimacy of the earliest occupants of the land was suppressed by the 
minority' s  defeat. 
Whereas majorities and minorities in democracies accede to power by turns, and all are 
eventually in office, Machoro shouted out that his people were structurally shut out of power. 
In France there may be a rightist majority or a leftist majority, but for Eloi Machoro there 
could be no Kanak majority, let alone a separatist majority. In this system, power was off 
limits, which to him meant that his identity and even his dignity were denied. 
1 Public law professor, University of Montpellier I ,  and Joint director of House Blong Melanesia, Noumea 
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When he expressed himself in this way on 1 8  November 1 984, Eloi Machoro had only 55 
days to live.2 He was not to get the answer to the question he had asked. 
But the answer did come. Today, Kanak separatists are not losers, because law has been able 
to (I) devise processes conducive to Kanak franchise and (II) perfect the specifically Kanak 
institutions. 
I. The Kanaks' enfranchisement 
Prior to the debate over the Kanaks ' enfranchisement, the Kanak people must be legally 
recognized ( 1 ), and that leads to setting up a New Caledonia (and not only Kanak) citizenship 
(2) . 
1. Legal recognition of the Kanak people 
a) First we must mention the Nainville-les-Roches statement of 12 July 1 9833 - that is, while 
Eloi Machoro was still alive; this was the first document resulting from dialogue and 
proclaiming 'the legitimacy of the Kanak people' ;  but in fact, negotiations failed and there 
was no total consensus on this document. 
As for the 26 June 1 988 Matignon Agreements, they mention 'the common recognition of the 
identity of each of the human groups present in the territory of New Caledonia' .  
S o  separatists never stopped asking for the settlement of the ' colonial dispute ' .  What they 
mean by this phrase is that even if governmental bodies were going to allow them to express 
themselves at various levels, it was necessary and essential first to recognize the legitimacy 
of the Kanak people and the negative aspects of the colonial period. 
True, colonial conquest had brought its share of violence, and the Indigenous Code was 
injustice turned into law. 
The Indigenous Code (for New Caledonia it was based on an order dated 1 8  July 1 887) was a 
regime of fundamentally discriminatory sanctions against the indigenous population; 
punishments were too many, too heavy and out of proportion with the acts that led to them. 
After the passing of the Third Republic and the French colonial empire, the 1 946 Constitution 
meant the end of arbitrariness. But despite these legal provisions, New Caledonian 
breakaway Kanaks complained that de-colonization was going too slowly. Only with the 
1 998 Noumea Agreement, whose principles are equated with constitutional provisions,4 did 
they really feel satisfied. 
2 Regarding all chronological information in the contemporary history of New Caledonia, see the essential book 
by Frederic Angleviel, Breve histoire politique de la Nouvelle-Ca/Monie contemporaine (1945-2005), Noumea: 
Editions du GFHOC, 2006 
3 See the Nainville-les-Roches Declaration, the Matignon and Oudinot Agreements and the Noumea Agreement 
in the journal Revue juridique, politique et economique de Nouvelle-Ca/Monie, no. 1 0, 2007, pp 2- 1 3  
4 O n  the Noumea Agreement and the status o f  New Caledonia stemming from it, see, among others, Jean-Yves 
Faberon and Guy Agniel (eds), La Souverainete partagee en Nouvelle-Catedonie et en droit compare, La 
Documentation fran9aise, 2000, p 463 
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The ' colonial dispute' was addressed and removed from the agenda insofar as the Noumea 
Agreement' s  preamble states :  'Colonization has undermined the dignity of the Kanak people 
since it deprived it of its identity . . .  It is appropriate to recall those difficult times, to 
acknowledge the mistakes, to restore the Kanak people to its identity which had been 
confiscated. ' 
The fine phrase in this document is well known: 'Now it is time to acknowledge the shadowy 
aspects of the colonial period, even though it was not devoid of light. ' 
The Agreement's preamble mentions the Matignon Agreements in terms of 'a negotiated 
consensual settlement' ,  and states that 'ten years later, it is appropriate to open up a new 
stage marked by the full recognition of Kanak identity. ' 
The document uses the term 'Kanak people ' a third time, saying that today it is about 
enabling 'the Kanak people to set up with France new relationships fitting the reality of our 
times. '  
This legal recognition of the Kanak people which restores them to their dignity was all the 
more significant in 1 998, as at that date people were aware of the Constitutional Council ' s  
ruling on the status of Corsica proclaiming the oneness of the French people and invalidating 
the notion of Corsican people, even though they were presented as a 'component' of the 
French people. 5 
The notion of Kanak people is therefore particularly remarkable since it occurred after this 
decision, and thus introduced an exception. 
b) This question, however, was raised again with the 2003 Constitutional Amendment 
relating to the decentralized organization of the Republic. This Amendment, which overhauls 
the constitutional organization of French overseas departments and territories (but does not 
change the provisions relating to New Caledonia, which are guaranteed under a separate 
heading (XIII)) creates a new article 72-3 worded thus: 'The Republic recognizes, within the 
French people, the overseas populations in a common ideal of liberty, equality and 
brotherhood. ' So this time there is a reassertion, in the very body of the Constitution, of the 
oneness of the French people. 
5 Constitutional Council ruling dated 9 May 1991  (290 DC). See L Favoreu and L Philip, Les Grandes decisions 
du Conseil constitutionnel, Dalloz, 1 999, p 772 ff. :  'Whereas Article I in the law is phrased thus: 'The French 
Republic secures to the historic and culturally living community made up by the Corsican people, a component 
of the French people, the rights to preserve its cultural identity and defend its specific economic and social 
interests. These rights, which are linked to its island status, shall be exercised while showing respect for the 
nation's unity, within the framework of the Constitution, of the laws of the Republic and this status . . .  Whereas 
France is, as Article 2 of the 1 958 Constitution provides, an indivisible, secular, democratic and social Republic 
securing equal protection of the laws to all citizens regardless of their origin, the law's  wording mentioning the 
'Corsican people, a component of the French people, '  is unconstitutional, as the Constitution acknowledges only 
the French people, made up of all French citizens regardless of origin, race or religion. '  
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Does that mean that the Kanak people no longer have a legal existence since in law there is 
only one French people? It is worth remembering that in law the most recent instrument is the 
valid one. 
In this instance, the answer to the above question is no, not as regards New Caledonia' s  very 
special case as spelled out under separate heading XIII. Indeed, the constitutional status of 
New Caledonia is extremely dispensatory with regard to ordinary constitutional law, for 
example in areas that are fundamental such as the franchise or the definition of the law. In the 
same way, therefore, we will consider that Article 72-3 of the Constitution does not prevent 
the Constitution from referring to the notion of Kanak people. Incidentally, if this notion is 
equivalent to a constitutional principle, its importance retains mostly and in a fundamental 
way a political, cultural and sociological value: it is a sanction restoring the dignity of the 
Indigenous Code 's  victims. 
For that matter, this does not have any absolute legal consequences, for Affirmative Action as 
implemented in New Caledonia, such as the disenfranchisement of a certain category of 
people, applies not to the Kanak people but to New Caledonian citizenship, which is not the 
same thing. 
2. The advent of New Caledonian citizenship 
Australia had denied the existence of Aborigines to the point that it did not include them in 
censuses until 1 987.  
The legal denial of the Kanak identity translated during the colonial period into Kanaks being 
deprived of citizenship. In 1 946, the new Constitution, substituting the French Union for the 
French colonial Empire, provides in its preamble (which is still valid today) that it ' rules out 
any colonization system based upon arbitrariness ' and 'guarantees to all equal access to 
public office and the individual or collective exercise of the rights and freedoms' proclaimed 
by the 1 789 Declaration of Human Rights and by this preamble of the 1 946 Constitution. 
Article 80 in the 1 946 Constitution proclaimed: 'All overseas territories' nationals are French 
citizens' ,  and this is continued in Article 82, which underscores ' the rights and freedoms that 
go with French citizenship' .  But democratization, notably in the matter of overseas 
representation in Parliament, had to wait until the Fourth Republic enacted the 23 June 1 956 
framework law, also called the Defferre Act. In  New Caledonia, the act was implemented 
through the 22 July 1 957 enforcement order. From that date on, New Caledonia has been 
represented in the French Parliament by two representatives in the National Assembly and 
one Senator. It had a Kanak representative, Rock Pidjot, from 1 967 to 1 986 and its Senator is 
a Kanak (Dick Ukeiwe followed by Simon Loueckhote) since 1 983 .  
When the Fifth Republic was instituted, the new Constitution was the subject of  a referendum 
that was held in September 1 958 ,  and in the overseas territories it was regarded as a self­
determination ballot - that is how one of the territories, Guinea, chose to be independent. 
In New Caledonia it is worth pointing out that at that time Kanaks were in the majority, and 
98 per cent of voters were in favour of the Constitution and of being part of France. That was 
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the time of the 1958 Constitutional Community; for its members, the former Black African 
territories, it proved a transition period toward independence, and New Caledonia, for its part, 
could look forward to increasing autonomy. 
In fact, the 1 960s were marked by two fundamental events: on the one hand, the State 
gradually recovered many powers and self-rule seemed to recede, and on the other hand a 
great shift in population happened: Kanaks became a minority in their own country as a result 
of what was dubbed the 'nickel boom' ,  which brought an influx of people from mainland 
France. In other words, at the same time as the government's centralizing policy was a great 
concern for Kanaks, who were eager to retain their identity, those Kanaks were drawn into a 
situation in which they were going to be deprived of the essential means of expression in the 
democracy in which they were now included: their electoral strength has become too small to 
be in a position to make majority decisions. At that moment, the foundations of the New 
Caledonian issue were laid, and they led both to the conflicts and to the consensus that was 
sought. In New Caledonia, defining the present and determining the future is like squaring 
the circle. 
New Caledonia was a settlement colony which prospered to the point where the indigenous 
population has become a minority. So how to make sense of the democratic institutions that 
the Republic had laid open to them? Did they mean the right to self-determination and 
citizenship based on electoral processes? 
For about a century, Kanaks had not enjoyed equality within the republic, and when they 
eventually did, thanks to the 1 946 Constitution, they soon lost its benefit because their 
numbers were lower than those of the other groups living in New Caledonia. 
In debates on New Caledonia that emphasize colonial, neo-colonial, repressive policy and the 
policy that was detrimental to the indigenous population practiced by the Republic, it may 
seem beyond understanding that the island, unlike most French overseas possessions, did not 
gain independence through the normal self-determination channels . . .  That is because people 
forget this peculiar feature of New Caledonia - the indigenous people have become a 
minority in their own land. Just think that in the other big French settlement colony, Algeria, 
there were one million Europeans in 1 962, but also 1 0  million indigenous people ! That being 
the case, the outcome was a foregone conclusion. 
That is why, as early as the 1 960s, the Kanaks ' fight for their identity was based upon the 
suffrage issue, and they had to realize one terrible fact - the franchise that they had claimed 
for so long was no longer of any use to them, since their ballot was powerless on account of 
their having become a minority. This is the profound meaning of Eloi Machoro' s  ballot-box 
smashing. 
Kanaks had suffered discrimination which disenfranchised them and kept them from being 
citizens, and yet they resolved to struggle so their votes would be decisive and to that end, 
this time around they would seek new discriminatory rules disenfranchising non Kanaks. 
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In the early stages of the struggle, Kanaks claimed they should be the only ones to have the 
right to vote in self-determination elections. Separatism started with the carefully stated 
phrase 'Kanak independence' ,  as distinguished from New Caledonian independence. 
In the face of the outcry generated by such a claim for discrimination which runs counter to 
Republican equality because it is based upon ethnicity and explicitly rejected by Article I of 
the French Constitution, Kanaks contended that only the people who were colonized must be 
allowed to vote on decolonization. 
But for France it was unthinkable to discriminate against some of its citizens on the basis of 
race,  and this would lead to charges of racism - not to mention that New Caledonia is a land 
with a mixed population. 
That is how, through a change whose importance cannot be overstressed, Kanak separatists, 
in the untenable situation they were in, accepted the participation of non-Kanak New 
Caledonians in consultations on autonomy. They dubbed those people 'victims of history' ,  
and that is  the 12  July 1 983 Nainville-les-Roches Declaration. 
Obviously, non-separatists, the RPCR party, had some reservations about this declaration; 
restricting the franchise, an essential civil right, was going to pose huge problems - the 
universal suffrage principle is a fundamental principle; obviously, the road was bound to be a 
long one, but the future was laid out. New Caledonia law will allow for a specific New 
Caledonian identity; it will not be strictly speaking the Kanak identity, but Kanak identity 
will be an essential component of the same. The price to pay was a Constitutional 
Amendment providing for an exception to the sacrosanct principle of universal suffrage, and 
the Amendment paved the way for the Noumea Agreement which sets up the concept of New 
Caledonian citizenship. But it is not a Kanak citizenship. 
After the 1 983 Nainville-les-Roches Declaration came the 1 984 self-rule statute and Edgar 
Pisani made proposals for independence in free association. Disagreements still focused on 
who was to be allowed to vote - in spite of the presence of the French Government and a 
national majority favouring the independentists. 
After the rightwing parties were returned to power, the 13 September self-rule referendum 
was boycotted by separatists (the election returns showed that 98 per cent of those who 
turned out voted for keeping New Caledonia in the French Republic and 40 per cent 
abstained from voting). People who could prove they had been residents for three years were 
allowed to vote. There was an appeal to the Constitutional Council, and the Constitutional 
Council did not find any reason to invalidate the procedure. 
But when the Matignon Agreements provided for a new self-determination vote after ten 
years and decided that only those with a ten-year residence would be allowed to vote, there 
was a referendum on that issue; this referendum, however, was exempted from constitutional 
review (6 November 1 988) notably because it was feared that the Constitutional Council, the 
guardian of constitutional principles, would reject such a franchise-restricting decision. 
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In French law Kanak suffrage cannot exist, but the requirement for ties to New Caledonia 
grew more and more stringent and as a result the residency requirement was stepped up to 
three years and then to ten years from the six months required in ordinary French law. In the 
consensus reached through the Noumea Agreement, the requirements are much stiffer, as the 
planned self-determination referendums starting in 20 14  will allow only those who could 
vote in 1 998 to take part, that is, those who in 1 998 had been residents for ten years, and this 
means they would have to have 26 years ' residence in 2014,  and many more in following 
years (at the date when the enforcement of the agreement ends, which is theoretically at the 
end of the term of the assembly elected in 20 14,  or 20 1 9  . . .  ) .  
I t  must be specified that this significant restriction of the number of voters in  the self­
determination referendum is accepted by all the parties to the agreement and it has never been 
interpreted in divergent ways. 
The situation is different regarding the fundamental concept of New Caledonian citizenship. 
There is a ten-year residency requirement to be allowed to take part in provincial elections for 
the New Caledonia Congress. There is a disagreement between the separatist and non­
separatist signatory parties over the question of whether anybody can become a New 
Caledonian citizen as soon as they reach a ten-year residency, or if citizenship is restricted to 
those who had been residents for ten years or more in 2008. This issue (which, unfortunately 
was not settled in the consensual spirit which pervades the Noumea Agreement) was decided 
in the most restrictive way, just as separatists has requested, by a Constitutional Amendment 
in 2007.6 
So this is where the issue of Kanak suffrage stands: Kanak suffrage as such does not exist; 
however, a new citizenship - that is, New Caledonian citizenship - has emerged. It is more 
inclusive than the notion of Kanak people, but significantly restricted as compared to French 
citizenship in a broad sense according to ordinary French law. The franchise will be very 
much restricted in self-determination referendums. 
In Provincial elections, local elections which represent the political voice in New Caledonia, 
the voting rights already restricted. But we should not forget that it concerns a political 
development which alone is a response to Eloi Machoro ' s  cry: dividing New Caledonia into 
provinces (which was in embryo when regions were created in 1 985) enables the minority in 
New Caledonia to be in the majority in some provinces. Separatists are in the minority across 
New Caledonia as a whole and in the Southern Province, but they have a majority in the 
Northern Province and in the Islands Province; so long as they hold power in these two 
provinces, they can show what they are capable of . . .  and achieve part of Eloi Machoro ' s  
dream. 
Similarly, in a very original way, New Caledonia has a government whose members are 
selected by proportional representation of the representatives in Congress - members of 
Congress are selected by the various provincial assemblies on a proportional basis. That 
6 Jean-Yves Faberon, 'La Revision constitutionnelle du 23 fevrier 2007 sur le corps electoral de Nouvelle­
Caledonie' ,  Revue.fram;aise de droit administratif, 2007, pp 665-68 
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means that even though separatists remain in the minority across New Caledonia as a whole, 
they are present in its government, which does not emanate only from the majority: it is a 
proportional representation of all political parties which have won seats. The government of 
New Caledonia which the Noumea Agreement wished for demonstrates consensual (and not 
majority) democracy, which is the very essence of the agreement. In it there is a place for 
everybody. 
And since we are talking about Kanaks and not strictly separatists - not all Kanaks are 
separatists - let us emphasize the fact that the very diversity within the Kanak population is 
always illustrated by the pluralistic nature of the New Caledonian government. 
Besides, legal imagination has devised institutions that are specific to Kanaks and help them 
develop their country. 
II. Kanaks-only institutions 
Kanak identity in law, the quintessential question for Kanak men and women, is their specific 
status as Kanaks; it is also that there be a deliberative assembly reserved for the Kanak 
community; thirdly, Kanak identity is a recognition of the values of Kanak culture. 
1. The Kanak customary status 
The 1958  French Constitution provides, in Article 75 : 'Citizens of the Republic who do not 
have civil status under ordinary law shall retain this status as long as they do not repudiate it. ' 
This Article shows that long before the Noumea Agreement, the Constitution at its inception 
included a major exception to the principle stated in Article I: 'France ensures equal 
protection of the laws for all citizens regardless of origin, race or religion. ' At the time, this 
provision related mostly to the bulk of French Muslims in Algeria. Currently, it relates to the 
French Muslims in Mayotte, part of the population of Wallis and Futuna, and New Caledonia 
Kanaks. 
The Constitutional Council, however, questioned some rules pertaining to personal status 
when it upheld, in its 1 7  July 2003 decision, the 2 1  July 2003 overseas outline law which 
repealed in Article 68 a certain number of major rules regarding the Mahorais personal status: 
polygamy, repudiation, and inheritance laws, the rules that are discriminatory against 
women . . .  
For the Constitutional Council, 'Citizens who retain their personal status enjoy the 
constitutional rights and freedoms that are part of French citizenship and they are subjected to 
the same duties . . .  The Legislative . . .  as long as it did not question the very existence of the 
civil status in local law, could pass provisions likely to change the rules of the local law with 
a view to making them compatible with the protected constitutional principles and rights. '  7 
7 See Regis Lafargue, 'Les Contraintes posees par ! 'article 75 de Ja Constitution entre heritage colonial et 
volonte de modernisation de la societe mahoraise',  in L Sermet and D Decoudray (eds), Mayotte dans la 
Republique, Montchrestien, 2004, pp 305-3 3 1  
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This constitutional stand could possibly apply to New Caledonia if some day the French 
legislature ventured into the area of the detail of New Caledonia' s customary status. 
Therefore, there could be some constitutional limits that the French Republic could set to the 
Kanak customary status and consequently on Kanak identity, which is legally registered 
within the French Republic. 
However, the status of New Caledonia in the Republic is an exception, and the Noumea 
Agreement, incorporated into the Constitution, departs from Article 75 of the Constitution 
when it states, with regard to New Caledonia, that 'any person who could have customary 
status and who repudiated it or who is deprived of it as a result of repudiation by his 
ancestors or through marriage or any other cause (as is the case of children on the records of 
Births Marriages and Deaths in mainland France) could recover that status. '  
The Organic Law of 1 9  March 1 999 adds, besides the ability to change the status, the 
possibility of reinstatement of customary status : Within five years after this law was enacted, 
any person who could prove that one of his or her ancestors enjoyed customary civil status 
was enabled to repudiate their ordinary law civil status and obtain customary status (art. 1 3  
par. 2) 
2 1 2  people took advantage of this possibility during the time allowed.8 
As early as title I, the New Caledonia statute involves customary civil status and to 
customary landownership.9 
Article 1 9  of the Organic Law provides that the Magistrates '  Court has jurisdiction in 
litigation related to customary status or to lands held under customary landownership rules. 
In such instances, the bench is complemented by customary associate judges appointed 
within the court and within the Appeals Court by the 1 5  October 1 982 governmental 
ordinance (82-877). 
The people to whom the customary civil status applies enjoy a broad interpretation of this 
statute thanks to a Cour de Cassation decision ( 1 5  January 2007). 1 0  In this case, the question 
was whether assistance to education was part of the customary civil status or not insofar as 
custom in Melanesian society could be viewed as rejecting the notion of assistance to 
education, since education is part of the private sphere. The Cour de Cassation ruled that 
'persons with a customary civil status are subject to their customs in anything contained in 
civil law. ' 
It is the common law judge who represents the judicial power of the French Republic, 
administering justice in the name of the French people, but when he makes decisions about 
8 Cf. L Wamytan and A Lenault, 'Changement de statut et statut civil coutumier: bilan et perspectives ' ,  Revue 
juridique, politique et economique de la Nouvelle-Caledonie, no. 4, 2004, p 39 
9 See R Lafargue, La Coutume judiciaire en Nouvelle-Ca!edonie. Aux sources d'un droit commun coutumier, 
Presses Universitaires d'Aix-Marseille, 2003, p 207 
10 See the commentary by Laurent Sermet in Revue juridique politique et economique de Nouvelle-Caledonie, 
no. 9, 2007, p 68 
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the Kanak people - or more exactly French citizens with Kanak customary status - he does 
not implement the same law. Customary justice, as compared to justice in common law, is 
part of an organic but not a substantive whole. 
It is worth pointing out, however, that criminal law rules out the use of custom, and it can 
oppose it: law and order and the general principles of law prevail over custom. 
With regard to land ownership, the Noumea Agreement states first that 'the identity of each 
Kanak is defined first and foremost in reference to a piece of land' (point 1 .4). The status of 
Kanak governs property rights by stating that they are guaranteed by the Constitution and 
they apply in landownership cases in the matter of private property and public property, to 
which the property of customary lands is added (article 6 LO). Customary lands and the 
properties located thereupon and belonging to customary civil status people are governed by 
custom. Customary lands are the reservations; the lands granted to groups governed by a 
particular local law (legal entities representing traditional group ownership), and the lands 
that were granted or are granted by territorial communities or government land corporations 
to meet requests within the framework of the principle of one ' s  link to land (Rural and Land 
Development Agency). Customary lands are inalienable, non-transferable, and immune from 
take-over. 
On the whole, Kanak customary law has significantly advanced with the enactment of the 1 5  
January 2007 local law relating to customary acts. 
This law now gives a legal definition to palaver as 'a  discussion conducted according to the 
practices of the Kanak custom and ending with a customary decision. The decision can be 
recorded within the framework of a customary act. ' (Article 1 )  
A customary act i s  defined as 'a  conventional legal act, characterized by a concurrence of 
interdependent wishes' (Article 3). A customary act can involve an individual or a group, and 
it is legally binding both to persons under the customary civil status and persons who are 
subject to ordinary law. 
This local law revokes the power that the gendarmerie had to take minutes of palaver 
meetings; it creates the customary public officers ' corps (for this purpose) . 
Differences over the interpretation of a customary act are settled by the appropriate 
customary council. When the council has reached the limits of its powers, the matter can be 
taken to regular courts. 
2. The Kanak Customary Senate 
It is remarkable to find in multiethnic New Caledonia with its multiethnic citizenship and a 
government made up as a result of proportional representation and which is at the service of 
the ' shared [or common] destiny' ,  a deliberative chamber devoted to just one community. Its 
purpose is to strengthen the Kanak identity in the process of setting up New Caledonian 
institutions. 
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In fact, the Customary Senate, the successor of the Customary Consultative Council provided 
for in the previous status, remains a consultative body, but the name Senate is, of course, not 
the result of chance, for it echoes the upper Chamber in the Republic. The French Senate 
historically speaking has been through some less satisfactory periods, and today it is still less 
powerful than the National Assembly, but the word Senate is synonymous with wisdom and 
respect; it is this image that is conveyed today by the Customary Senate and its members, 
called 'Senators ' .  
This Chamber i s  made up o f  1 6  members appointed by the customary councils in the eight 
customary areas (two senators from each customary area), in compliance with practices 
recognized by custom. The government' s  president takes note of these appointments as per 
Article 1 37  of the statutory law. This law envisages the selection of Senators by election. But 
this change in the type of legitimacy, which is not provided for in the Noumea Agreement, 
would only strengthen the criticisms of those who find fault with the Customary Senate for 
being a French law construct affording only an imitation of the custom through non-authentic 
channels. True, an election process might put at the head of area councils and in the Senate 
customary officials whose rank is below that of big chiefs, and as a result, chiefs would be 
challenged. This is another instance of how the democratic thought process and the Kanak 
thought process - here the customary process - differ, and this difference must be taken into 
account. If we are really seeking Kanak identity we must be aware that customary paths can 
be highly unorthodox. 
The customary senators' term is five years. The Senate can be dissolved if at least six 
customary councils request dissolution. 
The Customary Senate appoints its Speaker for a one-year term. Thus all members in tum get 
to fill that position, and each customary area in turn has a nominee appointed as Speaker. 
The Customary Senate has powers regarding plans and bills for local laws dealing with New 
Caledonian logos and badging, the customary civil status, the customary landownership 
system, the customary palaver system, customary area boundaries, and the way Customary 
Senators and customary council members are elected (Article 42). 
The Customary Senate debates these topics within two months after the matters have been 
referred to it, and the outcome of the debate is submitted to the New Caledonia Congress. 
Congress may pass the local bill either in the same terms as the Customary Senate' s  
document or with amendments . The Congress ' s  bill i s  submitted to the Customary Senate. At 
that juncture, the Customary Senate either accepts the bill as submitted by Congress or rejects 
it, and then Congress makes the final decision - of course, in its decision it can take into 
account remarks made by the Customary Senate. 
It is worth pointing out that the Customary Senate does not have the power of referring any 
local laws that it has debated to the Constitutional Council. 
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Regarding congressional decisions, the Customary Senate must be consulted on plans and 
proposals relating to Kanak identity by the Government Chairman, by the Speaker of 
Congress or by the Speaker of a provincial assembly. On all other matters, consultation is 
optional, as is consultation by the French State ' s  representative on matters for which the State 
has power. 
The Customary Senate can, on its own, refer any proposal regarding Kanak identity to the 
Government, to Congress or to a provincial assembly. 
If the Customary Senate considers that the matters referred to it relate to one or several 
customary areas, its Speaker in turn refers the matters to the customary councils involved. 
There is a customary council in each customary area. New Caledonian statutory law provides 
that membership in such a council is determined on the basis of practices specific to each 
area. 
Any customary council (besides the Customary Senate) can be consulted on any issue by the 
High Commissioner, by the government, the Speaker of a provincial assembly or a mayor. 
Any customary council can be consulted by any administrative or judicial authority on the 
interpretation of customary rules. 
3. The sanctioning of Kanak culture 
As New Caledonia is not made up exclusively of Kanaks but also by people of other 
cultures, 1 1  the January 1 988 statute (so-called Pons II) and its 22 April 1 988  enforcement 
order provided for a New Caledonian Office for cultures extant in New Caledonia. Its board 
was made up of people representing the various cultures such as Melanesian, European, 
Wallisian and Vietnamese (these people were appointed by the High Commissioner after 
taking the opinion of the most representative associations of these cultures). 
However, and for 20 years, the Kanak cultural identity of New Caledonia has been 
emphasized (just as was the case with the Kanak Cultural, Scientific and Technical Office 
created by the 15 October 1 982 government ordinance no. 82-879). 
The statute set up by the November 1988 Matignon Agreements created the Agence de 
developpement de la culture canaque, eventually sanctioned as ADCK, which made 'Kanak' 
the official spelling. This is a State organization, now in the process of being transferred to 
New Caledonia. 
The 27 July 1 989 enforcement order assigns to ADCK the mission of developing and 
promoting Kanak culture. In particular, it is in charge of developing the Kanak 
archaeological, ethnological and linguistic heritage; fostering contemporary forms of Kanak 
culture, especially with regard to traditional carving, audio-visual techniques, and arts; 
promoting cultural exchanges, notably in the South Pacific region, and defining and operating 
research programs. Its board is made up of three representatives of the State appointed by the 
1 1  See Paul De Deckker and Jean-Yves Faberon, eds, L 'Etat Pluriculturel et les droits aux differences, Brussels: 
Bruylant, 2003 (and specifically the 2nd part, devoted to New Caledonia). 
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High Commissioner, three people appointed by the Customary Senate (initially they were 
appointed by the Customary Consultative Council of New Caledonia) and six representatives 
from the provincial assemblies, two from each province. 
The Agency' s  Chairman is appointed by a joint decree by the Overseas Ministry and the 
Culture Ministry, after taking the opinion of the Board. 
To implement its missions, the Agency, as early as 1 990, was given the responsibility to 
build the Tj ibaou Cultural Centre. The Tjibaou Cultural Centre is one of the major 
architectural projects achieved under Fran9ois Mitterrand. It was dedicated on 5 May 1 998,  at 
the same time as the Noumea Agreement was being signed by the Prime Minister, Lionel 
Jospin, and the representatives of two New Caledonian political groups. The Centre was 
designed by Renzo Piano, and now its image can be said to be familiar worldwide. 
The Centre is a tool and part and parcel of ADCK - and it is ADCK's headquarters. It is a 
place where Kanak identity is asserted and a place for cultural encounters and creation. 
The Noumea Agreement itself provides that 'The State is committed to providing for the long 
term the technical assistance and the financial resources necessary for the Tjibaou Cultural 
Centre in order to enable the Centre to fully play its role as a gathering place for Kanak 
culture. ' 
Moreover, the 1 999 Organic Law defining the status of New Caledonia (Article 2 1 5) 
provides that 'for the purpose of contributing to the development of New Caledonia, New 
Caledonia, after taking the opinion of the provinces, concludes a special compact with the 
State. ' This cultural agreement was signed in Paris on 22 January 2002 by the Overseas 
Minister and the Chairman of the New Caledonian Government for a seven-year period 
starting on 1 January 2002. 
On the whole, this agreement on the cultural development of New Caledonia is devoted in 
large part to the development of Kanak culture - Kanak cultural heritage, Kanak languages, 
ADCK, etc. 
Finally, the Congress of New Caledonia set up a Kanak Languages Academy on 1 7  January 
2007 in order to set the standards and the usage rules for the 28 vernacular languages and to 
contribute to their promotion and development as well. The Academy is made up of eight 
members, one from each customary area, appointed by the Customary Senate at the 
suggestion of the customary council involved, for a five-year renewable term. 
Conclusion 
These are the foundations of the laws concerning Kanak identity in New Caledonia. The 
entitlements resulting from a restricted suffrage and from agencies specific to Kanaks are of 
major importance. But much remains to be done in this area, and this ongoing legal work 
must advance further, since it is programmed in the Noumea Agreement, a part of the 
Constitution. Among the other things that still need to be done are: 
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• Determining the role of customary authorities in social issues and mediation in 
criminal law; 
• Reinstating Kanak place names and judicial protection of holy sites according to 
Kanak tradition through implementation of the rules relating to historical landmarks; 
• Setting up a register for customary lands identifying customary rights on every plot of 
land and setting up legal instruments and financial resources for the development of 
customary lands; 
• The emblems of the country: they are mentioned in a specific way in the Noumea 
Agreement. The Agreement provides that, regarding the 'name, flag, anthem, motto, 
the design of banknotes ' ,  these identifying signs 'must be the result of a collective 
effort in order to express Kanak identity and the future that we share' .  
Nobody knows what has become of Eloi Machoro ' s  axe.  It is a symbolic axe. What is certain 
is that today the hatchet is buried in New Caledonian soil, a Kanak land, a land of welcome 
and a land shared by many diverse groups, so that the motto could be, ' This land is your land, 
this land is my land' .  
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be a Kanak now 
Elie Poigoune 1 
For a long time Kanak culture was ignored in New Caledonia. It was considered worthless, or 
a subculture. The fight for the assertion and recognition of Kanak identity has been waged by 
the separatists and FLNKS ' s  political struggle. It started with the Red Scarves Movement and 
Nidolsh Naisseline in the seventies and continued with the festival called Melanesia 2000 in 
1 975 .  Thanks to this struggle, Kanak identity has now a major place in the Noumea 
Agreement. 
The Agreement provides for a specific civil status; it recognizes customary law and 
structures, Kanak cultural heritage, place names, cultural artefacts and Kanak languages. It 
also provides for the development of our culture, for the Tjibaou Cultural Centre (for its 
influence in the Pacific and across the world), for land as an essential component of this 
identity, and for emblems and logos of the country which must be fully reflected in them. 
Kanak culture used to be a dominated, ignored and denied culture, but now it has grown into 
a developing culture; it is getting richer from contact with other cultures and it is in full 
bloom. Kanaks, since the Noumea Agreement was signed and their culture was 
acknowledged, have got a taste for life and they are raring to go; they want to build this 
country with the others and share the values that make up their identity. 
Being a Kanak today is both keeping one's  roots and values and being fully engaged in 
modernity. 
1. Keeping one's roots 
Blood, the symbol of life 
In Kanak culture, life is symbolized by blood. The blood circulating in my veins is my 
mother' s, and therefore that of my maternal uncle. My maternal uncle is said to be the owner 
of my blood. 
This blood moves across mountains and rivers, and even across the sea to irrigate, enrich and 
give life to other men and women, other families, other clans, other chiefdoms. 
The paternal clan which has received this blood must work hard to rise to be worthy of these 
riches and take responsibility for them at the most important times in life - birth, marriage, 
death. 
1 Chairman of the League of Human Rights, Noumea 
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In the cemuhi language, during wedding ceremonies, the bride, before her brothers and her 
clan, is called 'pwaden' ,  i .e .  the road or the way. This road crosses the country to bring life to 
it. 
A Kanak tribe, where people have been living for hundreds of years, is criss-crossed by a 
great number of roads running from north to south, from east to west, from mountain to sea, 
from the mainland to the islands. These blood roads make this tribe and this land a sacred 
space breathing life and gives forth energy springing from the depths. You can access this 
land only through a great deal of humility, respect and consideration. 
The land, mother of life 
I, for example, am said to come from a place called Lnenu, a land located between the Dozip 
and Haneu tribes in the Li:issi district in Lifou. This land is a sacred land for me because it has 
given me life. 
So the land is the cradle of life; man has responsibilities and duties towards it; he must work 
hard to make this land sweet and light so the life on it can grow more beautiful and so it can 
enrich other countries and other men. 
Yams as a symbol of man 
The land from which life springs must be worked with love and respect. 
The best way to work it is to plant yams every year. 
Yams symbolize the local man; they are handled with care and respect in the ceremonies 
marking life. 
To put yams in the soil, it takes a lot of work and care, and you must get the sweet and light 
topsoil ready, and after a few weeks of slumber in this warm bed they will shoot up their first 
stems and roots. 
During its growing period, the master of the land will watch over it carefully and cater to its 
needs. 
During the day it is flooded with light and warmth from the sun; at night it gets some dew 
drops to cool and it is visited by the 'yam stone' which will give it the strength to grow and 
be more beautiful. 
When life springs out of this soil to go to other countries, yams go along with it, as they 
represent man and the land from which they have sprung. 
Being engaged in modernity 
Being a Kanak today is also to live in the community and fully take one ' s  responsibilities as a 
citizen. With our secular system, the city enables us to live together in modem life and accept 
others who are different. To show respect for life amounts to showing respect for the blood 
that flows in each of us, but it also means respecting others because blood flows in each of 
them. The blood in others has taken a long trip to reach New Caledonia. Let's view these 
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ways and rivers which originated elsewhere as tributaries that will enlarge and enrich our 
own river. 
The Noumea Agreement brings a huge challenge - that of building this country with our 
various riches, and in conclusion I ' ll quote this passage from the Preamble to the Noumea 
Agreement: 
The past was colonization time. 
The present is the time for sharing and balancing things. 
The future must be the time for identity within a shared destiny. 
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I l l .  The Futu re 
Discussion : what is  the futu re of New 
Caledonia ' s  Me lanesian identity? 
Jean-Yves Faberon, Louis-Jose Barbancon, Jean- Brice 
Herrenschmidt, Raphael Mapou 
Jean-Yves FABER ON 
To the question of New Caledonia' s Kanak identity a good answer is: Elie Poigoune. It is a 
reassuring answer. For that matter, be aware that if Elie Poigoune is not here today it is 
because he takes care of an organization New Caledonians are familiar with and that is the 
Juvenat. The Juvenat helps out youths who want to work and to succeed at school. Regarding 
the demographics question, can we have a notion of what the future holds? 
Louis-Jose BARBANCON 
The gap between the demographics of Kanaks and the demographics of Whites is closing, 
and now the curves are quite close to each other. But this is a natural phenomenon which can 
be observed in most countries as soon as they experience economic development, well-being, 
a change for the better in health conditions, and an improvement in hygiene conditions. 
When the Magenta clinic opened and the Magenta Hospital for women and children was 
created, Kanak, Wallisian and Futunian women could have their babies delivered in 
conditions as good as anything in private clinics up to that time, and of course, things 
changed. Obviously, by the same token, when the Poindimie Hospital, and later the Koumac 
Hospital and others were opened, conditions improved and things changed. Inevitably, in 
these areas, the Melanesian mindset is drawing closer to the European mindset and to that of 
other communities. And the birth rate, which up to that time was very high among 
Melanesians, is diminishing on account of the change in the standard of living. 
It can be said that in New Caledonia, there are approximately - and real demographers would 
qualify this figure - 4,000 births and 1 ,000 deaths a year. Consequently, the natural increase 
in population is about 3 ,000 per year. Whenever the increase is greater than 3 ,000 it means 
immigrants have come in. These immigrants may stay or leave. 
These figures are important if we are to comprehend what I will say about the Noumea 
Agreement. The agreement was signed in 1 998, and if the referendum eventually takes place 
in 20 1 8, that would mean 20 years will have gone by; as a result, 20,000 people who were 
1 1 1  
The New Pacific Review 
living when the agreement was signed would have died by 20 1 8 . Meantime there will have 
been 80,000 births. People who were not 1 8  in 1 998 will be 1 8  or over and will be allowed to 
vote. In other words, the voting population in 20 1 8  will include 1 00,000 individuals who 
could not vote in 1 998 .  And there lies the Noumea Agreement challenge. It is a challenge to 
the country' s  youth, since in the end, who will vote in 20 1 8  if not the youth of the present? 
They will make their decisions depending on what we will have been able to bequeath to 
them, to teach them or to give them. And that is essential. It is important for school 
curriculum and for wealth distribution; it is important for there to be a better distribution 
when companies ' dividends are in. If we revert to the boom period when Kanaks saw trucks 
with loads worth millions go by, it won't work. Nothing could be as it used to be. 
Of course, there were other options. For example, in Hong Kong in 1 997 they said it' s  
handover, and you just get ready for  it. Here, in some ways, they trusted a future generation 
with the choice. And the whole responsibility shared by political leaders, intellectuals, other 
leaders, through organizations that are not only political organizations - such as Juvenat -
lies in this query - What kind of country are we going to leave to the youth? Because in the 
end they will be the ones to decide. 
Jean-Brice HERRENSCHMIDT 
Good morning, I 'm Jean-Brice Herrenschmidt, from IRD. I would like to give the floor to the 
Customary Senate people who honor us by being present. I believe that in this debate we 
should listen to those who are in the best position to talk about the future of Kanak identity. 
In order to be able to ask my question, I ' ll bring some quick testimony. I work alongside a 
small private organization called GIE Oceanide which, among others, works on management 
plans as part of the UNESCO world heritage. It involves fieldwork all across New Caledonia 
working together with the provinces. We are trying to develop participative management of 
the coral reef marine environment on the basis of consensual democratic principles and not 
only representative democracy (to use the terms that have been using previously), but in 
fieldwork we face challenges that are, in my view, and in many areas, closely linked to the 
issue of identity today. 
First of all, we have to face organizational problems regarding the structuring of chiefdoms or 
districts, and there are always very serious and hard-to-manage conflicts. In other words, we 
have to face challenges linked to clan identities, for in many places in New Caledonia many 
people and many clans are in a precarious position, which means that within the chiefdoms' 
organization they are viewed as outsiders. This strains relationships with regard to the way 
people can be represented in management committees. This is a first practical problem linked 
to identity that we have to face in fieldwork. 
Secondly, there is another area where the identity issue is often raised, and that is the link 
between generations. The problem of the transmission of knowledge is very often raised by 
people with whom we work as part of management plans for world heritage. As a matter of 
fact, in compliance with the Noumea Agreement, we try to put forward the recognition of 
Kanak identity and to have organizations and contemporary law recognize a certain number 
of social organizations and environmental management organizations, notably in marine 
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environment and, as a result, take into account place names, relations clans have with place 
names, etc . The purpose is to have this recognized. Now the challenge we face is that 
traditional knowledge of species, of fishing, of ecological environments, etc . ,  is often eroded. 
Similarly, knowledge regarding clans ' legitimacy in talking about such and such a place is 
also very fuzzy depending on the place . There are big differences; I wouldn't generalize, but 
we often have to face this challenge. 
And here is my question to the Customary Senate people : What is being done right now, in 
our customary institutions, the Customary Senate, the area councils, on the question of 
chiefly structures, on the issue of the transmission of knowledge within families, clans, tribes 
themselves? Could you tell us what the present situation is regarding work done by 
customary institutions? I think that to provide an answer to the future of identities, we, 
fieldworkers, really need answers; we need to work hand in hand and to know where you 
stand at the institutional level. Thank you. 
Raphael MAPOU 
Yes, this is a vast subject. Place names are just a beginning. Now it is necessary to work at 
the heart of the matter. If we want to go by the spirit of the Noumea Agreement all the way 
and if we really want to succeed in getting a synthesis, how are we going to combine 
citizenship, the status of people and property, custom and law? The Customary Senate is 
working on inheritance law, which refers to the customary civil code. Some chiefdoms, 
notably in the Islands, are revisiting the way they operate. These are ongoing things. You 
cannot talk about customary acts if you have not identified the basic customary structures, if 
you have not appointed the clan chiefs, redefined the way the ' clan council' operates - the 
clan council is the new name for 'Elders ' Council ' - and if chiefs are not instated. This is the 
work being done in an overhaul of chiefly structures. 
The other part is the customary land register, and this leads to the history of the valleys and to 
the history of specific places. It is an unheard-of undertaking, and we see land problems in all 
conflicts today. ADRAF is being told to overhaul the whole modus operandi which consisted 
of seeking to attribute lands at any cost as part of land reform, allegedly as part of one's  link 
to the land, while really promoting economic development. Now, out of all the lands that 
have already been distributed, 70 per cent are in litigation. Some land problems hark back to 
the history of the clans. Nowadays, what is at stake for us is writing the history of valleys so 
clans stop telling their stories separately and so we can, as a result, have a common history in 
all the valleys. And in litigation settlement, the first stage consists of enabling clans to 
exchange their views on their history, otherwise there could be no agreement on that history, 
there will never be a common history, and that would mean a never-ending string of conflicts. 
And at the institutional level, the process must be strengthened with new laws, etc. That 's  the 
work we have to do. We will need sociologists, anthropologists, etc. Are we able to achieve 
it, or are we, in some places, going to give up and say, we ' ll forget this and move on to 
another business? But today it is hard because we had to awaken the history of the indigenous 
struggle, the buried history of Kanak nationalism. Now people must express themselves in 
order to debate dispassionately about those issues and about the situation with regard to 
customary lands. 
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I need to emphasize this: we need a political will to conduct a program over several years on 
the topic of land law stabilization, and this effort will have to go on for more than ten years. 
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I .  The Past 
1 7. External  i nfluences on Melanesia 
Stewart Firth 1 
Colonial history and Melanesia 
The political and economic situation in all four independent Melanesian countries has roots in 
colonial history as well as in contemporary politics. The colonizers, who were external 
influences by definition, have left a mixed legacy in Melanesia - three states that are defined 
by territory rather than by national identity, and usually characterized by ineffective 
government rather than rapid development of the kind found in parts of South East Asia. 
These are Papua New Guinea (PNG), Solomon Islands and Vanuatu. In the other state, Fiji ,  
the colonizers bequeathed the region' s  most successful and diversified economy, together 
with its most efficient bureaucracy and effective state, but a succession of coups over the past 
20 years has seriously undermined that legacy. 
While the situation in Melanesia has roots in colonial history, it far from being entirely the 
consequence of that history. Pacific Islanders have been responsible for government in PNG, 
Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and Fiji since independence, and their mark on events is now far 
deeper than the one left by the colonizers. 
The independent Melanesian states had no pre-colonial existence except as parts of the 
broader Melanesian culture area. Where their borders should be drawn in order to create 
colonial territories was not obvious, except in the case of Fiji ,  and in the case of the Solomon 
Islands the original borders were changed, with Isabel, Choiseul and the Shortland Islands 
first of all falling to German New Guinea and only later incorporated into the British 
Solomon Islands Protectorate. Having defined their territories, Europeans then proceeded to 
administer them, and the most important outcome of their administration was to create 
nation-states that could become part of the international community of nation-states. PNG 
emerged as a nation-state in 1 975, for example, after a colonial period that began when the 
Germans and British partitioned eastern New Guinea in 1 884, and that included Australian 
administration of Papua from 1 906 onwards and of former German New Guinea from the 
outbreak of World War I in 1 9 14 .  
Colonial rule transformed some parts of  the newly independent world. By the time 
independence came to Singapore and Malaysia, for example, the colonizers had created new 
1 Australian National University 
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societies that owed their demographic mix, system of government and form of economy 
largely to the British. Such was not the case in Melanesia, except in Fiji ,  and even there the 
transformation was partial. 
'Colonial rule' is what the Germans and the Australians are said to have established in 
eastern New Guinea in those early years, but the phrase hardly captures the reality. The 
Germans probably reached no more than a tenth of the population of their New Guinea 
colony in thirty years of administration, confining themselves largely to the islands of the 
Bismarck Archipelago and a narrow coastal strip of what they called 'Kaiser Wilhelm' s  
Land ' .2 The Australians pushed further inland, but even they were unaware until the 1 930s 
that the intermontane valleys of the New Guinea Highlands were home to perhaps a million 
people, and the Highlands populations did not come fully under Australian administration 
until the 1 950s. Many Melanesians who found themselves in a country called Papua New 
Guinea in 1 975 experienced 'colonial rule ' as a transitory phenomenon that lasted no more 
than 20 or 25 years. Australia accelerated the pace of change in PNG in the last twenty years 
of its administration, but the fundamental characteristics of PNG society remained 
remarkably undisturbed. At independence in 1 975,  97 per cent of the country' s  land was in 
communal Melanesian ownership, 85 per cent of the population lived in their ancestral 
villages, the basis of the economy remained subsistence agriculture, and class in the W estem 
sense hardly existed. Too late, Australia rushed to educate a tiny elite of Papua New 
Guineans in the last decade or so of colonial administration, leaving PNG to join the 
international community radically unprepared and ill-equipped for the responsibilities and 
challenges of modem statehood. 
Much the same applies to Solomon Islands, which mattered so little to Britain that it 
remained a protectorate rather becoming a colony throughout the colonial period. The British, 
having resolved to withdraw from east of Suez in the 1 960s, made haste to leave their 
neglected possession in the 1 970s. They set up the country's first parliamentary institution, 
the Legislative Assembly, in 1 974 (as a protectorate, Solomons never had a Legislative 
Council) and rapidly recruited Solomon Islanders into a governmental and bureaucratic 
system from which they had been excluded for the previous 80 years. Like PNG, but with 
fewer resources, Solomon Islands entered the international community in 1 978 with minimal 
qualifications for becoming a successful state.3 
The ni-Vanuatu experienced the colonial administration of both France and Britain. 
Foreigners obtained more land here than in PNG or Solomons - about 20 per cent in all - and 
the French planter community became an important element in the politics of the colony. 
Independence in 1 980 was soon followed by a hasty reoccupation of alienated land by the ni­
Vanuatu, and the country' s  economy continues to rest on subsistence agriculture undertaken 
by 80 per cent of the population in rural villages. Tourism is more successful than in PNG or 
Solomons, but the population is growing fast and economic growth is not keeping pace. 
2 Stewart Firth, New Guinea under the Germans, Melbourne University Press, I 982 
3 Judith A Bennett, Wealth of the Solomons: a history of a Pacific archipelago 1800-19 78, University of 
Hawai 'i  Press, Honolulu, 1 987 
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Fij i  is different. Here the British have left a deep and enduring mark, above all by changing 
the ethnic composition of the population. Fij i ' s  continuing political instability, characterized 
by a succession of democratic governments being overthrown in coups, has its origins in 
British decisions made in the first decades after Cession in 1 874, above all to import Indian 
labourers and allow them to settle, but also to keep Fijians in their villages under the 
authority of chiefs.  Roughly a quarter of the 60,000 Indians who came to Fiji between 1 879 
and 1 9 1 6  to work on the sugar plantations of the Colonial Sugar Refining Company of 
Australia returned to India after five or ten years in the colony. The other three-quarters, 
however, stayed to become traders, artisans and, above all, farmers growing sugar on 
smallholdings, and their descendants now form the second great community of Fiji  (the 
contrast is Vanuatu, where most of the 22,000 Vietnamese who arrived between the world 
wars returned home).4 Today Fij i  citizens of lndian descent account for about 37 per cent of 
the population. 
Independent Fiji  has struggled since the 1 970s to devise a system of government and agree on 
a set of constitutional rules that will meet the demands and satisfy the aspirations of the two 
culturally different communities - indigenous and Indian - that constitute most of the 
country's  population. Fij i ' s  most recent coup - in 2006 - has damaged the country 's  
economy and economic prospects. The Reserve Bank of Fiji now estimates that gross 
domestic product declined by 6.6 per cent in 2007, about three times as much as the decline 
recorded after the 2000 coup. 5 
The transition to independence brought a new kind of external influence, exercised by aid 
donors, international financial institutions, investors (especially resource investors) and 
regional organizations. 
Australia and Melanesia: increasing engagement 
Measured by aid flows, investments, commercial links and diplomatic presence, the most 
important single external influence in Melanesia since independence has been Australia. The 
official view in Canberra is that aid to Melanesia underpins the security of Australia, but the 
form and content of that aid has changed over time. 
During the Cold War Australia was content to send aid without imposing many conditions, 
but the limitations of this approach were becoming clear by the early 1 990s. From 1 994 
onwards Canberra began to fear that unless Islands governments changed course their people 
faced a nightmare of rising populations, falling living standards, decaying schools, urban 
squalor and unemployment. From then on Australia, like other aid donors, argued that Pacific 
Island countries should reduce their public sectors, cut tariffs, encourage private enterprise 
and allow maximum freedom to foreign investors so as to become more competitive in a 
globalising economy. Australia began using its aid as a carrot and stick to make Melanesian 
governments conform to the new orthodoxy. 
4 Brij V Lal, Broken Waves: A History of the Fiji Islands in the Twentieth Century, University of Hawai' i  Press, 
Honolulu, 1 992 
5 Reserve Bank of Fiji, Economic Review, July 2008 
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Allowing 'maximum freedom to foreign investors ' ,  however, was a policy that depended for 
its success on who the investors were and how they operated. In Solomon Islands they were 
logging companies from East Asia, and they flooded the country, buying off local leaders, 
national politicians and in the end - under the prime ministership of Solomon Mamaloni -
whole governments. As companies extracted more and more concessions on taxation, 
government income fell and Solomon Islands faced insolvency, accepting a structural reform 
program from the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the Asian Development 
Bank in 1 997. The government did little for the villagers, who therefore dealt directly with 
the logging companies, earning more even from unfavourable agreements than they ever 
received from government. As government grew weaker, the ambitions of individual 
politicians grew stronger, and the Solomon Islands state effectively collapsed in 2000 when 
militia forces drawn mostly from the island of Malaita overthrew the democratically elected 
prime minister and replaced him with one of their own. Honiara became a wasteland ruled by 
young men with guns, and order broke down across much of the main island of Guadalcanal. 
A peace agreement brokered by Australia in 2000 failed to resolve the crisis. The economy 
contracted sharply. GDP fell 14 per cent in 2000 and a further 25 per cent in 200 1 .  Major 
plantation and mining companies ceased production. And the Solomon Islands government, 
such as it was, survived on monthly infusions of cash from Taiwan, given in return for 
recognition of Taiwan as the true China. Powerless within its own borders, the government 
continued to exist for the purposes of international diplomacy and in the form of a largely 
corrupt elite. 6 
Australia long claimed that Solomon Islanders should solve their own problems, but changed 
policy in 2003 , fearing its Melanesian neighbour was becoming a failed state that could one 
day endanger Australian security. Australia ' s  change of policy applied not just to Solomon 
Islands, but to the Pacific Islands in general, especially Melanesia.7 Australia's sharpened 
focus on the Pacific, according to the government, arose from a ' strengthened realisation that 
a porous, underdeveloped and insecure region can increasingly feed instability, inhibit 
development and pose a threat to Australia 's  national security. '8 As a result, Australian aid to 
PNG increased by a third in 2004-2005 , and aid to the South Pacific more than doubled. 
In Solomon Islands the Pacific Islands Forum organised a Regional Assistance Mission, led 
by Australia, with hundreds of police backed by 1 ,  700 military personnel. The mission 
arrived in July 2003 and enjoyed remarkable success in arresting and charging militants, 
purging the police force of criminals, and destroying thousands of weapons. The Regional 
Assistance Mission then moved to the more challenging task of constructing a workable state 
apparatus in Solomon Islands . Australians and mission personnel from elsewhere in the South 
Pacific now work in key ministries and government departments in Honiara with the aim of 
restoring good governance and efficient public administration. The crisis that gripped 
6 Clive Moore, Happy Isles in Crisis: The historical causes for a failing state in Solomon Islands, 1 998-2004, 
Asia Pacific Press, Canberra, 2004; Jon Fraenkel The Manipulation of Custom: From Uprising to Intervention 
in the Solomon Islands, Victoria University Press, Wellington, 2004 
7 Greg Fry and Tarcisius Kabutaulaka, eds, Intervention and State-Building in the Pacific: The Legitimacy of 
'Co-operative Intervention ', Manchester University Press, 2008 
8 Australia 's international Development Cooperation 2004-05, Canberra, 2004, p 2 1  
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Solomon Islands in April 2006 showed that local political forces remain potent despite the 
intervention and have the potential to derail it. Trouble started when newly elected 
parliamentarians chose Snyder Rini as Prime Minister-elect. People expressed outrage, 
peacefully at first but then in a riot that destroyed Chinese-owned stores in the capital. 
Australia sent 400 troops to stabilise the situation, and 140 remained in mid-2008, testimony 
to the continuing fragility of order in the capital. Much depends on who happens to be in high 
office in Solomons: the previous Prime Minister, Manasseh Sogavare, quarrelled with 
Australia and expelled the Australian high commissioner, whereas Derek Sikua, prime 
minister since December 2007, has restored good relations with Australia and called for the 
regional assistance mission to stay for a decade.9 
Australia 's  relations with the biggest and most important Melanesian country, Papua New 
Guinea, grew more strained in the last years of the Howard government, which lost office at 
the 2007 elections. The first of the 230 or so federal police to go to PNG under the Australia 
and Papua New Guinea Police Assistance Package arrived there in 2004. But Australia' s  
demand that its police in PNG b e  granted legal immunity provoked a nationalist backlash in 
certain quarters, and the PNG High Court declared such immunity unconstitutional, forcing 
the police to withdraw within months. The ' shoe incident' further strained relations. In March 
2005 the PNG Prime Minister Sir Michael Somare objected when he was required to remove 
his shoes as part of a routine security check at Brisbane airport. Demonstrations in PNG 
followed, with hundreds marching on the Australian High Commission in Port Moresby 
demanding an apology that was not forthcoming. And the Julian Moti affair made things 
worse .  Canberra considered Julian Moti, Solomon Islands Attorney-General, to be a fugitive 
from Australian justice, but in October 2006 the PNG Defence Force flew him to Solomons 
beyond the reach of Australian courts. Australia retaliated by cancelling planned visits by Sir 
Michael Somare and the then Defence Minister Martin Aini, and calling off the 2007 
PNG/ Australia Ministerial Forum. 
The new government in Australia, elected in November 2007, has fashioned a new 
relationship with PNG. The Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd, understands the importance of 
personal links with Pacific leaders, and has established a degree of rapport with Sir Michael 
Somare. Rudd chose PNG as the location to announce his new Pacific policy, enshrined in 
the Port Moresby Declaration of March 2000. Australia will now negotiate bilateral Pacific 
Partnership for Development agreements with Pacific countries, and the first to be signed - in 
August 2008 - was with PNG. 1 0 At the same time there is a new confidence in PNG. The 
global commodities boom has stimulated the PNG economy, which grew by 6.2 per cent in 
2007 and continues to grow. Mining and agricultural exports such as palm oil are gaining 
record prices, and new gold and nickel-cobalt mines are coming into production. If the 
proposed liquid natural gas project in Southern Highlands Province proceeds, PNG's  national 
income will treble within a few years. 
9 Sinclair Dinnen and Stewart Firth, eds, Politics and State-Building in Solomon Islands, Asia Pacific Press and 
ANU E Press, 2008, http://epress.anu.edu.au/solomon _islands_ citation.html 
10 Partnership for Development between the Government of Australia and the Government of Papua New 
Guinea, Canberra, 2008, http ://www.ausaid.gov.au/publications/pdf/png_partnership_200808.pdf 
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Successive coups in Fiji have presented Australia with a perplexing foreign policy challenge, 
and the most recent coup is no different. Fij i  matters to Australia not only for itself, but 
because of its regional importance. Fiji is the location of numerous regional organizations 
that serve the South Pacific as a whole - such as the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat and the 
University of the South Pacific - and forms a natural hub for smaller Pacific countries. What 
happens in Fij i  influences the entire region. Unlike previous coups in Fiji - in 1 987 and 2000 
- the 2006 coup was not undertaken in the name of indigenous rights, or of ensuring the 
political predominance of one ethnic group over another. Like New Zealand, the EU, the 
USA and the Commonwealth, Australia has not accepted Bainimarama' s  argument that this 
coup is justified by the nobility and far-sightedness of its alleged objectives. Australia' s  
response to the coup has been the same as  in  the case of  Fij i ' s  earlier coups, and consists of 
condemnation, smart sanctions and diplomacy aimed at restoring the democratic system in 
Fij i  as soon as possible. Australia has placed travel restrictions on Bainimarama, his 
supporters and their families, as well as members of the interim government and their 
families. Australia has also suspended defence cooperation and withdrawn aid from particular 
sectors, especially police and prisons. 
Bainimarama has responded defiantly. He expelled two Australian newspaper owners, 
Russell Hunter of the Fiji Sun and Evan Hannah of the Fiji Times. He refused to permit 
Australia to provide more security for the Australian high commissioner in Suva, James 
Batley, following a series of death threats. He broke the promise given to the Pacific Islands 
Forum and the EU that Fiji would hold elections in 2009, saying that elections could not take 
place until 1 2  to 1 5  months after a new electoral system had been agreed upon, in effect, 
sometime in 20 1 0. And when he was barred from joining bilateral meetings with Forum 
Dialogue Partners in New Zealand, Bainimarama withdrew from the Niue Forum leaders ' 
meeting at which developments in Fiji were to be the principal item of discussion, saying 
'most, if not all, Pacific Island leaders are against Fiji being further victimised by Australia 
and New Zealand, even if they may not say so openly in Niue. ' " 
Bainimarama's  appeals to Pacific solidarity against Australia are unlikely to convince Island 
leaders, especially as Kevin Rudd has given them what they most want from Australia and 
have requested for years - access to the Australian labour market. Australia's Pacific 
Seasonal Worker Pilot Scheme will be trialled over the next three years, recruiting from three 
countries that already participate in New Zealand' s  Recognised Seasonal Employer Scheme -
Kiribati, Tonga and Vanuatu - and one with close historic links to Australia, PNG. Somare is 
particularly pleased by the inclusion of PNG. Pointedly, the Australian government has 
excluded Fiji and will presumably continue to do so until satisfied that democracy has been 
restored there. 
Elections will eventually take place in Fij i .  But Australia needs to recognise that the vote is 
limited as a means to re-establish democracy in a country where the military seems certain to 
remain highly influential even after it has returned to barracks. The 2006 coup has been a rich 
source of military patronage. Bainimarama has sacked numerous public servants and heads of 
public organisations and replaced them with military appointees who owe him their jobs. 
1 1  'Fij i  pulls out of Pacific leaders meeting' ,fyilive, 18  August 2008 
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Fij i ' s  government has undergone thoroughgoing militarisation. Australia may have to accept 
that Fij i  will be a democracy rather like Thailand, where coups and elections alternate. 
New Zealand and Melanesia: a new focus of Pacific policy 
New Zealand' s  Pacific diplomacy has traditionally centred on its freely associated states and 
territories - Cook Islands, Niue and Tokelau - none of which is in Melanesia, on its former 
dependency Samoa and on its closest Melanesian country, Fiji .  In recent years, though, that 
Pacific interest has extended to the rest of Melanesia, where New Zealand is an increasingly 
engaged partner in aid and security. 
Half of New Zealand's  aid goes to the Pacific Islands, and that half is growing. New 
Zealand's  aid spending increased by 2 1  per cent in 2007 and will continue to increase over 
the next four years, taking Official Development Assistance to more than NZ$600 million by 
20 1 0/ 1 1 .  A particular focus is PNG, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu. New Zealand has 
participated in the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands since 2003 . A 43-strong 
platoon made up primarily of territorial soldiers from the 5th Wellington West Coast 
Taranaki and 7th Wellington Hawke' s  Bay battalions provides New Zealand's  current 
contribution. And New Zealand has pioneered the recruiting of seasonal labour in Melanesia 
outside Fij i  by including Vanuatu in its Recognised Seasonal Employer scheme. 
The European Union and Melanesia: aid with conditions 
The European Union (EU) matters in Pacific regional affairs and matters most in PNG and 
Fij i .  All 14  Forum Island states are members of the Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) 
group of countries, and their trade and aid relations with the EU are therefore governed by the 
Cotonou Convention of 2000. Cotonou aid comes with good governance strings attached, and 
Cotonou trade is being made compatible with the requirements of the World Trade 
Organization. Free trade is replacing replace the special arrangements and subsidised 
commodity prices that have helped to sustain agricultural exports from the Pacific. PNG and 
Fij i  both signed interim economic partnership agreements with the EU in 2007, pending the 
conclusion of a comprehensive region-wide agreement that will, in effect, make aid available 
in return for free trade. 
As a sugar producer, Fiji is particularly influenced by the EU. Fij i  sugar has been exported to 
the EU for more than thirty years at higher than the world price. But, with the Sugar Protocol 
due to end in 2009, Fiji sugar producers are surviving on an EU price that falls year by year, 
with a reduction of 9 .2 per cent due in October 2008 and a further reduction of 2 1 .  7 per cent 
coming into effect a year later. 1 2 Compounding the problem for Fij i  has been the response to 
the 2006 coup by the EU, which has repeatedly called for early elections . In an attempt to 
pressure the Fij i  to restore democracy, the EU has delayed paying hundreds of millions of 
dollars designed to assist the country move towards a more efficient sugar industry. 
1 2  'Fiji seeks help from EU for ailing sugar industry: Farmers expect very bad year in 2009 ' ,  fljilive, 10 June 
2008; 'EU mulls ultimatum over Fiji election deadline: Suspended aid money at stake' ,  Pacific Islands Report, 
2 1 July 2008 
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France and Melanesia: the drive to integrate 
France is both an external and internal power in Melanesia. Each year France gives about 
US$2 billion to New Caledonia (population 238,000). If this assistance is viewed as official 
development assistance by an external power, it vastly exceeds the aid given by any other 
donor, especially if it is calculated on a per capita basis. Even the $US200 million spent 
annually by Australia in Solomon Islands is small by comparison. 
France wants to integrate its Pacific countries and dependencies more effectively in their 
region, and has intensified its integration diplomacy in recent years, especially since the 2006 
France-Oceania summit when President Jacques Chirac hosted a meeting of all 16 Forum 
states including Australia and New Zealand. Chirac called Australia and New Zealand the 
two ' essential powers of the region' and argued that nothing effective could be done in the 
Pacific without France ' s  close cooperation with those two countries. In a keynote address at 
the summit, PNG Prime Minister Somare applauded France' s  'helpful efforts in integrating 
its Pacific territories with the other countries of the region' . 1 3  Later in 2006 the Forum 
admitted New Caledonia and French Polynesia as associate members. The two French Pacific 
countries were represented at the 2008 Forum leaders' meeting in Niue by Harold Martin and 
Gaston Tong Sang, while the French government sent a high-powered delegation that 
included the Assistant minister for Overseas, Yves Jego, and Ambassador to the Pacific, 
Patrick Roussel. With another France-Oceania summit planned for 2009, France seems 
determined to deepen the integration process still further. 
China, Taiwan and Melanesia: the quest for resources 
Taiwan and China compete with aid and investment for diplomatic recognition in the Pacific, 
and competition has intensified since the unrest in Solomons in 2006. 14  Taiwan' s standing 
has suffered from the corruption in Solomons, widely attributed to its indiscriminate aid 
policies, and Pacific countries that recognise the one-China policy can now expect tangible 
returns from Beijing. China is seizing the opportunity to enhance its influence. China' s  drive 
into the Pacific, mirrored in its policy in Africa and the Caribbean, is driven less by 
competition with Taiwan than by the search for reliable supplies of the primary resources that 
will be needed to power the mighty Chinese economy in the years ahead. 
On his 2006 visit to the Pacific the Chinese premier Wen Jiabao announced a raft of aid 
initiatives, loans and investments at the first China-Pacific Island Countries Economic 
Development and Cooperation Forum in Fiji ,  including a soft loan facility of $US600 m. for 
the region. China' s  aid to Fiji is growing fast, with grants and loans worth $US 1 1 1  m. in 
2007, far more than it has ever given before. China is reconstructing the central business 
district of Nuku'alofa, Tonga' s  capital, following the 2006 riots, and has built a secretariat 
building in Vanuatu for the Melanesian Spearhead Group, a sub-regional organisation 
comprising PNG, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and Fiji .  Unlike EU or Australian development 
assistance, China' s  aid comes with no strings attached. 
1 3 'France woos Pacific at Paris summit' ,  Pacific Islands Report, 27 June 2006 
1 4  Graeme Dobell, China and Taiwan m the South Pacific, Lowy Institute, 2007, 
http://www.lowyinstitute.org/Publication.asp?pid=533 
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China' s  investment is welcomed by PNG, Solomon Islands and Fiji .  PNG leaders, for 
example, have welcomed the Ramu nickel mine, which is owned by China Metallurgical 
Construction Company, as a contribution to national development. But the complications of 
Chinese investment are illustrated by recent events. In 2008 people living on the Rai Coast of 
PNG complained that Chinese workers for the mine were being smuggled into the country 
illegally - in containers. Eventually the nickel mine was forced to close after local workers 
walked off the job complaining of poor working conditions. At the same time armed 
landowners attacked a number of Chinese employees, forcing the company to evacuate its 
Chinese workforce. 1 5 These difficulties point not only to the disruptive power of PNG 
landowners at mine sites, but also to the fact that Melanesia is experiencing an influx of 
Chinese, who are coming legally and illegally in search of new opportunities. As the 2006 
riots in Solomons and Tonga showed, the resentment of unemployed young men in the 
Pacific can easily be turned against the new Chinese. Rioters targeted Chinese businesses on 
both occasions, forcing hundreds of Chinese nationals out of their country. 
Some observers see Asia, and China in particular, replacing the West as the most significant 
external influence in the Pacific over the coming decades. 1 6  Whether that happens or not, 
there is no doubt that China' s  influence in Melanesia will grow and that its aid and 
opportunities will be seen by Melanesians as valued alternatives to those offered by Australia 
and New Zealand. An example is Melanesian integration. China has breathed new life into 
Melanesian (as distinct from Pacific) regionalism by funding the salary of the Melanesian 
Spearhead Group' s  first Director-General, Rimo Ravusiro, and in time may do more. Papua 
New Guinea' s  former High Commissioner to New Zealand, Bernard Narakobi, has envisaged 
a wider role for the Melanesian Spearhead Group in the future, and even talked of a 
'Federated States of Melanesia' .  Australia and New Zealand are likely to oppose such 
developments because they would weaken Pacific-wide regionalism and their own 
domination of it. 
Conclusion 
Westerners originated the idea of Melanesia as a culture area; the idea of nation-state, which 
now forms the basis of political organization in Melanesia; the Melanesian nation-states 
themselves, which are the product of the colonial period; and the project of Pacific 
regionalism. But Melanesians are determining the fate and meaning of these ideas in their 
own, radically different cultural context, and in an era when Asian influences are becoming 
decisive. The financial crisis of 2008 will accelerate this process by strengthening China' s  
relative economic position globally, and will enhance China's  future influence in  the Pacific 
Islands. 
1 5 'PNG landowners attack Chinese mine workers. Three hospitalized after attack at Ramu nickel mine ' ,  Radio 
New Zealand International, 27 August 2008; 'Ramu nickel mine shut following attack: Workers walk off jobs, 
demand pay increase', The National, 28 August 2008 
1 6 Ron Crocombe, Asia in the Pacific Islands: Replacing the West, IPS, Suva, 2007; Paul D' Arey and Hank 
Nelson, The Rise of China in the Pacific, SSGM Briefing Note, 2/2007, 
http:/ /rspas.anu.edu.au/melanesia/BriefingNotes/PolicyBriefingNote _ ChinalnPacific _29 Augb.pdf; 
Fergus Hanson, The dragon in the Pacific: more opportunity than threat Lowy Institute Policy Brief, 2008, 
http://www.lowyinstitute.org/ 
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1 8 . Asserti ng i nternal  dynamics :  
the Melanesian Spearhead Group 1 
Nathalie Mrgudovic2 
Introduction: the Melanesian Spearhead Group - the upshot of a double frustration 
The Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) can be said to be the result of a double frustration. 
It is worth remembering that the Forum was created in 197 1  because the Pacific Island states, 
and especially those which had just gained independence or were about to gain it, no longer 
accepted the fact that political questions, whatever they were, were, on principle, excluded 
from meetings at the South Pacific Commission (SPC).3 Moreover, they wanted to show a 
common front to African and Caribbean independent nations to get the best deal they could 
as a group from the Yaounde Agreements. The Fijian Prime Minister, Ratu Sir Kamisese 
Mara is probably the politician who worked the hardest towards creating the Forum. Then the 
same pattern occurred within the Forum. The Melanesian states (Papua New Guinea (PNG), 
Solomon Islands and first of all Vanuatu) realized they were unable to get the Forum to be 
more committed to certain issues such as support for New Caledonia' s  independence. That 
prompted the most recently independent Oceanian states to set up a structure or a group 
specifically focused on the recognition and promotion of Melanesian identity.4 
I. Setting up the Melanesian Spearhead Group - asserting a claim for identity 
It could be contended, somewhat provocatively, that the MSG was born in 2007. As a matter 
of fact, in March 2007 a Charter was signed, and as a result, this sub-regional organization 
became a legal entity. 2007 also saw - on 7 November - the dedication of a General 
Secretariat in Port Vila. Actually, however, the MSG was officially created in 1 988,5 
although it had started to exist and act officially as a group as early as 1 986, and its inception 
can be traced back to 1 979, even 1976, for the will to promote Melanesian identity and 
emancipation had been stated as early as 1 976 in PNG by its Prime Minister, Sir Michael 
Somare, and his Deputy Prime Minister Ebia Olewale; and as early as 1 979, this idea started 
to produce concrete actions. 
1 This article uses contents dealt with or developed in the present author's book, La France dans le Pacifique 
Sud. Les enjeux de la puissance, foreword by Michel Rocard, Paris: L 'Harmattan, 2008 
2 Associate Professor, Aston University 
3 Renamed Secretariat of the Pacific Community 
4 Fiji gained independence in 1 970, PNG in 1 975, Solomon in 1 978, and Vanuatu in 1 980. Samoa was the first 
Oceanian island nation to gain independence, in 1 962. 
5 The year when the 'Principles of Cooperation' were signed 
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Although France and its territories were not admitted to the Forum,6 Kanak separatists from 
the Front Independantiste (FI), Frarn;ois Atonari, Yann Celene Uregei, Nidoishe Naisseline 
and Jean-Marie Tjibaou were officially welcomed to the Forum leaders ' conference at 
Honiara, Solomons, in 1 979.  For that purpose they were supported by some member states or 
entities with observer status, which were all Melanesian: PNG, Solomons, and New Hebrides 
(at the time the New Hebrides was an observer on its way to becoming independent Vanuatu 
the following year).7 The Kanak leaders were able to meet some of the regional 
organization' s  member states and hand them a petition requesting the Forum - through its 
members present at the United Nations8 - to file a resolution with the General Assembly for 
the purpose of reinstating New Caledonia on the UN list of non-self-governing territories. 
They invoked the United Nations General Assembly 14  December 1 946 resolution (66( 1 )) ,  
contending that New Caledonia was on that UN list in 1 946, along with 73 other non-self­
governing territories,9 and contended that France unilaterally decided to remove it from the 
list the next year. The reason put forward by France was that 'the Overseas Territories had a 
status that was very similar to that of French departments with regard to the legal status of 
their population and their political representation system. ' 1 0  
Thus, the representatives of the breakaway party, although they were not admitted as 
members or even as observers, managed after all to go to the Forum and submit their request 
directly, albeit only informally. PNG, the driving force behind support for Melanesian self­
determination, had insisted, at another level, through its Deputy Prime Minister Ebia 
Olewale, on mentioning New Caledonian Kanaks - and also French Polynesia - in the 
Forum's final communique. It was also insistent about France being called on to grant her 
South Pacific possessions the right to self-determination. 1 1  The final resolution was toned 
down by Australia and New Zealand and eventually it did not include a direct mention of 
New Caledonia or French Polynesia. The Melanesian states, however, did manage to have 
'the issue of the French territories in the South Pacific ' still dealt with specifically, and the 
specific point noted that the people of the Pacific, ' including those in the French territories ' ,  
wish 'to determine their own future ' . 1 2 
6 This situation has undergone some change now New Caledonia and French Polynesia are associate members 
of the Forum, Wallis and Futuna is an observer, and France is now a partner in the post-Forum dialogues. 
7 It is worth noting that the FI representatives had probably had the opportunity in 1 978 to meet informally some 
of those heads of State as they were taking part in the South Pacific Commission's annual meeting in Noumea, 
and notably the official Papuan representatives. 
8 At the time only Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, PNG and the Solomons were UN members. Besides, it is worth 
pointing out that Francis Bugotu, as soon as his term as SPC General Secretary ended in November 1 986, 
travelled to the UN to ask for New Caledonia to be put on the list of territories to be decolonized by the UN . 
9 Pacific Islands Monthly (PIM), September 1 979, p 1 1 . This list is also known as the list of the 'territories to 
decolonize. '  
1 0  Ibid., p 1 3 .  This amounted to saying that at the time France tended to regard her overseas territories as 
assimilated (an administrative notion applied to overseas departments) and not integrated (a notion which 
implied a greater recognition of an administrative and political self-rule and which was supposed to apply to 
overseas territories). 
1 1  Ibid.,  p 12 
1 2  ! Oth Forum communique, Honiara, Solomons, 9- 1 0  July 1 979 
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Events of 1986 show still more clearly how far-reaching Melanesian action was, for that year 
the Melanesian states, PNG, Solomons and Vanuatu, led by Walter Lini, decided to create the 
Melanesian Spearhead Group. One of the objectives of the Group was to provide support to 
the Front de Liberation Nationale Kanak et Socialiste (FLNKS) as it fought for New 
Caledonia's independence.  
The Melanesian Spearhead Group kept pressuring the other Forum member states until, in 
1 986, the regional organization accepted to act in favour of FLNKS. As a result, on 2 
December 1 986 New Caledonia was reinstated on the UN list of non-self-governing 
territories, a real political victory for the MSG (and for FLNKS). 1 3 
Despite a fairly informal organization, the initial members of the Melanesian group14 had set 
up some operating rules to promote what they called the 'Principles of Cooperation' ,  defined 
and adopted in 1 988 .  These principles were neither a constitution nor a charter; they did not 
even require compulsory commitment to supra-national cooperation. Their purpose was to 
promote three main objectives :  national independence, territorial integration (notably through 
the development of a Free-Trade zone) and non-interference. 
MSG decisions, as within the Forum, are reached through dialogue and consensus. Biennial 
summits are held a few weeks before the (yearly) Forum member states '  summit in order to 
determine common strategies to influence the Forum's decisions directly involving one or 
more of the Melanesian states (or territories) . Support for Kanak independence and keeping 
New Caledonia on the list of non-self-governing territories were for a long time an essential 
priority in those strategies. 
1. The issue of whether the creation of the MSG showed up any rivalries 
Among the three initial MSG members, Solomons, unlike PNG and Vanuatu, is certainly the 
nation that never showed any ambitions for regional leadership. 
Solomon Islands is the third-highest populated island state in the South Pacific, next to PNG 
and Fiji ,  and they are the second biggest, after PNG. The country has a great variety of 
natural resources and a certain potential for economic development. The infrastructure, the 
service sector, and the standard of living, however, have always been rather poor. As a result, 
the Solomons have generally shown a more cautious and more measured approach than their 
Melanesian neighbours. Thus, even though in 1 984 the former Prime Minister Solomon 
Mamaloni had called for the creation of a specific Melanesian group within the Forum, the 
Solomon Islands have never sought leadership in the region. A foreign policy statement in 
1 985 proclaimed that as a small state dependent on and vulnerable to changes in the global 
economy and devoid of military power, the country had chosen to adopt ' . . .  a 
13 After the creation of the Melanesian Spearhead Group and the reinstatement of New Caledonia on the list of 
non self-ruling territories in 1 986, FLNKS, now recognized as a national liberation movement, was allowed to 
submit in 1 987 to the UN a blueprint for a Constitution set up by the Kanaky provisional government. The 
blueprint had been reported as early as l 984. 
14 PNG, Solomons, Vanuatu. Fiji did not join MSG until 1 998. See below. 
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multidimensional approach at the bilateral, regional and multilateral level. '  1 5 Despite this 
realistic and humble attitude, however, the Solomon Islands have always had a firm stand 
against nuclear testing and the stockpiling of nuclear and toxic waste in the region, and they 
have always opposed ' all forms of colonialism' ,  although not without some caution, as we 
can see from this statement, in which the Solomon Islands government was committed to 
doing ' anything possible and reasonable to help South Pacific colonized people gain 
independence' .  1 6  
Unlike the Solomon Islands, PNG has, since i t  gained independence in  1 975,  shown its 
conviction that it should have leadership in regional affairs. The Papuan leaders, and 
especially Sir Michael Somare, considered that this role fell naturally to PNG because its 
physical features (area, population, mineral resources) are longer than those of the other 
South Pacific island nations. 1 7  
Besides these arguments, PNG's  aspirations to be  the Pacific Islands leader was partly linked 
to its will to assert independence and differentiate itself from its former colonial power, 
Australia. On account of British colonization, and later Australian administration, PNG 
considered it had been dispossessed of its role as a regional leader, contending it rightfully 
deserved the title. As a result, PNG adopted a 'universalist' policy, meaning that the nation 
wanted to establish relations on an equal footing with any country with which it had mutual 
interests and benefits. 
Beyond PNG's  relationship with Australia, the Papuan military intervention in Vanuatu in 
1 980 further illustrates the role PNG meant to play in the region, even though that 
intervention was actually outfitted and orchestrated by Australia. 1 8 
PNG expressed its will to break with the past and lead the island states towards a firmer stand 
in asserting regional politics; so PNG criticized the South Pacific Commission (SPC), which 
it perceived as an outmoded colonial institution. The criticism was strengthened by the fact 
that the organization's  headquarters were located in Noumea, which, according to PNG, 
illustrated a French ' illegitimate' 1 9 influence. PNG argued for a 'S ingle Regional 
Organization' ,  to replace the SPC, which would have combined the functions of the 
Commission, the Forum and the other regional organizations. The new body would have been 
15 Stephen Henningham, France and the South Pacific, A Contemporary History, Honolulu, University of 
Hawaii Press, 1 992, pp 204-205. At that date, Mamaloni was no longer Prime Minister, having been overthrown 
by Sir Peter Kenilorea in November 1 984. 
1 6 A document by the Solomon Foreign Affairs Ministry, Foreign Policy of Solomon Islands Government, 
Honiara, 1 985, pp 1 -6, (quoted in Henningham, France and the South Pacific, p 205) 
1 7  PNG alone covers 4/5 of the total land area in Oceania, and 84 per cent of its population. Solomons is the 
second biggest in area and third biggest in population, after Fiji . See Paul De Deckker, 'Le Pacifique: a la 
recherche du developpement dans un espace emiette ' ,  in 'Les outre-mers face a ! ' integration europeenne et a la 
mondialisation ' , Revue franr;aise d 'administration publique (ENA), no 1 0 1 ,  2002/1 , pp 1 57-158 
1 8 This emphasizes the fact that Papuan dependence on Australia was still quite real at the time. But this could 
also emphasize Australia's double aspiration to guarantee regional stability while deferring to the sovereignty of 
Oceanian island states. 
19 Henningham, France and the South Pacific, p 1 97 
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made up only of island states, even if funding was supposed to be provided by the current and 
former administrative powers, and also by other donor countries. This proposal fell through.20 
One aspect of PNG' s  regional ambition was its rivalry with Fiji .  While both countries 
emerged and gained independence at almost the same time, PNG' s aspirations have always 
seemed a little out of step with Fij i ' s, and PNG has even seemed to be overshadowed by Fiji, 
which enjoyed a major regional and international influence.2 1 This rivalry lasted until the first 
coup in Fiji  in 1 987. 
As PNG considers itself a bridge between Southeast Asia and the Southern Pacific, it has 
geared a significant part of its foreign policy to developing good relations with its closest 
neighbour, Indonesia. PNG realized Indonesia 's  territorial ambitions with the transfer to 
Indonesia of West Papua ordered in 1 963 by the UN . As a result, PNG' s  commitment to the 
creation of the MSG could be accounted for by the fact that by advocating a very firm stand 
in the face of France on the issue of Kanak independence, PNG could conceal its 
powerlessness on the issue of West Papua. PNG's  commitment could also enable it to divert 
its Melanesian neighbours' attention from its lack of support for the separatist movement 
Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM).22 
Like PNG, Vanuatu (and Walter Lini) aspired to a leadership role in the South Pacific, 
although this role was based upon ideological and moral foundations rather than geographical 
and physical foundations. As early as Vanuatu independence in 1 980, Walter Lini had 
decided to make support for the FLNKS one his key foreign policies. This attitude can be 
accounted for by the fact that the New Hebrides Condominium had trouble with the French 
administration in gaining independence (whereas the British had not opposed independence; 
they had even wished for it) . To support the separatist Kanak movement, Walter Lini talked 
PNG and the Solomons (but not Fiji) into creating the MSG, which could appear as one of 
the key instruments in Lini ' s  foreign policy. Lini also developed the concept of 'Melanesian 
socialism' ,  a 'post-colonial ideology' supposed to allow a 'Melanesian renaissance' and give 
an identity to the new state, Vanuatu, by making custom ('kastom')  the foundation of a 
progressive evolution of society. 'Melanesian socialism' was also to allow the promotion of 
20 Since 1 987, however, the PFS has partly responded to PNG's  concern by extending the role of the PFS 's  
Secretariat and restructuring a former coordination committee. The SPOCC, South Pacific Organization, created 
in Suva in February 1 989, and turned in 1 999 into CROP (the Council for the Regional Organizations in the 
Pacific) secures the link between the two big regional organizations, for the Council for Regional Organizations 
in the Pacific includes the SPC, the Forum and eight regional organizations that are related to it, including, for 
example, the Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA), SOPAC, and the University of the South Pacific (USP). 
21 See infra. 
22 Nor did the UN heed calls from the separatist guerrilla movement Orgnisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM) for a 
reopening of the free-choice act, sanctioned by the UN. The UN had allowed the transfer of the former Dutch 
territory, West Papua, to Indonesia. Part of the Papuan population across the border had therefore developed 
support networks for the neighbouring separatists, and this could jeopardize the already delicate relationships 
between PNG and Indonesia. PNG was thus caught between the aspiration for reunification and the necessity to 
safeguard peaceful relations with Jakarta; moreover, PNG was under pressure from Vanuatu, which proclaimed 
its diplomatic support for OMP in the name of the defence of the Melanesian people' s  interests. See Stephen 
Henningham and D Ball, ' South Pacific Security. Issues and Perspective' ,  Canberra Papers on Strategy and 
Defence, No 72, ANU, Canberra, 1 99 1 ,  p 7 1 .  
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cooperation between Melanesian states, notably by setting up a ' common foreign policy 
among the states of Melanesia' . This notion was directly linked to that of the 'Melanesian 
Way' ,  which is close to 'Melanesian solidarity' and to the notion of exchange, another MSG 
basic principle. The 'Melanesian Way' was also seen as a counter to Ratu Mara's  'Pacific 
Way, which was perceived as a kind of 'Polynesian Way' ,  too timid on regional and extra­
regional issues, notably with regard to Kanak independence. 
2. Does the MSG foster regional division? 
At that juncture the question was whether the Melanesian group was to be viewed as a threat 
to cohesion within the South Pacific. That was not the way the Forum felt; the Forum houses 
other groups, such as The Smaller Island States Group.23 Further, through the impetus given 
by Gaston Flosse, a Polynesian response has been attempted. But the plan to found the 
'Polynesian Peoples Community' based upon the famous 'Polynesian Triangle' (Hawaii, 
New Zealand, Easter Island) never got off the ground. Flosse invited Polynesian authorities to 
discuss it in his offices in Paris, then in Tonga, in Samoa, and in the Cook Islands, where the 
headquarters of the community were planned to be located.24 Bylaws were drafted and 
headquarters were supposed to be installed in the Cook Islands. It was to be an economic tool 
setting up a common international bidding system in purchasing basic foods.25 The cultural 
aspect of the plan aspired to bring new life to the culture and shared identity of Polynesian 
peoples. But, purportedly, the political part of the plan 'met with pretty strong reluctance, 
especially on the part of New Zealand. New Zealand saw in it a potential destabilizing factor 
in its socio-ethnic mix between Pakeha and Maori ' as well as in relations between New 
Zealand and its former colonies (Samoa, Niue, Cook Islands). 26 The political aspect was 
based on the idea that the planned community should be used as a tool to counterbalance the 
development of the Melanesian Spearhead Group and its weight in the region. 
3. Fiji's ambiguous situation 
While Fiji  belongs to the group of Melanesian states, the Lau Islands, to the east of the 
archipelago, were long part of Tonga before they were annexed by the Fijians in the 1 9th 
century. These culturally Polynesian islands are in some ways the breeding ground for Fijian 
rulers.27 Fij i ' s  location as a crossroads in the heart of the South Pacific both at the geographic 
and ethnic level is one of the factors that made it easier for Fiji to develop its role within the 
region as well as with international organizations. 
Fij i ' s  status, not as a leader but rather as an Oceanian spokesman,28 is partly due to its large 
population,29 to its relatively significant economy,30 and to its central geographical location in 
23 Interview with Iosefa Maiava, Deputy Secretary of the Pacific Islands Forum, Suva, Fiji, 7 July 2003 . The 
Smaller Island States Group includes the Cook Islands, Kiribati, Nauru, Niue, the Marshall Islands and Tuvalu. 
24 Paul De Deckker, 'Le Secretariat d'Etat au Pacifique Sud. Pour une politique du developpement ou un 
developpement du politique? ' ,  in Jean-Marc Regnault, ed. , Fram;ois Mitterrand et les territoires franrais du 
Pacifique, 1981-1988, Paris: Les Indes savantes, 2002, p 504 
25 A system that Gaston Flosse had successfully practiced in French Polynesia. 
26 De Deckker, p 505 
27 Ratu Mara, Timoci Bavadra, Sitivenu Rabuka, and Laisena Qarase are (or were) all from these Polynesian 
islands and are (or were) generally heirs to a local chiefdom. 
28 Fijian rulers have always denied that they want their country to play such a role. 
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the region. But it is also due in large part to the fact that Fiji emerged from colonization with 
a clearly-drawn political identity that it had acquired before independence. From 1 970, Fij i ' s  
leadership role was also largely a result of the personality of its 'chief , Ratu Sir Kamisese 
Mara,3 1  and to the positions he defended both on the regional and international scene. Ratu 
Mara's  commitment was sometimes perceived as a will to gain regional leadership. Indeed, 
Fij i  seemed to be a central player in regional institutions, not only by reason of its political 
stature but also because throughout their creation process, the regional organizations (except 
for the SPC) located their headquarters in Suva. Gradually, the international organizations 
likewise located their regional agencies there, thereby reinforcing Fij i ' s  centrality in the 
South Pacific. 
Yet, notably within the Forum, Fij i ' s  position was 'conservative' in that it sided, together 
with the Polynesian states, with Australia and New Zealand to support the creation of a 
nuclear-free zone. It also took a more moderate stand on its support for the FLNKS than did 
the other Melanesian states. 
Fij i ' s  conception of regional politics, as it was advocated by Ratu Mara in particular, has 
always had a global dimension, and this attitude is viewed as one of the ways of being 
listened to and winning the support of the international community for the benefit of the 
region. That is why Fiji  proved the most antagonistic to France (Fiji  took a stand against 
French nuclear activities) . In some ways, this attitude allowed it to have the ear of and a 
wider support from the international community for the region' s  cause. It also secured a fairly 
significant prestige for this small state, which nonetheless sought to retain the possibility to 
develop bilateral relationships with France and protect its immediate interests. Initially, Fij i ' s  
commitment to  decolonization was not about the New Caledonia issue, but i t  further 
illustrated its commitment to defending Pacific Islands ' interests. Indeed, Fij i  initially 
submitted requests or resolution plans at the United Nations General Assembly for the benefit 
of Oceanian entities still under Australian, New Zealand or American administrative rule.32 
Regarding New Caledonia, Fij i ' s  dual stand was expressed in different ways depending on 
whether Fiji was speaking within the Forum or on the international scene. Fiji was charged 
with being 'conservative' by the Melanesian states and had actually always gone along with 
the moderate stand of the rest of the Forum on the issue of Kanak independence.  Until 1 986, 
Fij i  also refused to contemplate the request to put New Caledonia again on the Committee of 
24 ' s  list.33 Fij i ' s  belonging to this committee, however, was important in that, from 1 986 on, 
29 Fij i ' s  population, 800,000, is the second largest after PNG 
30 With a GDP in the range of five billion US dollars (2004), Fij i  is second behind PNG (1 1 .9 billion in 2004) . 
31 Actually, Ratu Rama was the Lau Islands' 'Supreme Chief' ( 'Ratu') .  
32 Fiji introduced two resolution plans at the General Assembly in 1 973 to encourage Australia and New 
Zealand to remain committed to the decolonization process. Fiji also supported a third resolution calling for 
self-determination in American Samoa, in the Gilbert and Ellice Islands, in the Solomons, Pitcairn, Guam and 
New Hebrides. A few years later, the Fiji UN representative was even at the head of a UN delegation in the New 
Hebrides as part of the decolonization of the Condominium. Fiji, and the Forum as a whole, however, during the 
1 979 summit, advocated only self-determination rather than independence of the New Hebrides, and that, given 
the troubled context in which independence might take place, was a serious concern for Walter Lini. 
33 Or UN Committee for Decolonization. Fiji was and still is a member of the committee. 
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it further allowed the region to be heard on the international scene and at the same time it 
made Fij i  a major player in promoting the interests of the whole region and not only 
Melanesian interests.34 
Initially, Fiji ,  although it is a Melanesian country, had decided to privilege its relationships 
with Australia and the Polynesian states, or even its regional neutrality. That is why Fiji 
declined the invitation to join the Spearhead Group when it was created in 1 986.  During the 
year that followed the 1 987 coup, however, among the Forum members, only those that were 
members of the Spearhead Group, and specifically Michael Somare' s  PNG, had shown 
solidarity towards their 'Melanesian brother' and, in the name of the non-intervention 
principle, they were against the Forum taking a stand on the situation in Fij i .35 Indeed, the 
1 987 and 1 988 Forum communiques do not refer at all to the coup or even to Fiji .  Yet, Fiji 
continued to fudge on the Melanesian offer to join the Spearhead Group until 1 996, when it 
was invited one more time and eventually accepted the offer to join the MSG Trade 
Agreement. This initiative was approved in 1 997 during the MSG leaders ' summit, and Fiji 
became an MSG member in April 1 998 .  
II. Refocusing the MSG: from idealism to  pragmatism 
After the MSG's  political 'victory' with New Caledonia being back on the UN 
Decolonisation Committee list in 1 986, the Matignon-Oudinot Agreement and the Noumea 
Agreement in some ways removed one part of the MSG's  raison d'etre, namely support for 
New Caledonia' s  independence. The MSG's  support of FLNKS was not discontinued, 
however, since the separatist group was accepted with an observer status in 1 99 1  and as a full 
member in 1 999. Besides, to assert that the FLNKS legitimately belonged to the Melanesian 
group, Rock Wamytan, the FLNKS Chairman, was appointed MSG chairman from 200 1 to 
2003 . However, as the breakaway party was now recognized by France and joined New 
Caledonian government authorities, and as the self-rule referendum is planned for in the 
Constitution, support for the separatist cause by the MSG no longer seemed so compelling. 
1. Mandatory refocusing 
This development, and the fact that Melanesian states were going through growing economic 
hardships, led the Spearhead Group to focus anew on its initial principle, i .e . ,  Melanesian 
unity through a free-trade agreement reached in 1 993 and turned into a free-trade zone in 
2006. This necessary refocusing on economic issues had also been emphasized by Fij i ' s  long­
standing refusal to join the MSG, as Fij i  did not agree with the Melanesian group's  political 
ambitions. 
According to Maxime Carlot, Vanuatu Prime Minister from 1 99 1  to 1 997, Fij i ' s  refusal to 
join was due to its reluctance to associate with a less developed group of countries that 
seemed bent on decentralizing Fij i  and the University of the South Pacific.36 Refusing to join 
the group, then, seemed like the best way for Fiji to avoid being confronted with the 
34 Today, PNG is also a member of the committee. 
35 N Macqueen, 'The South Pacific: Regional Subsystem or Geographical Expression?' ,  Working paper, no. 
2 14, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, ANU, Canberra, 1 990, p 6 
36 Maxime Carlot. Interviews, Port Vila, Vanuatu, 2 July 2003 
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aspirations of its Melanesian 'brethren' .  Nonetheless, there can be other ways of accounting 
for this reluctance. When it first gained independence, Vanuatu (or more exactly Walter Lini) 
had harshly criticized Fij i ' s  pro-American stand.37 This approach, which aimed to strengthen 
the rationale for the notion of 'Melanesian socialism' , castigated Fiji because Vanuatu 
deemed it a selfish state which rejected the solidarity 'kastom' .  Rather than attracting Fiji ,  
this censure prompted it to further legitimize its refusal to join the group. Another account for 
the refusal can be based on Fij i ' s  geostrategic interests. Owing to the major position of 
France within the European Union,38 but also to France ' s  support after the 1 987 coup, the 
French government had to be treated with deference, and that was not the Melanesian group' s  
objective. Lastly, at the national level, the Indo-Fijian issue, which still destabilized the 
political, economic and social life of the country, had probably prompted Fij i  to show some 
restraint on the New Caledonia issue. 39 
By accepting to join the MSG and its free-trade agreement in 1 99640 - and then actually 
joining in 1 998 - Fiji, because of its much greater economic weight than that of the other 
members, quickly wrecked - involuntarily - the fragile trade balance, especially with 
Vanuatu. At that juncture, some ni-Vanuatu political officials accused Australia of using Fiji 
to conduct a policy of dumping within the Melanesian group.41 As a matter of fact, the 
modest and faltering economies of the group members can by themselves account for the fact 
that this economic project is still not successful, just as they can also account for Fij i ' s  long 
reluctance to join the Spearhead Group. 
2. Economic centrality 
This refocusing on economic issues is emphasized in the MSG's  2007 Charter which states in 
Article 2 that the prime objective of the Melanesian group is trade.42 This is an illustration of 
the extent to which in the South Pacific, 'Foreign Affairs is Trade ' .  This economic 
relationship, illustrated particularly by the magnitude of trade with the European Union 
(Yaounde, Lome, and Cotonou Agreements in chronological order), is the same vis-a-vis the 
People' s  Republic of China. China, in recent years, has increased the number of its trade 
contracts in the region. It has also secured funding for numerous infrastructure projects, 
especially within the Melanesian states, and notably the MSG's  headquarters in Port Vila. 
The emergence of China on the regional scene could be accounted for by China's  need to 
increase its supplies of raw materials (as it has done in Africa) . It could also be the result of 
its single China policy through which the PRC attempts to prevent or reverse the process of 
37 S Verines, 'La Politique des micro-Etats du Pacifique Sud' ,  Politique etrangere, 1 / 1 987, p 104 
38 Fiji has always been largely dependent on the European Union's sugar policy. 
39 Gerald Cortot, interviews, Noumea, New Caledonia, 19 June 2003 
40 At the time, Fiji and PNG were committed to cutting their customs duties on a number of products between 
2003 and 20 1 0, and Solomon and Vanuatu had done the same over the 2005-201 2  period. 
41 Vincent Boulekone, interviews, Port Vila, Vanuatu, 26 June 2003 
42 Article 3: Objective: The purpose of the MSG is to 'promote and strengthen between its members trade, the 
exchange of Melanesian cultures, traditions, values, sovereign equality, economic and technical cooperation and 
the adjustment of policies to serve the objectives shared by MSG members regarding economic growth, 
sustainable development, good governance and security. ' 
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diplomatic recognition of Taiwan.43 The organization of the China-Oceania summits in Suva 
in 2006 and in Beijing in 2008 is another example of the Chinese policy of global economic 
presence. 
Besides, Melanesian statements generally critical of Australian and New Zealand 
interventionism cannot make us forget that Australia and New Zealand, the two regional 
powers, still remain the major economic partners of the Melanesian states, and in particular 
of PNG, which, moreover, is the major recipient of Australian aid to Oceanian states.44 
And despite repeated covert appeals made to New Caledonia, New Caledonia has still not 
accepted to join the MSG free-trade zone. During its 1 5th Summit in 2003 , the Melanesian 
group had even asked the FLNKS delegation to try to talk New Caledonia into joining the 
zone. Does that mean they are using the FLNKS as a lever to promote the MSG' s  economic 
interests or a gradual reverting to politics by the MSG? 
II. The ambiguous politicisation of the MSG 
1 .  The MSG confronting the 'Melanesian Arc' 
The 'Melanesian Arc of instability' is symbolized by the 1 987, 2000, and 200645 coups in 
Fiji ,  the climax of the secession crisis in Bougainville in 1 997, the civil war in the Solomons 
in 1 998 and continuous governmental weakness in Vanatu. This instability, however, seems 
paradoxically to have strengthened Melanesian solidarity. The contention can be borne out by 
the contents of the Forum's annual communiques wherein the Melanesian states always see 
to it that the non-interference principle in the member states '  domestic affairs be respected. 
Criticism and the increasingly firm stand taken by Australia and New Zealand, particularly 
with regard to Fiji ,  have in some ways strengthened Melanesian solidarity, as symbolized by 
the welcome extended to a Fijian interim representative when the MSG's  incorporating 
document was signed in March 2007.46 This, however, did not mean that the Melanesian 
group backed or condoned the situation in Fij i .  The idea was to avoid isolating Fiji ,  a 
Melanesian State. Yet, given the ' coup culture' in Fiji  (a phrase used by the interim Prime 
Minister Bainimarama), that parliamentary elections are continuously put off, and that Fiji 
declined to attend the latest Forum Summit in 2008, we might see MSG's  support of Fiji 
taper somewhat. However, given the Summit' s  communique of August 2008, it might seem 
that this is not the case as PNG offered to host a special Forum meeting by the end of 2008 to 
further discuss the Fijian issue and in order to help that country quickly restore democracy. 
2. The MSG and the 'New Melanesians' 
Some small states or territories located in the northwest extension of the Melanesian Arc 
seem to have realized the political, even geostrategic interest of claiming a Melanesian 
identity. That is notably the case for Timor, which gained independence in 2002 and still 
43 It is worth noting that six Oceanian nations, including a Melanesian one, recognize Taiwan. They are Kiribati, 
the Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, the Solomons and Tuvalu. 
44 For the 2008-2009 period PNG will get about 390 million Australian dollars and the other Pacific islands will 
get 1 82 million, www.ausaid.gov.au 
45 Cf. supra, Richard Herr's paper 
46 Flash d 'Oceanie, 27 March 2007 
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considers being a neighbour of Indonesia - the former ruling power - a direct threat to its 
security. By claiming to be Melanesian, Timor wishes to be integrated into the Melanesian, 
and therefore to the Oceanic zone. 
The West Papua issue is a still greater concern for Papuan separatists, but also for the MSG's  
credibility. In 200 1 ,  a special self-rule law had been enacted by Indonesia for  its Papua 
Province in order to try to put a stop to the violence which had been going on since 1 963 .  
Yet, in 2003 , in total violation of this law, the Indonesian Papua Province was split into the 
two provinces of Papua and West Papua, because, among other reasons, Indonesia sought to 
eliminate rebel and separatist movements. 
Now it appears that for some years PNG has been blocking the proposal from Vanuatu and 
later endorsed by Fij i, the Solomons, and the FLNKS, to grant West Papua MSG observer 
status.47 We wonder whether this does not mean the resurgence of a leadership rivalry 
between Vanuatu and PNG. Maybe not, but it is worth remembering that the MSG's  raison 
d'etre was, among other things, to support all Melanesian peoples fighting for independence, 
and just the Kanaks.48 So there is consistency in Vanuatu's  position. The 'Melanesian Way' ,  
however, seems to prevail, as  the MSG' s  official stance after the 2008 summit was to defer to 
PNG' s  decision to ignore the West Papua issue. PNG justifies this position by stressing the 
importance of building with Indonesia a relationship based on trust. PNG's  Foreign Affairs 
Minister has emphasized that the West Papua issue is a domestic issue which should not be 
raised within the MSG. Thus PNG invokes another MSG founding principle, non­
interference in the domestic affairs of another nation. This policy can be traced in the 
Forum's  communiques. The Forum touches lightly on the West Papua issue.49 During the 
2007 Forum summit, PNG offered to report the Forum's debates to the Indonesian President, 
thus showing its desire to retain control on this issue. It is worth noting that PNG is the only 
nation to face a difficult geostrategic context; most of the other Pacific states or territories are 
'protected' by their strictly Oceanic environment.50 
3. The MSG and New Caledonia 
It is interesting to consider the FLNKS's  relevance within the MSG, for the question of 
whether the FLNKS is a full member of the MSG is debatable. 
On the one hand, the answer is clearly in the affirmative. Article 2 ,  paragraph 1 of the 2007 
Charter states clearly that the MSG includes the Republic of Fiji ,  PNG, the Solomon Islands, 
the Republic of Vanuatu and New Caledonia' s FLNKS, and in Rock Wamytan, then 
chairman of FLNKS, chaired the MSG from 200 1 to 2003 . 
47 Post Courier (PNG), 9 October 2006; Islands Business (Fiji), 28 May 2008; Vanuatu Daily Post, 7 June 2008 
48 It is good to remember that West Papua (and Papua) have a population of about 3 million, as compared to 
New Caledonia, whose population is under 250,000. 
49 The 200 1 Forum communique commended Indonesia for the self-rule special law; that of 2006 commended it 
for implementing the law, whereas the 2007 communique briefly emphasized the Forum's concern in view of 
the continuing violence in Papua and West Papua. 
50 In the summer of 2008, PNG suffered very serious border violation problems on the part of lndonesian forces. 
Flash d 'Oceanie, 1 7  July 2008. 
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However, can the FLNKS really be considered a full member since it is not a party to all the 
agreements or decisions between or by 'member states'? The Charter' s last paragraph, where 
signatures are affixed, states that invoking Article 1 9-5 (on the possibility for non­
independent organizations or territories to express reservations), the FLNKS has reservations 
about Articles 1 0, 1 1  and 1 2  in the Charter. These articles deal with meetings by Foreign 
Affairs Ministers (who, among other things, determine the MSG's  general policy) , meetings 
between high-ranking officials, and meetings between trade and economic officials . Thus the 
FLNKS does not take part in core MSG decisions, and as a result, its role is diminished and 
may seem a merely nominal one. Moreover, some formal speeches by representatives of 
MSG member states 'forget' the FLNKS when it comes to listing MSG 'member states ' .  
Besides, can a group such as the FLNKS legitimately represent the territory o f  New 
Caledonia within the MSG? Moreover, the New Caledonian government appears to be 
supplanting the FLNKS within the MSG. Since 2002 the New Caledonian government has 
been arousing genuine interest on the part of the other MSG members. In 2002 , the New 
Caledonian government, after challenging the FLNKS 's  right to host an international meeting 
using New Caledonia taxpayers' money, became the official host of the MSG's  annual 
meeting. By accepting this invitation, the Melanesian group recognized the legitimacy of the 
ruling government group,5 1  and therefore, more broadly, France' s  presence in the region. 
A new stage in the rapprochement between the MSG, and in particular Vanuatu, and France, 
was reached during the ni-Vanuatu Prime Minister' s  visit to Noumea in May 2003 . Mr 
Natapei did not hesitate to assert that he would support New Caledonia' s  application for 
MSG membership. Contemplating New Caledonia' s  presence within the organization 
underscores the MSG's  shift in outlook. New Caledonia' s stability, wealth, and its special 
relationship with the European Union52 foreshadowed positive consequences for the four 
Melanesian states, notably regarding the Melanesian free-trade zone. The first SPC deputy 
chairman confirmed this assumption, stating that ' real MSG interest is now in New 
Caledonia's economic potential ' .  53 This was one of the reasons behind the MSG meeting in 
New Caledonia in 2002 : The members of the Melanesian delegation were very much 
interested in nickel and in New Caledonian knowledge in this field.54 
The other MSG members are very interested in New Caledonia on account of its political 
stability, its financial and technical abilities (notably in mining development) and in the 
development of its aid and cooperation policy with regard to the region, and in particular the 
Melanesian states. So the question is: Is New Caledonia as a whole more interesting as a 
member than the FLNKS? Will the MSG have to choose between Melanesian solidarity and 
pragmatism? At any rate, the MSG asked the FLNKS in 2003 to talk New Caledonia into 
joining the free-trade zone, and Article 1 paragraph 3 of the 2007 Charter allows for the MSG 
to invite observers, associate members, or special guests to join. New Caledonia, which is 
5 1  It is true that it is a collegial power, since FLNKS is a component of the New Caledonian government. 
52 New Caledonia is in the category of Overseas Countries and Territories, and as a result enjoys privileged links 
and more benefits than the ACP countries, which include MSG member states. 
53 Yves Corbel, interviews, SPC, Noumea, 6 June 6 2003 
54 Especially the Papuan representatives 
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already an associate member of the Forum, could therefore become an associate member of 
the MSG. But that might mean the MSG withdrawing its support for the FLNKS' s  cause. 
Conclusion: the challenges facing the MSG 
Can or should MSG members retain a 'Melanesian Way' ,  a way to manage their relationships 
and promote their interests within the Oceanian region? Since 2005 , the Melanesian states 
have been having serious commercial disputes (over the trade in cabin biscuits and kava 
between Vanuatu and Fiji and the corned beef trade between Fiji  and PNG). It is also possible 
to see a potential lack of solidarity, or at least some Melanesian fatigue, regarding Fij i  which 
has been eschewing parliamentary elections and the principles of good governance since 
2006. 
Similarly, we can observe the very slow emergence of a Melanesian cultural movement. Do 
the Melanesian Arts and Cultures festivals held every four years since 1 998,  generate that 
cultural dynamism wished for since the late 1 970s (with the 1 978 Melanesia 2000 festival in 
Noumea, organized by Jean-Marie Tjibaou and others)? While the third festival, held in Fiji 
in 2006, generated some publicity, the 2002 festival in Vanuatu was disappointing because 
the other MSG members showed little interest in it. Is it a latent lack of interest on the part of 
the Melanesian states in these activities or a harsh lack of funds to ensure genuine cultural 
development? 
In May 2008 the MSG confirmed the appointment of its first Director General, PNG's  
economic counsellor, Rima Ravusiro. The brand new Secretariat buildings were funded by 
China. China also subsidized other infrastructure projects in Melanesian countries and signed 
numerous trade agreements. As a result, one wonders whether the group will be able to 
preserve its independence in the face of an increasingly active power in the region. 
All these questions underscore how fragile the MSG is. Now the South Pacific (or, more 
precisely, Oceania) needs a strong Melanesia to be able to achieve the four main objectives of 
its Pacific Plan set up in 2005 : good governance, economic growth, sustainable development 
and security. It is probably in this context that PNG, among others, revived the debate in 
2008 about a possible Regional Union, a South-South type of cooperation. This concept, born 
some twenty years ago, is in some ways the extension of the Melanesian free-trade zone to 
the whole Pacific Island region (excluding Australia and New Zealand) . In this plan it is also 
possible to detect the Melanesian ambition to establish their supremacy in the region. 
The MSG should have a clear position with regard to New Caledonia. As New Caledonia has 
for many years been invited to join the free-trade zone, will it be a more appropriate member 
than the FLNKS? Will the MSG have to choose between Melanesian identity and 
pragmatism? It is interesting to point out the irony of the situation. Initially New Caledonia' s  
inclusion was challenged, due to its status a s  part of  France. It appeared at that time a s  a 
factor in Melanesian cohesion for FLNKS' s  benefit and against the New Caledonian 
government. Now the MSG's  message seems to be that Melanesian unity can only be 
achieved with the New Caledonian government. 
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I I .  The Present: the emergence and 
development of regional organizations 
in Melanesia 
1 9 . The diversity of regional  organizations:  a 
general overview 
tPaul De Deckker1 
Introduction 
Producing an exhaustive analysis of regional organizations in the Pacific is an impossible 
task, as the area has an impressive number of multilateral formal and informal organizations 
and associations linking Pacific states in many fields. They range from sports organizations 
to religious, education, cultural, and trade organizations to organizations concerned with 
regional telecommunications and stamp collecting. The main purpose of all these 
organizations is to foster cooperation in the proper sense, and therefore to pool ideas as well 
as possibilities for action and the financial resources necessary for their proper operation.2 
They are also a communication tool, a tool for encounters between their members who live 
on archipelagos scattered on the surface of the Great Ocean. These organizations have made 
people aware that they belong to the same region, and even that they share a common 
identity. 
The geographical makeup of the Pacific Islands acts like a protective shield. At the military 
level there is no need for internal alliances insofar as archipelagos are too distant from each 
other and thus are not a threat to their neighbours. Moreover, the alliances made with 
Western countries since the end of World War Two have been protecting them from any real 
danger of outside intrusion, and the United States, France, Australia and New Zealand 
entertain close military relationships.  While some occasional problems have arisen (and we 
will review them here), they have never really jeopardized the region' s  stability. The Pacific 
island states are all fundamentally Christian, as many of their Constitutions show - they ask 
for Almighty God's  protection. That did not keep some of those states from entertaining 
1 University ofNew Caledonia 
2 For example: the South Pacific Forum Line for shipping, Air Pacific for air transportation, SOP AC for mineral 
prospection. 
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occasional relationships with the Soviet Union or China, but the motives for those 
relationships were mostly financial. From an ideological standpoint, the Pacific island nations 
belong to the Western camp, although they retain their own operating principles, focused on 
custom and tradition as well as Christianity, conjoined in a peculiar mix. 
For about 30 years this peculiar way of doing things in the region has been known as the 
'Pacific Way' . Its two underlying requirements are tolerance and consensus. Because the 
common good or the common interest must prevail, they end up in agreement. All opinions 
are expressed and debates are supposed to end in general approval. Votes are seldom, if ever, 
used, except when there is no other way, for indeed, a vote allows a majority to emerge, but 
as a result, some people, groups or parties are shut out of the process .  Whenever possible, a 
general approval is sought in order to reach a consensus.3 
This system by no means implies that there are no differences or disagreements. Actually, 
there are many. 
Fij i  has often been criticized for seeking leadership within the region. True, Suva, the 
nation's capital, hosts the foreign diplomatic posts with jurisdiction over the other island 
states; Suva houses the branches of the main international organizations such as the European 
Commission's delegation for the Pacific, the World Health Organization and the United 
Nations Development Program's regional bureaus, etc . ,  and the headquarters of intra-regional 
organizations such as the University of the South Pacific and the South Pacific Forum 
Secretariat. Fij i ' s  former President Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara' s  personality contributed much 
to this situation, as he was Prime Minister for 1 7  years.4 His charisma, his mana, as they say 
in the Pacific, was such that in some cases he could seem in the view of his foreign partners 
to be the natural spokesman for the region. 5 
Consensus does not always show up in the latent opposition between the Melanesian Arc 
nations and those of the Polynesian Triangle. Enmities are first and foremost the result of 
geology; the Melanesian archipelagos are better endowed with natural resources, and 
consequently, they feel superior because they need less foreign subsidies for their 
development. They have something to sell and develop, so they can have a more favourable 
position with some serious advantages in regional organizations. This is not the case for 
Polynesian states or territories. They have only a few agricultural and fishing resources, and 
as a result, they are necessarily much more dependent on foreign aid with little to give in 
3 This means that the system is not based on majoritarianism. 
4 This aristocrat ( 1 920-2004), who was born to a paramount chiefdom in Fiji (Lau), headed negotiations with 
London leading to independence in 1 970. He became Prime Minister, and he was continuously re-elected until 
the 1 987 election. A very skilled politician, a Pacific regional development theorist, Ratu Mara was constantly 
supported by Australia, New Zealand, the United States and Europe in most of his actions. The two 1 987 coups 
detracted somewhat from his prestige in power circles. A short time after the 1 987 coup, he became Prime 
Minister again until 1 992. He succeeded his friend Ratu Sir Ganilau as Fiji President in 1 994 and retired from 
politics shortly after the third coup in May 2000. 
5 Criticism of Fiji regarding this pre-eminence within the region came mainly, and still comes from Papua New 
Guinea. Each of the Prime Ministers of Papua New Guinea since 1 975 has contended that as his country is the 
major state in the region in terms of area and population, Papua New Guinea should house more regional and 
international agencies represented in the Pacific. 
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return. Further, just like Micronesia, Polynesian archipelagos have political and customary 
systems with a strict hierarchical organization which makes them seem more conservative 
than the Melanesian states. The Melanesian states exhibit anti-colonialist feelings and support 
for the Third World. This posture has been dubbed by some people Melanesian Socialism.6 
In Melanesia, several linguistic separations or distinctions must be taken into account. The 
first group is made up of three countries with pidgin as one of their official languages: Papua 
New Guinea, the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu. In those countries some 1 ,000 languages 
have been found. Managing communications between the various communities required a 
lingua franca. That is how pidgin came about: pidgin, or tok pisin, or bislama, emerged on 
the plantations; it features a mainly Oceanic syntax combined with mostly English 
vocabulary. In Fij i  pidgin is not spoken, as the official language is English. Alongside 
English we can find the Bau Fijian dialect, a language into which the Bible was translated, 
and Hindustani which is spoken by Indo-Fij ians. In New Caledonia, French is widely spoken 
and the local villagers have retained the wealth of their vernacular languages. 
The Pacific can also be divided up on the basis of its contemporary colonial history. The 
United Kingdom and its satellites have imprinted on the peoples '  consciousness a worldview 
that is somewhat different to that conveyed by France and by the United States in their 
respective territories. 
An additional division, related to status, can be found between the independent countries and 
those that are still in association with or under the rule of the mother country. For reasons that 
we will analyse, the first countries to gain independence set up a regional organization in 
1 97 1  - the South Pacific Forum. Membership is open only to independent countries or 
countries that have self-government in free association with the mother country. 
At first we will provide a reminder of the role of the two main regional organizations. First 
we will just mention in passing the Pacific Community (Dr Jimmie Rogers will talk about it 
as he has been very familiar with it for many years); thereafter, we will deal with the South 
Pacific Forum by providing a quick sketch of the idea underlying its foundation by Ratu 
Mara. 
I. Two major organizations 
The South Pacific Commission7 
While I would not like to encroach upon what Jimmy will say later, nonetheless I would like 
to mention that the South Pacific Commission, when it was founded in 1 947, made it a rule 
never to deal with political issues. When Pacific island states gained independence, this 
position became untenable. For France and the United States the word 'politics ' meant 
managing their territories, whereas for the leaders of the newly independent nations it meant 
determining priorities, for example with regard to development. 
6 This ideology is clearly stated in Walter Lini' s  Vanuaaku Pati founding documents. Lini is a former Prime 
Minister of Vanuatu. Both Papua New Guinea and the Solomons have been sympathetic to this idea, and the 
ideological foundations of the Melanesian Spearhead show it very clearly. 
7 Since 1 997 it has been officially called the 'Secretariat of the South Pacific Commission' 
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The South Pacific Forum8 
Ratu Mara, the then Prime Minister of Fiji - which had gained independence from the United 
Kingdom in 1 970 - decided to found this Forum. Ratu Mara was eager to unite the young 
independent Pacific microstates to counterbalance the African and Caribbean countries in 
negotiations in Brussels as part of the Lome Agreements. Acting on the principle of strength 
through unity, he was aware that independence processes were well and truly launched, 
which meant an increasing number of members for the Pacific Forum. Ratu Mara did not 
want Australia and New Zealand to be members of the Forum, but he had to accept them for 
economic reasons,9 as Australia and New Zealand each fund one third of the organization' s 
budget, 10 which is far from being an insignificant contribution. At the same time, there was 
something in it for the two Western powers because the microstates had to rely on Australia 
and New Zealand for the necessary services and expertise to prepare the files submitted to the 
European Union in Brussels. Australia and New Zealand had been shut out of the European 
Union as soon as the Common Market was created, and now they could access it through the 
Pacific microstates. This was far from being insignificant, and thus as Australia and New 
Zealand could find out about the content of negotiations in Brussels regarding priorities for 
development. They had a constant hope that one or two of their companies as enterprises 
could benefit from European funding. 
As the 1980s drew near, the Forum shifted into a much more political dimension, meaning 
more specifically partisan politics or confrontational politics, as France was uncompromising 
about both its nuclear testing in Polynesia and the issue of Kanak independence, which it 
meant to suppress. The New Hebrides Condominium gained independence in late July 1 980, 
and its Prime Minister, Walter Lini, led an unrelenting fight against France by deciding to 
join the non-aligned movement. He did his utmost to help the 'Kanak brethren' gain 
independence. That is how, under Lini ' s  impetus, the Melanesian Spearhead Group was 
created; it was aimed at New Caledonia and nuclear testing in Polynesia, in that order. 
At the end of each of the Forum's annual meetings, which usually bring together the heads of 
member states, a communique is issued. During the 1 980s, half of the points raised in the 
various communiques were about France in the Pacific. The Forum had become France' s  pet 
aversion. The climax was reached in 1 985 with the Rainbow Warrior failed attempt at 
intimidation. The sinking of the Greenpeace flagship in Auckland Harbour by the French 
special services was viewed by the Pacific region as an act of state terrorism. The Forum was 
winning the battle, and it was there that the decision was made to put New Caledonia back on 
the UN list of countries to decolonize. A few months later, Francis Bugotu, three months 
after his term as Secretary General of the South Pacific Commission had ended in September 
1 986, took the Kanak's  request to New York. Bugotu was from the Solomon Islands, and in 
Noumea he often met with Kanak leaders such as Tj ibaou, Uregei, or Yeiwene, all dead now. 
8 Officially the Secretariat for the Pacific Islands Forum 
9 A statement by Ratu Mara at the Pacific Leaders Conference of the Pacific Islands Development Program in 
March 1 988 at the East-West Center, Honolulu. The content of the statement was slanted by Australia and New 
Zealand's adverse posture after the two coups in Fiji . 
1 0  The financial contribution of each of the other 14 members stands at about 2.5 per cent of the total. It is easy 
to bear for Papua or Fiji, but much less for Tuvalu or Kiribati. 
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With the Matignon Agreements in 1 988,  and ten years later the Noumea Agreement which 
fully included Kanaks in determining the future of New Caledonia, and with the end of 
nuclear testing, relationships were quiet and dispassionate again, and everybody publicly 
wished to let bygones be bygones. Besides, priorities have changed as has the spirit that 
prevailed at the time that the Forum was created. 
Now the Secretariat operates by means of an Officials' Committee which makes up the 
organization' s  directorate. It operates with about forty officials assigned to the Forum by the 
member governments or hired by the Forum on contract. The Secretariat has about ten 
divisions ranging from the ACP-EU programs to oil resources, telecommunications, trade and 
investments and the Secretariat 's  own administrative management. It channels foreign funds 
for specific programs. Therefore, its main objective lies in its ability to provide cooperation 
between the Pacific Island state governments. The Forum also means to be a link or an 
agency through which bilateral and multilateral cooperation with other countries and 
international organizations for development must go. 
The Forum was the driving force in the drafting of the free-trade treaty signed in 1 980 by 
Australia and New Zealand on the one hand and the independent island states on the other. 
This organization now watches over and monitors some 200 development projects. Some of 
these, such as the Forum's sea line and the Forum' s Fisheries Agency have become fully­
fledged organizations, separated institutionally from the Forum as they became more and 
more important. 
One question continually arose, and that was whether it was necessary to put a stop to agency 
duplication - to cut heavy operating budgets and merge the two main regional organizations 
for better coordination of their respective actions with regard to development. France and the 
United States were not really in favour of this merger insofar as the Pacific Community was -
and still is - the only organization in the region to enjoy a universal scope. Besides, it was not 
conceivable to run the risk of non-egalitarian development through a single regional 
organization on the basis of status or political motives. 
The Pacific Plan 
In Auckland and during the previous Forum meeting in Papua New Guinea in 2005 , the 
Pacific Islands Heads of State and Government approved the Pacific Plan, which was 
developed and drafted by high-ranking New Zealand and Australian officials. The focus was 
the strengthening of priorities in the areas of good governance, sustainable development, 
regional security and economic and trade growth, so as to foster stability in the region. 
Experts on development economics are very pessimistic about the ability of Pacific Island 
states to foster their growth, except for population growth . . .  The funds granted to the tune of 
millions of dollars or euros have not jumpstarted the economic growth machine. Therefore, it 
is appropriate to start all over again and decide on the measures to be implemented to achieve 
the objectives stemming from the plan. 
To state things more clearly still, in the view of the regional Western powers, it is necessary 
to meet the challenges of globalization. Custom and tradition have led to a dead end, even to 
1 45 
The New Pacific Review 
failure with regard to economic development and progress. One striking example is public 
health - cardiovascular diseases and diabetes, despite the amounts that have been spent, 
continue to wreak havoc .  So it was decided to take the appropriate measures !  A competent 
Australian official, Greg Urwin, 1 1  was appointed as Forum Chairman to see that the structural 
measures suggested by the two Australasian powers are implemented. 
The latest Forum summits (Auckland, Port Moresby, Tonga and Niue) revealed the present 
concerns of the organization' s  sixteen member states. Of course it is necessary to read 
between the lines, as diplomatic practices often mask litigious topics . . .  It is also interesting 
to see that more and more partners from outside the region are anxious to take part in the 
Forum's meetings. This shows that the Pacific is recovering its position as an important 
region on the world stage, contrary to the assertions of those people who dismiss it as an 
uninteresting languid space. 
Indeed, and as an example, 'the liquid continent' is an extraordinarily rich but overexploited 
fishing area. Experts have sounded the alarm so that the amount of fish caught by ships often 
coming from faraway ports (from Europe, America and Asia) can be regulated. Yellow-fin 
and big-eye tuna are now in danger of extinction. Therefore it is essential to determine and 
set fishing quotas and see that unauthorized ships are stopped, examined and subjected to 
penalties. The Pacific island states must be able to earn revenue from fish caught in their 
exclusive economic zones, and it is imperative that bilateral and multilateral agreements be 
signed. Moreover, it is necessary to set up air and space surveillance operations for the 
benefit of the islands . In this respect, Australia, New Zealand and France have decided to 
pool their resources. That is an example of regional cooperation making it possible to reach a 
reasonably high degree of efficiency for the benefit of all partners. Greenpeace attended the 
Forum meeting in October 2007 in Nuku'alofa, the Tongan capital, and stated that in order to 
avert the extinction of yellow-fin and big-eye tuna, it was necessary to cut authorized fishing 
quotas in the Pacific by 50 per cent. 
The European Union, through its commissioner Louis Michel and its General Director for 
Development, was present in Tonga. It had to make its new credo heard, a geo-political credo 
which Brussels had established. 
Since the Lome Agreements and the later Cotonou Agreements, Europe has been subsidizing 
exports, essentially agricultural exports, from African, Caribbean and Pacific countries 
(ACP). However, because of new rules imposed by the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
those practices are no longer authorized. Subsidized purchases should be supplanted by new 
economic partnership agreements (EPA). The European Union had planned to complete 
negotiations by 3 1  December 2007 in order to implement EP As as early as the following 
year. Because Pacific countries were very reluctant and because they emphasised that their 
economies were peculiar and fragile in the face of trade globalization, The EU decided to 
agree on a provisional intermediate solution pending a general agreement with ACP 
countries. Louis Michel travelled to Tonga to formally sign the tentative program mobilizing 
the European Development Fund (EDF) over the 2008-20 1 3  period for Oceanian countries. 
1 1  It was specified that he was partly Oceanian, since his wife was from Samoa. 
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The EU views itself as a partner in the Pacific Plan and predicates its aid on the Plan's  
implementation. The Pacific Plan, as  noted above, consists of structural reforms and it  is 
meant to lead to the strengthening of the four pillars made up of good governance, 
sustainable development, economic growth and regional security. The EU will contribute to 
its implementation along with its Western partners in the region, as it is convinced that 
regional unity is the major key for ensuring a better future for Pacific nations. Louis Michel 
has clearly stated that the intermediate solution of financially endowing the Pacific nations to 
assist their development by no means endangers the EPA, which will eventually have to be 
concluded. The amount of money allotted is 267 million euros. 
It is worth noting that the New Caledonian government President, Harold Martin, declared in 
Nuku'alofa in October 2007 that New Caledonia was eager to become a full member of the 
Forum in order to better contribute to regional development. For his part, the French 
Polynesia President, Oscar Temaru, requested support to put his country on the UN 
decolonisation committee list. 
What were the prospects after this major meeting in Tonga? Some issues that were brought to 
the fore are not clearly mentioned in the final communique. There is general agreement on 
how extremely important sea resources are for the future of Pacific island nations. The 
Forum's Fisheries Agency was created in 1 979 with its headquarters in Honiara. The Agency 
has been able to negotiate compensatory agreements with nations or companies that do not 
belong to the region. The Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission has taken over 
to prevent overexploitation of resources, especially by geographically distant countries. 
Protecting sea resources and seeing that catches do not exceed the standards that have been 
set is essential. This process requires common operations and a concerted regional 
cooperation on the part of the islands and the mother countries. In this respect, the Forum will 
always be important. At the Nuku'alofa meeting it immediately granted an observer status to 
the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. 
The new Australian Parliamentary Secretary for the Pacific, Duncan Kerr, talked about 
Melanesia using the symbolism suggested by the words 'arc of responsibility ' ,  a short time 
after taking office in December 2007. Mr Kerr's statement is a dramatic departure from the 
previous Australian Government' s  attitude. The previous Government talked about an 'arc of 
instability' .  
There was much talk about organizational structure in the Pacific, a phrase meaning the 
necessary reorganization one way or another of the two main regional organizations 
operating under the Pacific Plan. Is there eventually a trend toward a single regional 
organization set up by redeploying some of the components of the two previous ones toward 
other structures so that they are more efficient? This is, of course, one of the recurring topics 
of discussion brought up by the different audits and objections. The small island states are 
usually reluctant to see this change happen, for they consider that a single organization will 
not cater for the interests of all members as before. Some see an advantage in such a change: 
things will be clear again if there are three main components, a political component, a 
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technical component, and a third component to take care of training by pooling the available 
resources. 
There is a clear danger in the possible emergence in the Pacific region of sub-groups with 
diverging or conflicting interests. Such a situation would break up regional coherence and 
cohesion, and as a consequence, the region will be less well treated in view of the block 
geopolitics the European Union is currently contemplating. 1 2 
II. Some other regional agencies 
We will only briefly introduce some of the organizations that are offshoots of the two main 
regional organizations. 
The Forum's Fisheries Agency 
Following the commencement of the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea 
(beginning in 1973 and culminating in the signing of the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea at Montego Bay in 1982), 1 3 the Forum's 1 976 annual meeting in Nauru 
revealed the necessity of undertaking 'a common action and have regional cooperation 
regarding the monitoring and management of sea resources' in the Forum member states' 
territorial waters. Thereafter, debates focused around whether or not to incorporate into the 
intergovernmental agency about to be created, those countries that do not belong to the South 
Pacific but whose fishing fleets operated in the area. The Polynesian states were in favour of 
including the United States .  Australia and New Zealand, as allies of the United States, did not 
want to argue openly against the Polynesian standpoint, but instead let the Melanesian 
countries oppose the inclusion of the US on the grounds that incorporating countries from 
outside the zone into the Agency would both weaken regional unity and restrict its room to 
manoeuvre in negotiations on the ownership of migratory fish caught within their exclusive 
economic zones. Actually, the Melanesian states meant to exploit their sea resources on their 
own, whereas the Polynesian microstates hoped to get royalties from the foreign countries 
that had fishing fleets operating in their territorial waters. The Melanesian countries argued 
for the assertion of regional control over regional resources, and they all adhered to this 
argument on the basis of the potential revenue that could be obtained. In 1 979 the Forum 
established the Fisheries Agency, now headquartered in Honiara, and the Agency conducted 
negotiations in the late 1 980s, the outcome of which was the regional treaty on fishing 
between the United States and the South Pacific Forum countries. 1 4 The Agency was 
particularly active in disseminating information regarding the delimitation of the exclusive 
economic zones of its member states; in gathering information on other countries' laws on 
fishing; and in the draft agreement for the 1 989 convention prohibiting the use of driftnets. 
1 2  The EU has nonetheless got Papua New Guinea and Fiji to approve the EPA. By advocating bloc politics, the 
EU does not abide by its strategy-based policy, and thus it sows the seeds of discord . . .  In fact, by signing the 
EPA, Papua New Guinea finds itself in a win-win position, and Fiji relaxes the blockade hampering its sugar 
exports, but the group's  solidarity is shattered. The poorer countries will suffer the consequences. 
1 3 During that conference the concept of exclusive economic zones (EEZ) extending 200 miles off shore was 
implemented. 
14 The Fisheries Agency got US$4 million annually as part of assistance to its development as well as $7 million 
to be distributed among the member states in whose territorial waters the American tuna fishing boats caught the 
fish. 
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The Agency, invoking the UN Declaration and supported by the Forum, struggled to have 
this practice discontinued in the South by Japan, Taiwan and South Korea Pacific from as 
early as 1 992. The Agency, in concert with the Pacific Community, or SPC, which has an 
observer status in the Agency, provides to member nations data on both bilateral and 
multilateral conventions or treaties and on the catches by the various fishing fleets. To this 
end, the Agency gets help from the Australian and New Zealand navies and air forces, which 
watch the zone. The Agency is headed by a director who is assisted by some 40 experts and 
administrative staff. The director works in close concert with the Forum Officials Committee 
and submits an annual activities report for approval by the Forum. The funding of the Agency 
comes from the member states on the basis of their contribution to the Forum, and also from 
Canada, Japan, the Commonwealth, the EDF, WHO and the UNDP. 1 5  
The Pacific Forum Line 
The Pacific islands are scattered over huge areas, and consequently the distances between 
them are extremely large; freight volume is low and costs are ever increasing. These are the 
main factors that led to the decline or closing down of most commercial sea lines in the 1 960s 
and 1 970s. The Pacific island states which depended heavily on the frequency of these sea 
links for importing food and raw materials and for their exports brought up this serious issue 
at the Forum's inaugural meeting in Wellington in 1 97 1 .  Tonga and Nauru did initiate some 
actions to overcome this problem, but they were not really successful; so in 1 997 New 
Zealand and nine independent countries established the Pacific Forum Line. 1 6 Its objectives 
are to: 
• Operate a regular, rational and viable shipping line 
• Keep freight cost as low as possible 
• Meet the essential needs of the islands that are located off the trade routes 
• Promote the region' s  exports and foster its development. 
During the first years of operation the Pacific Forum Line was a financial disaster; but thanks 
to an increase in New Zealand capital and a loan from the European Investment Bank, its 
profitability improved. Now seven ships regularly ply the profitable trade routes, while an 
eighth ship deliberately operates at a loss so as to service the most remote islands. The Line 
has its headquarters in Apia, Western Samoa, and it operates through a share-holder system. 1 7  
While emphasizing how important this line i s ,  we must bear in  mind that i t  serves mostly 
New Zealand and Australian interests insofar as the consumer products that are dumped in 
the islands come from those two countries. Inter-island exchanges are much less significant. 
1 5 The overall budget of the Agency was a little over 2 million US dollars in 1 990. Its Director in 1 995, Victorio 
Uherbelau, told this writer at the time that the budget was constantly increasing (personal talk, Noumea, October 
1 995). At that date, the Agency had three boats. 
1 6  New Zealand, Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, Papua New Guinea, Solomons, Western Samoa, Tonga and 
Tuvalu. 
17 The total equity of the company is more then 20 million Samoan talas (dollars), and the main stockholders 
are, in decreasing order, Papua New Guinea, Fiji, New Zealand, followed by Tuvalu, Tonga, Western Samoa 
with approximately the same share, followed by Kiribati, and, with a small share, the Cook Islands and the 
Solomons. Nauru's contribution is not known. 
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The University of the South Pacific 
This higher education institution was founded in 1 970 in Suva, where there was already a 
medical school funded by American donors . As set out in its bylaws, the University of the 
South Pacific was established to serve the region and it has campuses in several Forum 
countries. Some of those campuses offer specialized programs such as agriculture in the 
Cook Islands and law in Vanuatu. Thanks to satellite technology, the peripheral campuses 
can use remote teaching through telecommunications. 
The University of the South Pacific offers the main teaching subjects and meets the region' s  
needs. The degrees are not automatically equivalent to those awarded in  Australian and New 
Zealand universities for reasons that are clearly spelled out: keeping the degree holders in the 
islands, and offering degrees that meet the region' s  needs. The quality of teaching was 
excellent until 1 988  when many USP professors found that their contracts had not been 
renewed for political reasons. 1 8 The USP council is made up of academics and administrators, 
and the Senate is made up of representatives of the Forum countries and business leaders. 
The vice-chancellor is usually an administrator appointed by the Senate, whereas the 
Chancellor is a key political figure from the region. 1 9 
The student body is made up of young people from across the Pacific. They are awarded 
government scholarships and they live on campus. Relations between students have been 
somewhat strained since the coups, and some member states did not hesitate to recall their 
students during the coups or when ethnic unrest broke out in recent years. Papua New Guinea 
is not a party to the USP; it has created its own universities, with traditional subjects taught at 
Port Moresby and technical teaching at Lae, in the north.2° For a few years, these two 
campuses have been experiencing unrest and occasionally high levels of crime. It is 
impossible to know if and when these institutions will recover stability. They are essential to 
training the region' s  elites. 
The South Pacific Applied Geosciences Commission (SOP AC) 
The Pacific Islands have Fiji  to thank for the establishment, in 1 970, of a Committee for 
Coordination of Joint Prospecting for Mineral Resources in South Pacific Offshore Areas, a 
committee created along the lines of one created four years before for the Asia region. The 
underlying idea was initially to assess the economic potential of the region with regard to 
mineral resources. Most Forum countries are either full members or observers. The agency is 
mainly a technical assistance agency. It is assisted through international cooperation in two 
ways: funding and foreign volunteers who work on a contract basis at the centre in Suva. 
Since 1 984, this committee has been an autonomous regional organization in its own right. In 
1 989 it was officially renamed the South Pacific Applied Geosciences Commission, but the 
acronym SOP AC has been retained. This commission has produced remarkable results in the 
1 8 A number of Australian and New Zealand academics had helped in the creation of the Fiji Labour Party 
which won the 1 987 election in Fiji .  Following the second coup, most of them were deemed persona non grata 
in view of the criticism they had levelled against the new regime. Many academics of Indo-Fijian descent have 
since moved to Australian, New Zealand or Canadian institutions, and as a result some USP departments lack 
teachers and filling the void is not easy. 
1 9 Such as the King of Tonga for some time, or the Cook Islands' Prime Minister, etc. 
20 Papua New Guinea has denominational and private universities as well 
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fields of undersea charting, seabed geology, mineral resource management, and 
submarine/underwater environmental management. The Suva centre also has an educational 
function, training high-level technicians in many areas. Its operating budget is funded by 
member states and its research projects are funded by the United States, the UNDP, the EU 
and Canada. SOPAC's  staff comprises some 50 researchers, technicians and administrators, 
and SOPAC is now the most endangered organization in the debates about possible re 
organization of agencies in the Pacific islands. While SOP AC has a good record, member 
countries are approaching a consensus regarding its incorporation into the SPC and the 
Oceania Regional Environmental Program. 
The Oceania Regional Environmental Program 
The Pacific islands ' environment is both valuable and fragile. In 1 973 the South Pacific 
Conference hired an environmental expert to work on the issues relating to environmental 
management. Five years later, the Commission and the Forum agreed that it was necessary to 
pool their efforts to establish a Global Environmental Management Program. In 1 980, with 
financial support from CESAP and UNEP, the SPC and the Forum created the Oceania 
Regional Environmental Program. The secretariat funding was provided by SPC. OREP 
proved instrumental in the adoption, in 1 986, of the Convention for Natural Resource and 
Environmental Protection in the South Pacific Area, prohibiting nuclear testing and the 
dumping of radioactive waste. OREP developed its research activity on climate change (the 
greenhouse effect) , pesticides, water quality, etc. - in short, it worked on ways to control 
various forms of marine pollution. For a while, the Forum and SPC got along well, but the 
SPC was accused of interfering in the definition of OREP's  priorities. As a result, relations 
between the SPC and the Forum became somewhat strained, and the program's  committee 
was overhauled. From then on, a representative of each of the cultural areas, another from 
Australia or New Zealand, and yet another from Great Britain, from the United States or from 
France were supposed to make OREP more efficient. Eventually, as recommended by the 
Forum, OREP became a self-ruling organization in 1 992, with headquarters in Apia. Its 
activities are still coordinated by the two major regional organizations.2 1 However, despite 
strong political and financial support from the region' s  countries, there are more and more 
doubts as to whether it is really efficient. Moreover, for some people, the worldwide interest 
shown in environmental issues and the international financial efforts being made to safeguard 
the environment make the claims of OREP somewhat ludicrous. 
There are many other regional organizations such as - for example - the Pacific Islands 
Development Program (PIDP), located since 1 980 (at the urging of Ratu Mara) at the East­
West Center, at the University of Hawaii at Manoa. The main objective of the Program is to 
conduct research on areas deemed priorities by the Conference of Heads of Government of 
South Pacific Countries and Territories which meets every five years. The research and 
results of the Program are expected to inform the member country leaders ' proposals 
regarding development, training, cruise tourism, etc. The research is supervised by a 
committee made up of high-ranking officials from the region' s  countries. The Program is 
funded by international organizations and mother countries. Its budget of about one million 
21 The OREP's annual budget is about one million US dollars. 
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US dollars was drastically cut over the last few years, and the Program risks becoming 
somewhat dormant for a period. 
Conclusion 
All these regional organizations are very important, first in order to encourage any possible 
external financial assistance to foster internal regional development, and secondly to link the 
islands to the outside world through their governments while at the same time strengthening 
regional solidarity and identities. Let us bet that New Caledonia, committed to Melanesia, 
will continue to play a greater and greater role in the region both in terms of its institutions 
and its leaders ' and peoples ' aspirations for development. 
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20. Statement by the Di rector-General,  
Secretariat of the Pacific Com m u nity 
Dr Jimmie Rodgers 
Mr Chairperson, distinguished delegates to 'A house blong Melanesia Conference ' ,  ladies 
and gentlemen, please allow me first of all to thank the organizers of the conference for the 
opportunity to participate at this historic gathering this morning. 
I have been asked to speak about the Secretariat of the Pacific Community in the context of 
the 'Emergence and Development of the Regional Organisations in Melanesia' . 
In the next few minutes I will try to talk about the SPC, its origins, its mission and to some 
extent its journey from its birth to the present. To help relieve boredom and if time permits I 
would like to play a 7 minute DVD containing a short documentary about the SPC. 
From the ashes of World War 2, the SPC was born on 6 February 1 947 founded under a 
Treaty called the 'Canberra Agreement' by the six metropolitan powers who had colonies in 
the Pacific at the time: Australia, France, Netherlands, New Zealand, United Kingdom and 
the United States of America. 
The founding of the SPC was the very first example of regional cooperation in the Pacific, 
and one of very few at that time. 
Article IV of the Founding Agreement prescribed the main role of the SPC as 'a consultative 
and advisory body' to the participating governments in matters affecting the economic and 
social development of the territories within the scope of the Commission and the welfare and 
advancement of their peoples. To this end, the Article vested the following mandate to the 
Commission: 
(a) to study, formulate and recommend measures for the development of, and where 
necessary the co-ordination of services affecting, the economic and social rights 
and welfare of the inhabitants of the territories within the scope of the 
Commission, particularly in respect of agriculture (including animal husbandry), 
communications, transport, fisheries, forestry, industry, labour, marketing, 
production, trade and finance, public works, education, health, housing and 
social welfare; 
(b) to provide for and facilitate research in technical, scientific, economic and social 
fields in the territories within the scope of the Commission and to ensure the 
maximum co-operation and co-ordination of the activities of research bodies; 
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(c) to make recommendations for the co-ordination of local projects in any of the 
fields mentioned in the previous sub-paragraphs which have regional 
significance and for the provision of technological assistance from a wider field 
not otherwise available to a territorial administration. 
(d) to provide technical assistance, advice and information (including statistical and 
other material) for the participating governments; 
(e) to promote co-operation with non-participating governments and with non­
governmental organisations of a public or quasi-public character having common 
interests in the area, in matters within the competence of the Commission. 
(f) to address inquiries to the participating governments on matters within its 
competence; 
(g) to make recommendations with regard to the establishment and activities of 
auxiliary and subsidiary bodies. 
These functions embody the concepts of assisting, protecting, promoting and advancing the 
welfare of Pacific Islands peoples. They embody the concept of ' guardianship' which is built 
around Pacific Islands peoples. They helped shape the development of SPC programmes over 
the past 6 1  years; with one clear objective: ' to promote and enhance the social and economic 
development and wellbeing of Pacific Islands peoples. However it hadn't been an easy role to 
fulfil. 
The SPC was located in Canberra for the first two years of its existence. In 1 949 the SPC 
relocated to New Caledonia. The US Army Pacific Command centre, nicknamed the Pacific 
'Pentagon' ,  became the SPC' s  home for 47 of its 59 and a half years in New Caledonia. 
There began the relationship between New Caledonia and the SPC, the only organisation in 
the Pacific whose headquarters is located in a territory. New Caledonia has been our guardian 
and a wonderful host for the oldest bilingual technical regional organisation in the Pacific. 
On 6 February last year, we celebrated the organisation's  60 years of service to the region - a 
very rare milestone and an outstanding achievement by an organisation. I would like to share 
some highlights with you - about the SPC setting some records: 
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• Firstly, SPC is the oldest bilingual technical regional organisation in the Pacific, about 
as old as the United Nations. 
• Secondly, the SPC is the only regional organisation that has its headquarters in a 
territory. 
• Thirdly, the SPC was the first regional organisation to accord equal membership 
status to all its members, regardless of their political independence. 
• Fourthly, the SPC is the only technical regional organisation that has a multi-country 
presence.  We currently have three official offices - in New Caledonia (the southern 
office), Fiji (the central office); Federated States of Micronesia (the northern Pacific 
office); and soon Papua New Guinea (the Western Pacific office); and to complete the 
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picture, an eastern Pacific office will be established in the near future. In addition a 
national SPC office will be opened in Solomon Islands later this year and one 
possibly in Vanuatu sometime next year. In addition, the SPC has a physical presence 
in 14 other island countries and territories including French Polynesia and Wallis and 
Futuna. 
• Fifthly, the SPC was involved in the creation of other regional bodies and 
organisations such as the South Pacific Games - a product of the South Pacific 
Conference in 1 963 ; the South Pacific Board for Education Assessment (SPBEA) and 
the Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP) to name a 
few. 
One of the most significant events in the SPC' s history occurred in Saipan in 1 983 when the 
23rd Conference admitted all participating countries and territories as full and equal members 
of the organisation. 
New Caledonia has a special place in the history of the SPC. New Caledonia was host to the 
SPC for almost 34 years before itself attaining full and equal membership status in 1 983 .  
New Caledonia' s  support and commitment to the SPC have never wavered over the past six 
decades. The special relationship between the SPC and New Caledonia started in 1 949 when 
the SPC accepted the offer to establish its headquarters in Noumea, at Anse Vata, in the 
former American military headquarters then nicknamed the 'Pentagon' .  In 1 993 New 
Caledonia reaffirmed its commitment to the SPC by contributing quite significantly, together 
with France and Australia, to rebuilding the headquarters of the SPC which was opened in 
1 995 .  
Now what about the SPC's  role and contribution to Melanesia? The five countries of 
Melanesia - Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, New Caledonia and Fiji -
between them account for 97.9 percent of the total land area in the Pacific (540,239 km sq.) 
and 87 per cent of the total population. 
New Caledonia and Fiji, by virtue of their hosting the organisation's  headquarters and largest 
regional office respectively have benefited immensely from the SPC' s  presence both in terms 
of employment of nationals as well as the economic spin-off resulting from SPC expenditure 
flowing into the respective national economies. The SPC has also benefited from these two 
countries. 
Looking into the future, the SPC will have an office operating from each of the five 
Melanesian countries, three of them with regional scope and coverage (New Caledonia, Fiji 
and PNG) and two being national offices (Solomon Islands and Vanuatu) - due to the SPC 
having a relatively large programme of assistance to them requiring on ground representation 
and coordination. 
In relation to influence in the governance of the SPC, many high-profile personalities from 
Melanesian countries have either held senior positions in or have participated in the 
organisation' s governing body or technical and scientific meetings over the years. Four out of 
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20 of the organisation' s Secretary Generals/Director Generals hail from Melanesia, with a 
fifth one unfortunately passing away just before taking up the position. 
Let me now for the last few minutes digress a little and focus on the wider region and the 
SPC' s  place in it. 
The Pacific region is at a time of immense change, economically, socially, culturally and 
politically. Some of these changes are driven from outside the region by way of international 
agreements that we have no choice but to comply with. Others originate from within the 
region, such as the Pacific Plan and the current exercise of exploring a more effective 
regional institutional arrangement for the ten regional organisations in the Pacific. Yet some 
of the changes are driven by national agendas. 
Progressive changes in the current geo-political dynamics in the region have opened up new 
opportunities for many Pacific Island countries and territories to interact more effectively 
with each other. The change in the membership criteria of the Pacific Islands Forum 
Secretariat, for instance, has enabled New Caledonia and French Polynesia to take their place 
in the regional political dialogue process. 
The changing architecture of the region has tremendous implications for the work of the SPC 
and how it conducts its business. We must ensure the continued relevance of our work, yet 
stay on the cutting edge to achieve the greatest impact and best possible outcomes for Pacific 
Island people. 
Over the next six years, the work of SPC will focus on three pillars. 
• An increased focus on member priorities - this is the operational part of our work, 
our core business. It is for this reason we exist, to work for and assist the development 
of our members. 
• Strategic engagement at the international, regional and national level - this is the 
enabling part of our work. Not all members have enough resources and expertise to 
engage with international and regional bodies that impact their livelihood. The SPC 
will act as the eyes, the ears, and the analytical framework working on behalf of our 
members to engage, analyse, and provide options to decision-makers at national level, 
to help them position themselves to respond effectively to challenges. 
• Strategic positioning of the organisation - to ensure it can deliver top quality 
services to its members effectively and efficiently. This is the key to our success. To 
meet the first two aims, the SPC needs to have the resources, the processes and most 
importantly the commitment and passion to achieve excellence of service. I am very 
happy to inform you that the commitment and passion is unquestionable, the 
processes are in place, and the resources? We continue to live in hope. 
The SPC continues to be a highly professional and dynamic bilingual organisation that 
remains closely attuned to the needs, aspirations and priorities of its members. 
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It is a credit to the members, the staff and the development partners who provide the 
resources that the region' s  oldest and largest technical organisation has not lost sight of the 
purpose for which it was established sixty years ago, and that it still remains highly relevant 
in today's  Pacific, and no doubt in the Pacific of the future. 
Let me assure you that we continue to be guided by our vision of a region that is secure and 
prosperous, and whose people are educated, healthy and empowered to manage their 
resources in an economically, environmentally and socially sustainable way. We are fully 
committed to our mission - to help Pacific Island people make informed choices and 
decisions about their future and more importantly the future they wish to leave behind for 
future generations - our children and grandchildren. 
To commemorate the organisation' s  60 years of service to the region last year, we launched a 
book about the SPC, researched and written by a team of our own staff, called Meeting house 
in the Pacific - the story of SPC 1947-2007. This is the only book that is written about the 
organisation and, as we wrote in the book, the development of the SPC in New Caledonia is 
very much about the development of New Caledonia. I have a few copies of the book here 
today. 
I thank the Government and people of New Caledonia, the three provinces and the city of 
Noumea for the commitment and unwavering support in hosting the SPC over the past 59 and 
a half years and I look forward to this relationship being continued in years to come. 
In closing, the SPC is a pan-Pacific regional organisation, however the main staging post for 
our regional service are our two largest offices in Melanesia - Fij i  and New Caledonia. 
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I l l .  The Futu re 
2 1 . Discussion : the strengths and weaknesses i n  
bei ng part of t h e  Melanesian com m u nity 
Jean-Yves Faberon, Charles Wea, Charles Washetine, Jacques 
Ziller, Paul De Deckker 
Jean-Yves FABER ON 
Our colloquium is entitled 'New Caledonia and Melanesian Unity' ,  and the current session is 
entitled 'Melanesian Unity without New Caledonia' . We have been told that this phrasing is 
somewhat provocative. We heard testimony from a New Caledonian, Charles Wea, a 
member of the Spearhead Group, representing the FLNKS. New Caledonia is not a member 
of the Spearhead Group; however, New Caledonia is not only located in Melanesia, but it is 
very active in the area, as we will see this afternoon. So the question I 'm putting, notably to 
Charles Wea is: 'What are the relationships between the Spearhead Group and New 
Caledonia? Is it relevant to picture New Caledonia as a member, just as it is already a 
member of other organizations in Oceania? ' 
Charles WEA 
The Spearhead Group has relationships with the New Caledonian government. The New 
Caledonian government goes along with some Spearhead Group decisions. I mentioned the 
Melanesian Arts Festival, one of the major decisions by the Spearhead Group; the New 
Caledonian government organizes programs and funds the festival . True, the FLNKS is part 
of the Spearhead Group, but as early as the time when Pierre Frogier was Chairman of the 
New Caledonian government, Pierre Frogier was willing to join the Group. Even before the 
formal incorporation of the FLNKS into the group, New Caledonia took part in the 
organization of the 'Melanesia Cup ' .  Let me mention the Spearhead Group mission to New 
Caledonia by the end of 2008. This mission will have talks with New Caledonia not so much 
on a political level, since political talks are ongoing, but mostly to determine how New 
Caledonia can incorporate the decisions relating to trade. The philosophy behind the creation 
of the Spearhead Group consists of defending and preserving solidarity between Melanesia's 
peoples; New Caledonia can bring economic experience to Melanesian countries. Even 
though New Caledonia is not part of the Spearhead Group, its current Government already 
has some influence on some of the Group' s  actions. So now things are moving forward, and 
we have ongoing discussions with the New Caledonian government. It ' s  mostly a question of 
political will on the part of political parties in New Caledonia. 
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Charles W ASHETINE 
I ' ll say a few words to complement what Charles has just said. Nathalie Mrgudovic was 
wondering whether New Caledonia was not elbowing the FLNKS out of the Spearhead 
Group. The FLNKS is first and foremost a political tool for the emancipation of all of New 
Caledonia as a country and as an entity. And true, solidarity materialized in the 1 970s. This 
was restated this morning and yesterday. It is solidarity in the name of a certain identity, 
since the identity question was the central question. How can these Melanesian countries 
with a common identity come together in more political struggles? That is how the Spearhead 
Group was born, and the FLNKS is part of it, and the FLNKS is a group of political parties 
with various standpoints, but they are driven by a single objective, independence. Hamid 
Mokaddem restated this through quotations from Jean-Marie Tjibaou on independence. New 
Caledonia is involved in various organizations in the region. The FLNKS is first of all made 
up of indigenes of the country, and in many different places they use tools to see how, at a 
given moment, they can raise the region' s  awareness of problems they encounter here in 
relation to social and economic data, such as the issue of marginalization. All these issues are 
the FLNKS 's  driving force in its relationships with the region' s  nations. But I don't  think we 
should set the FLNKS against New Caledonia. The FLNKS' s  actions are not at variance with 
New Caledonia' s  actions. And we can see clearly that since 2003 New Caledonia and not the 
FLNKS has become a member of the Pacific Forum, thanks to the solidarity shown by the 
Spearhead Group nations. And now, the issue at the close of the last meeting of the 
Spearhead Group in Port Vila is to see how to achieve a better incorporation of New 
Caledonia into an organization such as the Spearhead Group. I don't  think we should see any 
opposition here. The FLNKS has first fought its own battle, the political struggle for the 
recognition of the rights of the Kanak people, and in that struggle it has been supported by 
the Spearhead Group nations. Thereafter, things changed. Work is being done in order for 
New Caledonia to be eventually incorporated into the region. And a major event has also 
brought a change in the FLNKS 's  policy, the Noumea Agreement. Since the Noumea 
Agreement, which allows New Caledonia to be more present in the region, the FLNKS, a 
party to the Agreement, has been thinking about how to better incorporate the country into 
the region. So there is no incompatibility between the FLNKS ' s  actions and New 
Caledonia' s  actions. The FLNKS must continue to exist as long as the country has not 
reached full sovereignty, since that is its initial and major struggle. Now, the Noumea 
Agreement process must in some ways bring the country to full sovereignty. It was initiated 
by the FLNKS alongside the State and the other partner, who is opposed to independence. 
But this is a process, a challenge that is being met by all the country's  components. There is a 
time frame: in 20 14  voters will be asked whether the State should hand over its remaining 
powers to New Caledonia, and that is the peculiar feature in the Agreement: power transfers 
are irreversible. In 20 14,  the country, the citizens of this country, will determine their future 
and, obviously, this future cannot be built outside the region. That is why New Caledonia is 
more and more present in the region. So there is no opposition between the FLNKS and New 
Caledonia with regard to their active presence in Melanesia. 
Jacques ZILLER 
I have two fairly technical questions. First I 'd  like to know if within the Pacific regional 
organizations there is a specific Melanesian coordination apart from the Spearhead Group; in 
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other words, are there any internal mechanisms among the Melanesian countries to reach 
common attitudes? The second question is about outside contributors: Paul De Deckker 
mentioned the European Commissioner on development, but my question is broader than 
that: When in the region people perceive the European Union, what do they see? Do they see 
the EU as an entity with its Commissioner for Development? Or do they see the EU as a 
group of states, including France and the United Kingdom but also other states? Do people 
feel other EU member states have some influence on European policy regarding the Pacific 
or not? 
Paul DE DECKKER 
We should organize a conference devoted to this question. As I see it, we must identify two 
things; on the one hand the way European officials introduce themselves in the EU bureaus 
in the Pacific Islands - in Suva, Port Moresby, Noumea, among others. Sometimes we see 
that some European officials put their own country forward. I think Germans and Italians, in 
particular, tend to act in this way. Regarding French European officials, things are different ­
Europe first, and only Europe. This attitude is probably linked to past events when France 
was having difficult relationships with the countries in the region and in Europe. This state of 
things may not be as clear-cut as I 'm suggesting, but concerning Germans and also Greeks, 
my assertion is very close to reality. So the situation is pretty fuzzy in this connection. 
Regarding the perception of Europe here in the Pacific, I don't think that in Kiribati or in 
Tuvalu people say, 'Oh, will they integrate Croatia or not into Europe? ' They are not aware 
of all this and they don't care about it at all. On the whole, here in New Caledonia, nobody 
can identify the roads or other infrastructure projects funded by the European Union pursuant 
to the privileged partnership the overseas countries and territories enjoy as part of the 
European Union decision-making process. 
But there is a new deal: The EU seems to outrageously favour the island states that have 
natural resources, such as Papua New Guinea and Fiji .  It would seem that for the other 
nations the EU sets up global financial packages which are merely window-dressing. Such an 
attitude illustrates a real lack of interest, certainly the result of the new reality of 
globalization and of the emergence of new situations like the Chinese trade presence which is 
spreading by leaps and bounds in the islands. 
Regarding the second part of the question, Melanesian countries do their utmost to join 
forces to negotiate with the European Union and make a united stand. One example is 
provided by what happened when Sir Michael Somare came to Noumea to be awarded a 
Doctor Honoris Causa degree from the University of New Caledonia in 2005 . He rejected 
France' s  Foreign Ministry's offer to take a jet liner and he flew over with his aides on a small 
plane. Thus, from Port Moresby, he could do some ' island hopping' and meet his 
counterparts in Honiara, Port Vila and, if memory serves, Suva. So he was able to prepare 
both the Spearhead Group meeting and the meeting between Melanesians within the Forum. I 
think that this modus operandi is very common and it illustrates the strong solidarity between 
those countries. 
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I . The Past: New Caledonia and non­
French Melanesians 
22 . New Caledonia and non-French 
Me lanesians:  the Me lanesian standpoi nt 
Jean-Pierre Nirua 1 
Since yesterday we have been discussing New Caledonia, or rather Kanaky, and how it can 
be incorporated into Melanesia. Discussions took us to France, England, Australia, and other 
places, and then we returned to New Caledonia. From a customary standpoint, it behoves us 
to come back here through Melanesia, and more specifically through neighbouring Vanuatu. 
The topic I was asked to deal with is about a non-French Melanesian point of view on New 
Caledonia, and I would like to illustrate the topic in the most Melanesian way possible. Here 
are three anecdotes. 
The first is about the customary 'gesture' ,  the Melanesian symbol of humility and respect, 
but also a way of asking permission to access, use or talk on ground that is not one 's  own. If 
I chose to show a little gesture before taking the floor, it is because from a customary 
standpoint I was compelled to deal with a taboo subject regarding the Melanesian New 
Caledonia issue from a Melanesian viewpoint - and I am a representative of that viewpoint. 
This topic compels me to question the Melanesian status, the status of those hailing from 
Kanak land in New Caledonia, and that is something strictly taboo in Melanesian custom and 
consciousness. In Melanesia, Melanesians do not compare with each other, for they are and 
they remain Melanesian with all the riches and cultural diversity involved! We do not 
compare because we are born and we remain Melanesian ! 
The second anecdote I would like to test with the audience is about the Melanesian language: 
Are there among you any persons (French Melanesians) who understand or use Bislama? Of 
course there are - thank you for confirming this, because according to the Melanesian 
manner, I should speak Bislama (pidgin), but as most of the audience is French, or rather 
international, I ' ll speak in French. 
1 Director, Emalus Campus, University of the South Pacific, Port Vila 
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Third anecdote: are there among you any persons who have heard about kava, or who even 
had to share a cup of this Melanesian wisdom drink originating in Vanuatu and renowned in 
Oceania and in most of the world? Of course there are, and once again, thank you for 
confirming this. 
Dear friends, if I allowed myself to parenthetically use these anecdotes, it is to demonstrate 
that from a cultural and customary standpoint, New Caledonia' s  incorporation into Melanesia 
is a real and present fact; it is simply a reality that people experience in their own lives ! In 
Melanesians' eyes it is neither a myth nor a plan. And I do not intend to dwell on the 
historical and age-old links that had been established with our Melanesian ancestors from 
New Caledonia or elsewhere to prove this reality. Some of my colleagues have mentioned 
numerous exchanges in the past, and these are getting more significant now, especially 
during the last two or three decades. 
If I agreed to take the floor as a non-French Melanesian, a Melanesian neighbour from 
Vanuatu, it is to be able to reassert that it is a real fact and it is true that New Caledonia, a 
Kanak land, is Melanesian, and that is quite clear and unambiguous. 
The Chiefs' role 
In Melanesian society, the chiefs are the wardens of custom, of speech, of space and of land 
property. Some contributors have challenged the role of chiefs; more specifically, they asked 
the question of whether a Kanak chief, when he is travelling on Melanesian land, would be 
acknowledged in this capacity? My answer is simply 'Of course, he would! '  The appropriate 
privileges would be granted to the Melanesian chief as he travels across another Melanesian 
space, and this reflects the recognition of his customary status. When a country is informed 
that a chief or a delegation of chiefs is coming over, the chiefs are welcomed in this capacity. 
Non-French Melanesia as seen by its neighbours 
Melanesia' s  neighbours have perceived Melanesia as a troubled place and an overpopulated 
and poor region, afflicted with a host of social, economic and political problems and where 
bribery is rampant. For Melanesians, this statement only illustrates a domestic weakness, and 
its purpose is to justify military and 'humanitarian' intervention by Australia in Papua New 
Guinea and in the Solomon Islands (RAMSI), just as it had been attempted to do in Vanuatu 
and Fiji .  Melanesians call this interventionist policy the ' employment schemes ' ,  whose aim 
is to remedy Australian unemployment. 
If Melanesia had been really poor, how would we define the wealth that we see elsewhere 
and what would the criteria be? What is wealth if it is dissociated from human dignity? 
Despite the constraints with which Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea or Fiji 
are burdened, Melanesians live and take pride in their identity, in their resources, in their 
huge cultural heritage, and most of all in their hitherto unexploited potential ! Non-French 
Melanesians live and die like anybody else; thousands among them live in a more wholesome 
way amid their natural environment than many in an industrial and so-called 'rich' 
environment. My answer to those who criticize Melanesian countries is, 'We must let time do 
its work' . In other words, we must allow the young Melanesian countries some time to adjust 
to foreign standards in governance, in the economy and in international trade in order to 
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develop. The biggest and most powerful civilizations (including those of Europe) evolved 
over several hundreds, or even thousands of years before they reached the economic and 
social prosperity they enjoy nowadays. So why blame our young Melanesian nations if not 
for unjustified selfish ends and political interests? 
New Caledonia is after all a French Melanesian community which is privileged, thanks to its 
mineral wealth, its powerful economy and its better living conditions, and non-French 
Melanesians acknowledge this with some pride, for New Caledonia represents for all of 
Melanesia a model society. 
For Melanesian heads of State and Government, Melanesia (or the Spearhead Group (MSG)) 
is incomplete as a structure without New Caledonia (Kanaky). Melanesia is the richest area 
in Oceania, and within the MSG there is a strong will and a hard-to-break common strength 
to reach political, economic and cultural solidarity. New Caledonia (Kanaky) can only be 
happy to enjoy the advantages it can enjoy as a result of a more systematic incorporation into 
this very influential regional group. Non-French Melanesian countries are anxious to get the 
opportunity to welcome New Caledonia with open arms into its Spearhead family, and in 
their Melanesian wisdom, they are positive this is only a question of time. 
Melanesian governance, ceaseless criticism and the welfare syndrome 
Non-French Melanesians are well aware of the welfare syndrome that their 'rich' neighbours 
are willing to inflict on them when the time is right for them. Vanuatu, for instance, has a 
regular cooperation program with New Caledonia, Australia, New Zealand, China, the 
European Union and other powers. The nation humbly appreciates the assistance that is 
extended as bilateral, regional or provincial cooperation. 
By contrast, non-French Melanesians are well aware of the humiliation and discrimination 
shown openly by some agencies in their 'rich' neighbours. Vanuatu, for example, has often 
been cited as an example of a failed independent state during election campaigns by groups 
in New Caledonia who are opposed to New Caledonia independence. Vanuatu nationals are 
deeply aware of the unceasing humiliation campaign on the part of French interests in the 
Pacific region regarding its system of governance, its social and economic conditions, its 
'poverty' level and any other argument that can be put forward to suit the circumstances. The 
non-French Melanesian people are neither bothered nor impressed by these awkward 
advances because they are driven by the traditional values of humility and toleration which 
they use as a shield. Just as you cannot mix apples and oranges, it is impossible to compare 
adjustment to a so-called 'modern' imported governance system used in independent 
Melanesian countries (and others) and a governance system that is specific to us. 
When Vanuatu gained independence, on 30 July 1 980, the number of its academics could be 
counted on the fingers of one hand, which is a sad and shaming reflection on 74 years of 
French-British colonization! Yes, it was just a handful, made up of four English-speaking 
and one French-speaking individual. How could a nation be built on such little intellectual 
ability and in so short a time? Vanuatu has just celebrated the 28th anniversary of its 
independence, and it can be compared to a 28-year-old young person. It is quite awkward to 
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compare the skills, experiences or qualities of a 28-year-old person or a 28-year old state to 
those of a person, institution or civilization that has been around for a few centuries. 
The ni-Vanuatu people say that they are grateful for the assistance provided by foreign 
countries and institutions, including the New Caledonian government and New Caledonia 
provinces, and more specifically the Southern Province and the Islands Province.  In some 
instances there is irony in this notion of ' international cooperation' ,  for non-French 
Melanesians are quite aware of the misleading ' aid' strategy used most often by the countries 
that provide money in order to get profit. Aid is often used to give life to and justify the 
notion of poverty in a country rather than contribute to stopping it. The evidence for this is 
that a major part of this international cooperation goes back to the countries it came from. 
That is the sad reality of the 'boomerang' aid. When you throw it it' ll come back to you. 
Melanesian countries and their rulers are often criticized, called incompetent and unable to 
practice good governance and manage the affairs of their states. Let those who preach this 
show better governance amid conditions such as those non-French Melanesian countries have 
to face. Let those people prove that they can perform better in the same circumstances. 
The conference and Melanesian unity 
As a Melanesian, I hail the initiative taken through this colloquium to foster totally open 
exchanges with the purpose of studying the issue of a more complete Melanesian unity. I hail 
it the more as the initiative has originated within New Caledonia. This display of ideas and 
thoughts would have prompted a different response if it had been initiated from outside or by 
organizations such as the Spearhead Group, the Pacific Forum, or even by Pacific 
neighbours. This conference illustrates the will, within New Caledonia, and specific to New 
Caledonia, to be open to Melanesia. 
For non-French Melanesians, New Caledonia (a Kanak land) remained inward-looking for 
too long, and for reasons it deemed legitimate and specific. Non-French Melanesian countries 
open up to Kanaky but they realize New Caledonia so far has not been willing to welcome 
them in return. One actual finding is that it is not easy for a non-French Melanesian to enter 
New Caledonia without a visa, and visa requirements are very strict! Irony of fate: a New 
Caledonian, a Frenchman (an Australian or New Zealander) arriving in Port Vila, Nadi, Port 
Moresby or Honiara finds that he can get a visa right away as long as he has a valid passport 
and a return ticket. 
Melanesians need their New Caledonian brethren, whether they be Kanaks or otherwise, 
living on New Caledonia soil. Melanesia will never be complete without New Caledonia' s  
full incorporation. Let this b e  a political statement, but one made in all Melanesian candour. 
As Professor Paul De Deckker said, 'Melanesians spell out what they think' . Understanding 
each other and learning from one another is a praiseworthy proposition, and Melanesian 
countries have a lot to learn from the New Caledonia example, just as New Caledonia must 
better understand and incorporate Melanesia' s  rich values and resources. 
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Dialogue and sharing 
Melanesians must know how to conduct a dialogue and exchange more freely around the 
same table ! I hail the richness, the good will, the sincerity and the success of this colloquium, 
and I ' ll report the proceedings to the Vanuatu authorities and to the University of the South 
Pacific, which I represent. 
New Caledonia and Vanuatu have much to share in an Oceanian multilingual context. The 
two 'countries' must cooperate more actively to conduct a policy based on regional 
bilingualism, for the existence of French and English is a reality in our region and a plus we 
must take advantage of. 
New Caledonia, who now wants to be a full partner of neighbouring countries in Oceania, 
needs to be more open and expand the teaching of English (and Bislama) on its soil. New 
Caledonia can use Vanuatu as a reference, and the bilingualism or multilingualism project in 
Oceania affords unlimited opportunities of which French-speaking people can take advantage 
if they develop it with conviction. 
Thank you for having given me the opportunity to be heard. 
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I I . The Present: New Caledonia applying 
to be part of a united Melanesia 
23 . New Caledonia' s  regional  cooperation : 
what is at stake and what are the prospects? 
Laurent Semavoine 1 
I. The geopolitics of the South Pacific in the era of regionalism 
A characteristic of the South Pacific is its vast expanses of ocean and a myriad of 
archipelagos showing very great geographic, ecological, sociological and economic diversity. 
This region extends over half the circumference of the globe and covers 37 per cent of the 
earth' s  surface. Besides, it constitutes a link between the world' s  two most dynamic regions, 
America and Eastern Asia. The South Pacific is made up of two superimposed areas: 
• Oceania (the fifth continent), including the Pacific Islands and the two Southern 
Hemisphere developed countries, Australia and New Zealand. 
• The South Pacific states, a composite group consisting of several thousand islands 
traditionally divided into three subgroups, which are actually three large geographical 
areas: the Polynesian Triangle (numerous islands), the Melanesian Arc (black 
islands), the Micronesian constellation (small islands making up the northern part of 
the Pacific) . 
Thus, Melanesia includes New Caledonia, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, 
Vanuatu, and Fiji ,  which together make up 90 per cent of the land area and 85 per cent of the 
island countries' population in the region. 
The island Pacific is subject to many constraints, and it is quite diverse. 
After a belated decolonization, the region is characterized by modest human, economic and 
financial resources, and it is strongly dependent on aid donors. It is subject to the 
consequences of globalization, threatened by crises and it has to face the consequences of 
global warming. 
1 Head, Regional Cooperation and External Relations, Government of New Caledonia 
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In this context, we can find permanent features that cannot be obliterated, such as distance 
and the poor condition of communication and transport networks; the consequences of global 
warming and the fact that those countries are vulnerable to natural disasters such as cyclones, 
tsunamis, etc . ;  the dwindling ocean resources and the poor energy sources (except for 
Australia and PNG, Pacific states are lacking in sources of energy). 
The major challenges are the environment (safeguarding the coral reefs, waste management, 
etc .) ,  public health (the fight against HIV-AIDS, in particular, endemic diseases), political 
and economic fragility in the small island states, and the lack of good governance. 
Moreover, one of the features of this vast regional group is the great diversity of political 
systems: 
• Independent states;  
• States that are independent in free association with another country (the Cook Islands 
and Niue); 
• Territories with more or less extended self-rule but placed under the sovereignty of 
another state (for example, the French communities; Tokelau, a non self-governing 
territory of New Zealand; Guam, the Northern Marianas and American Samoa, both 
United States territories,) 
• Possessions and dependencies (the last vestiges of colonial presence:  Pitcairn, a 
British dependency; Norfolk, an Australian dependency; Wake and Johnston Islands, 
unincorporated territories of the United States) . 
• Some territories are more or less self-ruling, and they are active partners recognized 
at the regional level, such as New Caledonia and French Polynesia. 
The independent states struggle against such great economic and political difficulties that the 
large neighbouring states had to deploy regional missions to restore the rule of law 
(Solomons in 2004), or to bail them out economically (Nauru in 2005) .  (c.f. the Bitekawa 
Declaration, 2000, which sanctioned the Pacific Islands Forum as being allowed to intervene 
in the affairs of a member state, while respecting its sovereignty, to restore law and order.) 
While various institutional systems exist, with cultural, economic or historic links that place 
most of these states or territories in various networks or connect them through dependence or 
interdependence which sometimes unite them with metropolitan countries in the Pacific or 
outside the region, the word independence no longer seems to be relevant in pinpointing 
differences. In such a context, it can be said that ' Independence consists of the ability to 
choose one 's  interdependences . '  
From a general standpoint, we  can see that Oceania i s  a region where Australia and New 
Zealand play a dominating role, and this region is subject to the influence and strategies of 
the surrounding countries. It is marked by political issues dating back to the Cold War 
(Taiwan) and to World War II. 
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Now China's  rise in power is being felt. China is strengthening its position in the island 
Pacific. 
Regional organizations 
The South Pacific has a teeming regional life. 
The different nations realized that development in the zone was not conceivable unless 
resources are shared, which implies bringing the countries together in regional organizations. 
All countries in the region are members of the South Pacific Commission (SPC), a 25-
member apolitical organization headquartered in Noumea with a branch in Suva. SPC is a 
real tool for Pacific development, and it is funded mainly by the four major powers in the 
area - Australia, France, the U.S.  and New Zealand. Territories and independent states are on 
the same footing, and the official languages are English and French. SPC is a representative 
of the region and a meeting place, where all Pacific communities can voice their opinions. 
SPC ' s  action focuses on cooperation and ranges from health to culture, from sustainable 
development of marine and land resources to social questions. 
The Pacific Islands Forum, headquartered in Suva, is the second major organization in the 
Pacific. Its emergence is related to the fact that many countries in the Southern area gained 
independence in the early 70s, but also to SPC's  decision to exclude any political debate. The 
Forum includes 1 6  Pacific Island states; it is the region' s  major political organization, and it 
includes only independent nations ( 14  island countries along with Australia and New 
Zealand). 
The Forum recently created an observer status and an associate member status; these are 
meant to include non self-governing territories, as the Forum considers that this membership 
does not challenge sovereignty. This is the case of France with New Caledonia and French 
Polynesia, which are associate members, and Wallis and Futuna, which is an observer. 
France is a post-Forum partner, as are 1 2  other countries or entities. 
Interdependence and the advance of regionalism lead to pooling certain risks and to a 
regionalization of the resources available. That is the idea behind the Pacific Plan, which was 
adopted in 2005 by the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (PIFS); its aim is to strengthen 
regional cooperation and solidarity. 
The Pacific Plan's priorities are trade and economic exchange, sustainable development, 
good governance, and security. 
The determining factors to consider can be found at several levels,  for a vision that is more 
focused on interdependence and regionalization is gradually emerging, and at the same time a 
genuine collective effort is being made to pool initiatives through regional policies and 
programs - design and implementation of solutions developed jointly to remedy the 
problems that cannot be solved at the level of microstates alone. 
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A new regional organizational structure is emerging in order to enhance the process of 
regrouping and connecting regional organizations with a view to reaching a greater efficiency 
and good governance. 
There is a greater awareness of new rivalries between China and the United States in the 
region whereas cooperation for inclusive regional stability is being implemented (between 
Australia, New Zealand, New Caledonia and Melanesian countries.) 
As of now, one constant concern and priority is awareness of environmental problems and 
global warming. We find that France is the only European Union member to be present in the 
heart of the Pacific, at a time when island countries are anxious to find alternatives or to 
counterbalance the influence of English-speaking regional powers. 
It is worth noting that eyes are now increasingly turning to Papua New Guinea (PNG) - with 
its important mineral resources and whose population is more than half of the population of 
the island Pacific - and to New Caledonia, the third biggest nickel producer in the world. 
New Caledonia has 40 per cent of world reserves, which allow it to hope for self-sufficiency, 
beyond the ongoing readjustment between the country' s  three provinces. 
The other countries have hardly any prospects of ensuring their own development, except for 
some varying revenue from fishing or tourism. 
II. Regional cooperation in New Caledonia 
In external relations, New Caledonia enjoys important powers. The March 1 999 Organic Law 
is a major step in decentralizing a power which had hitherto been strictly reserved to the 
State. 
New Caledonia has the legal tools allowing it to establish its own external relations, although 
it has to abide by France' s  international obligations. It can strengthen its ties to the European 
Union and to the other states and territories in the Pacific (in a broad sense) and develop its 
regional cooperation and regional incorporation. 
While respecting France' s  international commitments, New Caledonia is empowered to 
conduct direct negotiations with one or more states, territories or regional organizations in 
the Pacific and with regional organizations which are part of specialized UN organizations 
(this is a sanctioning of the right to autonomous initiatives in external relations). 
These provisions allow New Caledonia to be a member or an associate member of, or an 
observer in international organizations (in that case New Caledonia is represented by the 
President of the Government or his representative). The provisions also allow New Caledonia 
to be represented in the European Union and in the Pacific states or territories, and to 
establish decentralized cooperation relations with the other French Pacific territories or any 
other French overseas country or territory. 
This peculiar situation in French polity is the result of a dual political will: 
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First, it is the result of the State 's will. The State wants the French Pacific communities to 'be 
better and more integrated into their Pacific environment, ' in compliance with the French 
President's proposal to the Pacific States '  leaders. During the first France-Oceania summit, 
the President called on them 'to henceforth have a privileged relationship with the executive 
powers of the French Pacific communities . '  
Secondly, this situation i s  the result of  New Caledonia' s wish to  be  integrated into the region 
as a result of the Noumea Agreement, in order to better understand the Pacific region' s  
economic and social challenges and produce the right conditions for  new cooperation. 
The idea is to produce a context fostering the negotiation of agreements and concluding them 
with the neighbouring countries and with the region with a view to taking part in the region' s  
development and contributing to strengthening relations between the Pacific Island countries 
and the European Union. 
To that end, it is appropriate to secure close cooperation with state external relations services 
and develop bilateral cooperation relations (with regional countries) and multilateral 
cooperation (with regional organizations, the Forum, etc.) 
Regular and privileged relations with the directorates of the European Commission and the 
Overseas Countries and Territories Association (OCT A) exist, supported by the @ction 
Europe consulting office (Brussels) and Adecal (in Noumea). Besides, there is a permanent 
link with the French diplomatic offices in the Pacific and the foreign diplomatic offices in 
New Caledonia. 
Cooperation initiatives and programs are determined on the basis of New Caledonia' s  
priorities for regional incorporation; of  France' s  priority for cooperation in  the Pacific; of  the 
Pacific Plan' s guidelines, and of EU's  objectives (the millennium objectives, EDF, the Green 
Book on EU-OTC relations .) 
At the regional level, relations between New Caledonia and 13 regional and international 
organizations of which New Caledonia is a member, an associate member or an observer, 
have been developed and enhanced in the fields of regional cooperation, the environment, 
science, fishing, health, economic and social development, customs, sport, etc. 
Under the direct authority of the President of the New Caledonian Government, the regional 
cooperation office is charged with coordinating and monitoring New Caledonia' s  relations 
with regional, European or international organizations, of coordinating and enhancing 
bilateral and multilateral cooperation that New Caledonia is to develop alongside France in 
the Pacific region. 
New Caledonia has an advisory role with institutions, and it is in charge of analysing all 
issues regarding relations with the EU and of cultural, technical, scientific and sports 
cooperation. 
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The general issues to be dealt with relate to negotiation and taking part in the Forum as an 
associate member since 2006; participation in the Fonds Pacifique' s  executive committee, 
with the Permanent Secretariat for the Pacific; the management of 'micro-projects ' for 
funding cooperation initiatives with all the Pacific states and territories, the implementation 
and monitoring, along with the State' s  services and Adecal, of the bilateral cooperation 
agreement between New Caledonia and Vanuatu. 
This bilateral cooperation agreement is unique for several reasons. First, the special links 
between New Caledonia and Vanuatu on account of history, geography and culture have led 
both parties to set up cooperation projects and a mutually beneficial partnership. Secondly, 
the Economic, Social and Cultural Cooperation Fund for the Pacific (usually called Fonds 
Pacifique,) a cooperation tool for France, was set up, among other things, to help to integrate 
the French communities into the Pacific. The Fonds Pacifique is the basis of this cooperation 
system, and it is complemented by funds specifically appropriated by New Caledonia. 
A cooperation agreement determines the scope of this program and the way it is to be 
implemented. A joint committee is in charge of approving the annual programs and seeing 
that they are carried out. 
The 2008 program budget is around 59 million Pacific francs; it deals with the following 
areas: economic development; health; education; job training and jobs for youths; youth; 
culture and sports; research and technology transfer; good governance. 
It is necessary to note that as part of this system a decentralized major cooperation program 
with the Southern Province is also being carried out; two projects in connection with the 
agreement are also being implemented by New Caledonia for Vanuatu' s  benefit. One is in 
the amount of 6 million Pacific francs for the purchase of TV relays to broadcast CFI 
programs to Efate and Santo islands, and the other is a 20 million-franc project for the 
renewal of the Vanuatu Parliament' s  sound system and the simultaneous translation system. 
Domains and issues 
Regional cooperation by New Caledonia covers mostly four major domains and deals with 
three major issues. 
The scientific domain 
Developing scientific partnerships with neighbouring countries is a priority, because the 
countries or territories are geographically close and because the environmental problems are 
similar. In New Caledonia there are six research institutions and a university, and these are 
funded on a regular basis; at the regional level, New Caledonia is a real partner of the 
European Union and the Pacific zone states in environmental matters and in biodiversity. 
Regional cooperation initiatives are implemented to fit the French Pacific community into its 
bio-geographical context (invasive species, coral reefs (IFRECOR, CRISP, ZoNeCo,) 
sustainable nickel extraction, etc .) 
On a European scale, the EU strategy in the Pacific encourages the achievement of the 
objectives of the Millennium for Development in order to contribute to the development of 
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the Pacific region. The final statement after the 2006 France-Oceania summit mentions three 
priorities - environmental protection; taking into account climate change (its effects on 
natural risks), and the protection and development of biodiversity, notably coral diversity. In 
this connection, it is necessary to mention that the New Caledonia lagoons were listed as a 
UNESCO World Heritage Site in July 2008.  
One of the major challenges of this domain is also the monitoring of scientific and technical 
relations between regional environmental organizations of which New Caledonia is a 
member, namely SPC, OREP and SOPAC, and the merger plan as part of the regional 
organizational structure reforms. 
As regards maritime borders, the file relating to ' the extension of the continental shelf off 
New Caledonia' was submitted under the aegis of France in May 2007. The UN ad hoe 
commission has recently approved Australia and New Zealand's  applications. 
In the matter of marine resources and illegal fishing, authorities are actively watchful (there 
is a close cooperation with the merchant marine and marine fisheries services, the French 
Permanent Secretariat for the Pacific and SPC.) The SPIN underwater cable is a major 
economic and social project for Oceania (to reduce the digital divide.) The idea is to open up 
the region and make it less isolated thanks to an unlimited bandwidth broadband connection 
(a regional cooperation project supported by the French State, the EU, and SPC.) 
The cultural domain 
This domain is based upon developing partnerships in the arts and culture. It is about 
promoting the cultural and artistic expression of New Caledonian artists abroad and fostering 
cultural and artistic exchanges between New Caledonia and the Pacific region. 
In this area, New Caledonia has the services and resources to conduct a cultural action policy 
with the provinces, the State, City Halls and cultural institutions. 
The objectives are to act as a link, to provide advice and to monitor cultural action by partner 
institutions in New Caledonia, by State institutions and by regional institutions. In this way, 
initiated actions can be harmonized at the local or at the regional level. This requires 
continuous exchange of information and concerted action between partners. Partnership 
objectives are determined to assist cultural or artistic projects financially or technically. 
Regional cooperation is meant to act as an initiator in implementing cultural projects such as 
'The New Caledonia Season in New Zealand 2007 ' .  
Action can b e  initiated at three levels: building enduring exchange networks between artists 
and cultural officials, notably Melanesian ones; fostering the implementation of training 
programs, training periods, residences, and organizing encounters in all cultural areas; 
fostering and supporting New Caledonian cultural, artistic and musical expression and 
disseminating their cultural productions in neighbouring countries. 
To that end, New Caledonia relies on the French Embassies ' network, on French cultural 
institutions, on the Alliance Fran9aise, present in the Pacific, and on the cultural networks of 
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regional countries and organisations. The common objective in establishing privileged 
relations is to promote Pacific Islander artists ' works. 
Among cultural and artistic events, we can mention the Pacific Arts Festival and the 
Melanesian Arts Festival, which take place alternatively every other year. They are major 
cultural and artistic events allowing New Caledonian and Pacific Islands artists to express 
themselves, to share, to exchange, and to establish enduring friendships.  
New Zealand and Australia also provide spaces and stages for quality cultural expression 
which New Caledonia artists can use. 
The first edition of ' The New Caledonia Season in New Zealand in 2007 ' is viewed as a 
success and it must be used as a point of reference for other cultural New Caledonia seasons 
in the region. 
The 'micro-project' funds and the 'cultural' funds are meant for economic, social, cultural 
and sports cooperation programs in the neighbouring countries such as Fij i, Vanuatu, Papua 
New Guinea, New Zealand, Australia, and also - in sports - Fij i, Samoa, Cook Islands, 
Guam, Vanuatu, Papua New Guinea, Wallis and Futuna, and French Polynesia. 
The youth and sports domain 
Here the objective is to integrate New Caledonia into its region through sports. 
The idea is to make New Caledonia known as a French-speaking sports resource place in the 
region and to set up structures to go along with New Caledonia' s  cooperation policy. 
The development of a sports policy in the Pacific confirms New Caledonia as a permanent 
partner in a position to support Pacific programs while asserting its place and that of the 
French language in the region. That is the outlook for the 201 1 Pacific Games; their objective 
is to 
• Upgrade sports facilities 
• Set up a sports campus and - as part of the equalizing scheme - relocate some events 
so they take place in the North and in the Loyalty Islands 
• Smoothly incorporate New Caledonia into its region 
• Establish a relationship of trust between the 22 countries that make up the Pacific 
Games council as well as with French and international Olympic committees, and 
organize high-level sports events in New Caledonia as part of those games. 
European Affairs 
The European Affairs service is in charge of coordinating and following up on the 
implementation of the projects funded by the 7th, 8th, 9th, and 1 Oth European Development 
Funds (EDF), in close collaboration with the Government members and the technical 
services involved. 
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The service, in collaboration with the Overseas Ministry, carries out negotiations with the 
European Commission about changes to the decision regarding overseas association; it is 
also in charge of monitoring negotiations between the EU and the Pacific ACP countries in 
order to reach an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA). 
The ongoing issues: the Green Book on EU-OCT relations: this is a study on the relations 
between New Caledonia and the EU. It is complemented by an analytical study on a possible 
granting of Ultra-Peripheral Regions (UPR) status to New Caledonia and its impact; another 
issue is taking part in seminars and OCTA studies : these are, among other things, reporting 
seminars in Brussels on 'Water and Waste Management' and 'Energy' Studies. 
Three major issues represent regional cooperation in action: 
The 3rd France-Oceania Summit, Noumea, 2009 
The French President stated that 'The Pacific region is meant to be a peaceful and prosperous 
region, based on democratic values, on respect for and promotion of Human Rights and on 
good governance. ' 
This summit is the keystone for the direction given to relations between France and the 
Pacific. It is the symbol of the revival of the policy based on developing relations with all the 
region' s  countries (regional unity, EU-OCT relations) by determining the strategic directions 
given to French cooperation in the Pacific. The summit' s  objective is also to pinpoint the 
future areas of collaboration and cooperation and to assess in 2009 ten years of regional 
cooperation (since the March 1 999 Organic Law took effect) and to allow New Caledonia to 
share the State ' s  powers in external relations. 
Actually, the objective of the summit is to support the Pacific Plan's  objectives and also the 
Millennium for Development objectives, with two main points: managing and preserving the 
region' s  natural resources on a long-term basis; facing major environmental threats, as these 
have become major challenges for the future of the small island states. 
The 'Pacific Plan' was adopted by the Pacific Islands Forum leaders at the Port Moresby, 
PNG summit in October 2005 . It is a framework setting general policy objectives, economic 
policy objectives and objectives for regional unity. It is not binding, but it is used as a 
framework for regional cooperation and as a reference for island countries in their 
negotiations with aid donors. 
The Pacific Plan has four objectives: 
1 .  Economic growth - facilitating regional trade; adopting similar standards to make 
goods and services available across a wide geographic area; economic unity in the 
Pacific. 
2. Sustainable development - regional plans to improve environmental management and 
the management of natural resources; harmonization of the health sector; improving 
networks in sports and physical education, and training. 
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3 .  Good governance - enhancing justice; harmonizing structures within the judicial 
system; bringing local laws into line with international conventions, treaties and 
agreements. 
4. Regional security - maritime security, national police force efficiency; strengthening 
customs relations; pinpointing stress indicators in relationships and sources of 
conflict in the region. 
The Pacific Plan Committee, however, admits that major progress must be made in fighting 
the effects of climate change, and underscores two new challenges facing Pacific countries, 
increases in the price of energy and increases in food prices. 
Consequently, it is essential for the small island states to set up a common wholesale supply 
mechanism for oil products and basic essentials by requesting help, notably from World 
Bank experts. 
It is interesting to point out that, in this connection, France is the only European state to be 
present in the Pacific through its communities (if we except the United Kingdom, with 
Pitcairn, an islet with a population of 60 . . .  ) 
France is the only European member of regional organizations - SPC, OREP. 
Note: EU' s  contribution to the development of island states is significant, through the EDF' s  
national and regional programs (funded up to 1 9.3 per cent by France.) 
Economic and trade unity 
The 1 988 Matignon Agreements, extended by the 1 998 Noumea Agreement, are an 'essential 
turning point for New Caledonia on the domestic level and pave the way for a more and more 
fruitful integration into its neighbouring and regional environment' .  
This unity has been enhanced and asserted through many instances o f  cooperation in a great 
number of sectors . . .  The opening up of our countries, and exchanges of every kind are the 
driving forces towards a gradual increase in economic and social welfare at the local as well 
as at the global level, which is an essential contribution to world stability. ' (See the speech by 
the New Caledonian government President at the Forum in Niue, August 2008). 
Economic and trade unity is one of the four pillars of the Pacific Plan and in the end it 
represents 'a  real opportunity to improve the standard of living of people in Forum countries 
or countries that are associated with its operation. ' 
International agreements in free trade are therefore being negotiated. The adoption of two 
international agreements occurred during the 200 1 Pacific Islands Forum. 
The Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations (PACER) reflects relations within the 
general framework of future economic cooperation between the Forum member states. It is 
the negotiation of a free-trade agreement between the island countries on the one hand and 
Australia and New Zealand on the other. 
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PACER, which includes Australia and New Zealand, still requires, according to the Pacific 
ACP countries, 'more time for careful preparations . . .  ' Australia and New Zealand are 
finalizing their bilateral agreement and urging the Forum member states' leaders to expedite 
PACER's implementation. 
The second agreement is the Pacific Islands Countries Trade Agreement (PICTA). In 2003 it 
covered only exchange of goods between member countries. In 2007, the scope of the 
agreement was widened to include services (air and sea transportation, financial services, 
telecommunications, health, education and tourism). The Forum member nations wish to be 
able to include in this agreement the French and American non-independent Pacific 
territories as soon as PICTA is approved. Only 6 Forum members have so far ratified PICTA, 
but only four (the Cook Islands, Fiji ,  Samoa, Niue) are in a position to implement it (regional 
trade relations). New Caledonia has officially informed the Forum's  Secretariat of its wish to 
begin negotiations -regarding its possible membership in PICTA. 
The Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) 
The island states that are both Forum and ACP group members enjoyed a most-favoured­
nation status with the EU as a result of the Cotonou Agreement. These favourable but 
exceptional arrangements ended in January 2008;  they are gradually supplanted by a free­
trade arrangement in compliance with international practice as it results from EP As. During 
the 39th PIF in Niue, the ACP members enjoying privileged relations (most-favoured-nation 
clause) with the EU wished that EP As 'would bring benefits to their Pacific Island countries ' .  
Pacific leaders are committed to having their countries increasingly take part i n  the 
international trade system, but the Pacific ACPs are the smallest economies in the world, 
with few resources enabling them to engage in trade negotiations. They want this specific 
situation to be taken into account. The regional Free-Trade zone made possible by PICTA 
(including the 14 island states except Australia and New Zealand) is still in the process of 
being set up. The deadline is 2009. 
The EU is a South-South instrument for unity, and as such, it has revived negotiations. Fij i  
and Papua New Guinea have negotiated an interim agreement dealing directly with the EU 
(market access, fisheries, and rules for product origin). Vanuatu and Solomons could also 
soon join the Pacific interim agreement. An analysis of the economic and social impact of 
this agreement should allow New Caledonia to eventually choose to join a regional free-trade 
zone or not, and if/when necessary, to implement the tools and regulations needed for 
preserving, or even enhancing, economic activity in New Caledonia. 
Foreign trade control in New Caledonia (control of the flow of goods and respect for 
import/export restrictions rules) has led to reforms in market protection sustaining the 
development of local industry and activity. 
The difficulty lies in the necessary protection of the local economy to preserve and foster the 
country' s  activity while gradually opening up to the regional and world market. Opening up 
is 'conducive to trade development and to wealth increase in an increasingly interdependent 
market at all levels (globalization). '  The obstacles in determining the rules on product tracing 
between New Caledonia and the European Union within the framework of the overseas 
1 81 
The New Pacific Review 
association decision have not been totally cleared, hence the cautiousness in reaching an 
agreement. 
The World Trade Organization meeting took place in Geneva in July 2008 with a view to 
concluding the Doha round on liberalizing world trade, and as it has failed at this stage, we 
realize how complex and difficult this subject is both at a global level and at a regional or 
bilateral level. 
This subject has a major global interest and also specific interests for businesses, for local 
manufacturers, merchants and local jobs, but also for governments and international 
authorities or organizations of which New Caledonia is a member or to which it is associated 
through France.  
III. French policy in the South Pacific 
French cooperation and aid policy for development in the South Pacific is focused on three 
pillars: 
• A North-North type cooperation policy with New Zealand and Australia. 
• A North-South aid policy for the development of the Island Pacific. 
• A regional cooperation policy through its overseas countries and territories (OCT), 
being established under a new 'South-South' scheme, enhancing the regional unity of 
those French communities endowed with a specific status. 
Thus France is one of the key contributors to development aid in the Pacific, next to 
Australia, at the same level as Japan and New Zealand, and ahead of the United States. 
France contributes to the stability and development of the Pacific region and prompts the 
European Union to enhance its commitment, which is already significant. For the region' s  
states, foreign affairs are essentially linked with trade (foreign affairs i s  trade). France' s  
foreign relations in the area could translate as 'Foreign affairs i s  aid. ' 
Geostrategy 
France' s  cooperation policy with Australia and New Zealand is based upon military 
cooperation agreements and scientific and technical collaboration. Between these two nations 
and France, there exists a common will to strengthen their diplomatic relations in order to 
serve the region' s  interests. Military cooperation is multi-facetted. It is meant both for 
assistance and regional protection for the benefit of the South Pacific small island states, 
which are encouraged to take part in military programs or exercises. The two main points are: 
1 )  looking for a strong defence relationship with Canberra and Wellington and 2) integrating 
French Pacific territories into their regional environment in order to contribute to stabilizing 
the Pacific Islands as a whole. Therefore, the activities of the Armed Forces (FANC) in New 
Caledonia with respect to international relations is geared towards integrating New Caledonia 
into its region. 
The mission of the Armed Forces in New Caledonia with respect to cooperation is: 1 )  
enhancing training and setting up civilian or military cooperation, 2 )  performing surveillance 
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of exclusive economic zones (EEZ) as in Fiji ,  Tonga or Vanuatu, 3) performing cooperation 
activities, 4) humanitarian assistance in the case of natural disasters (the FRANZ Accord), 5) 
staff exchanges. 
Regional security is illustrated by a major military cooperation exercise involving armies 
from many nations, called 'Southern Cross. ' It takes place every other year. So in the area 
where French forces (COMSUP) operate, regional cooperation, performed by the F ANC, 
consists in keeping alive relations with neighbouring countries in order to preserve the 
' interoperability' levels reached with the Australians and New Zealanders; supporting the 
rule of law in the island states;  maintaining good relations with Fiji ,  Tonga and Vanuatu; 
extending cooperation with Papua New Guinea (PNG) and initiating cooperation with Samoa 
and the Solomon Islands. 
As a result, this position allows France to take part in the protection of sovereign interests 
(sovereignty rights, EEZ, New Caledonia's territorial boundaries) and to contribute to 
regional stability. It helps enhance New Caledonia' s incorporation into the South Pacific area 
through its many activities and fosters good-neighbour relations, notably with Melanesia, 
which is a priority. These actions contribute to regional influence, through which France 
wants to give a new momentum to regional unity in the Pacific. 
Mr Yves Jego, the Overseas Under-secretary, indicated in late August 2008 that all this is 
about ' . . .  further pursuing regional cooperation by the three French communities, New 
Caledonia, French Polynesia and Wallis and Futuna toward their frequently-mentioned 
incorporation into the region to which they belong . . .  ' 
The Noumea Agreement provides a sort of road map for New Caledonia which is often cited 
as a model: ' . . .  having increasing exchanges shows that cooperation exists and responds to 
globalization, which in tum is the strengthening of exchanges . . .  in the Pacific we need to 
reinforce relations with the neighbouring countries, and these exchanges showcase French 
presence in the Pacific, a major, historic presence, growing stronger given the current 
challenges, including environmental ones . . .  ' 
The New Caledonian government President underscored, in his 1 9  August 2008 speech 
before the Pacific Islands Forum's leaders in Niue, ' . . .  the shared values uniting the Pacific 
Islands (dialogue, sharing of responsibilities in agencies and in local communities, respect for 
cultural identities) as well as the will to continue the incorporation process within the Pacific 
as a whole . . .  ' 
Conclusion 
The integration of New Caledonia into the region continues through enhancing its role as a 
regional player as a result of its being an associate member in the Pacific Islands Forum; as 
SPC's  host, and as a privileged partner in the cooperation policy of the French Republic and 
the EU in the Pacific. 
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New Caledonia strengthens its incorporation into the region thanks to its privileged 
relationships and collaboration with neighbouring countries and with the numerous 
diplomatic representations in the area. 
This translates into activities relating to external relations in the form of multilateral or 
bilateral regional cooperation - taking part in the Pacific Islands Forum; the Pacific Plan 
follow-up; the management of French aid and cooperation systems in the Pacific; the micro­
projects Fund; the coordination and management of the European Union's  financial 
instruments (EDF); the representation of New Caledonia and the organization of formal visits 
outside and inside New Caledonia. 
In 2009 the third France-Oceania Summit will be held in Noumea, and during the summit 1 0  
years of regional cooperation will b e  assessed. Thus New Caledonia affirms itself as a model 
player with political and economic influence in the region. New Caledonia displays, for the 
benefit of the island countries and states in the region, its image as a stable and continuously 
evolving modem polity within the framework of the Noumea Agreement. It offers strong 
infrastructures, an outlook characterized by development, and creates conditions for 
extending its relations with neighbouring countries by stepping up exchanges and 
partnerships in all areas where collaboration is possible. 
In this way, New Caledonia proves its real ability to act and its will to cooperate through its 
regional incorporation policy, and especially incorporation into Melanesia. 
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24 . Eu ropean U nion law resou rces for 
Me lanesian u nity 
Professor Jacques Ziller 1 
In light of the interdisciplinary character of this first conference organized by House Blong 
Melanesia it seemed to me that there were at least two ways the topic - European Union Law 
Resources for Melanesian Unit - could be comprehended for a paper contributed to a session 
dedicated to 'New Caledonia Applying for Melanesian Unity' .  There is a specific technical 
approach to regional unity in the Pacific, taking into account the fact that the region includes 
on the one hand ACP countries, independent countries in free association with the European 
Community (EC)2 as part of the Cotonou Agreement (which succeeded the Lome 
Agreement) , and on the other hand non-independent overseas countries and territories 
(OCT), which are also associated with the European Community in partly similar and partly 
different ways. There is also a broader approach, focused on European experience in regional 
unity through the creation of European communities during the 1 950s, and the European 
Union starting in 1 993 .  This paper uses both approaches. 
A. Resources provided by EU Law as a type of regional unity 
A mistake has too often been made regarding European support for regional unity in other 
parts of the world, notably in Africa and Latin America. That is the institutional copy-paste 
approach, consisting of copying institutions, even regulations, while making only minimal 
adjustments to the situation these components are tacked on, and often these components are 
impossible to separate from the original model, which is also difficult to transfer. This is a 
faulty process, for it ends up transplanting institutions that are not adapted to the context in 
which they have to operate. It is better to be just inspired by what is original and what works 
satisfactorily in European unity, and most of all by what is relevant to other regions.3 As I see 
it, four specific elements of the European experience regarding regional unity are particularly 
relevant to Melanesian unity projects, and especially for New Caledonia' s  participation in 
them. 
1 University of Pavia 
2 Note: Union and Community should be merged into a single organization, the European Union, when the 
Lisbon Treaty takes effect. in some ways, I am getting ahead of myself when I use the words European Union 
(EU) and EU law as equivalents for European Community (EC) and community law (EC law), which for the 
time being are technically more accurate. 
3 See Jacques Ziller, The Challenge of Governance in Regional Integration - Key Experiences from Europe, 
European University Institute, Working Papers Law, No. 2005/1 1 
1 85 
The New Pacific Review 
1. The functionalist approach 
The first possible contribution of the European experience in regional unity, and most 
certainly the most significant one for other parts of the world, is the functionalist approach of 
the project which led to the setting up of European Communities. Functionalism and neo­
functionalism mean an approach that has been theorized by international relations scholars, 
particularly Ernst Haas4 after it had been implemented by Jean Monnet, the man who 
inspired the 9 May 1 950 Schuman Declaration. 
The Schuman Declaration is certainly the best illustration for the functionalist approach; it 
states, 'Europe will not be built overnight, nor will it be built as a whole - it will be built by 
practical achievements which first of all will bring on actual solidarity. ' Certainly, the project 
referred to a remote future, namely the establishment of what was dubbed 'The United States 
of Europe ' .  But the approach was apparently a more modest one, precisely a functionalist 
approach in that it was about setting up a common market for coal and steel in Europe along 
with the institutions required for the best operation of this limited-objective body. 
For a brief introduction to the functionalist approach, we will say that it is continuously 
focused on the immediate content of the regional integration project to be set up, even if 
there are still unexpressed 'mental reservations ' or further projects. This approach necessarily 
leads to an extremely pragmatic attitude, and the question of whether each of the 
achievements stemming from it remains adjusted to its objectives can vary as time goes by.5 
Adopting a functionalist approach to European integration has major consequences. 
I believe the first document mentioning shared sovereignty - although it does not use these 
exact words - is precisely the 9 May 1 950 Schuman Declaration. In my opinion, the 1 988 
Matignon-Oudinot and the 1 998 Noumea Agreement signatories were acting as  direct heirs 
to Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman, saying in some ways, 'Let us focus on what unites us, 
and not on what divides us ' ,  let us set up institutions to work together. 
The functionalist approach leads also to a type of legal analysis - precisely, functional 
analysis, with which French administrative law scholars have been familiar since at least 
Leon Duguit6 - which is the approach used on a regular basis by the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) . This approach differs from the institutional/organic approach, which is more 
formalistic and used in many legal organizations. The functionalist approach makes it 
possible to go beyond appearances and develop particularly useful concepts with regard to 
regional integration. 
4 See Ernest Haas, The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces 1950-1957, Stanford 
University Press, 1 968 
5 See, among others, Jean-Louis Quermonne, Le Systeme politique de I 'Union Europeenne, Paris, 
Montchrestien, Collection Clefs, 2005 ; and John Temple Lang, 'Checks and Balances in the European Union: 
The Institutional Structure of the "Community Method"' ,  in European Public Law, 1 2/2006, pp 1 27-1 54 
6 It is worth noting that the Dean of the Bordeaux School of Law also authored a very interesting analyses on 
sovereignty: Souverainete et liberte: Ler;onsfaites a l 'Universite Colombia New-York, 1 920-1921, Paris, Alcan, 
1 922. 
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One last illustration of the functionalist approach to integration, and notably of functional 
analysis performed by the ECJ, is provided by the notion of the 'primacy' of community law 
over member states '  laws. Politicians and jurists who are not community law specialists often 
construe primacy as applying to the European Community law the notion of ' supremacy' ,  
which i s  s o  well illustrated by Article VI o f  the Constitution o f  the United States. Article VI 
provides that 'This Constitution, and the laws of the United States [ . . .  ] shall be the supreme 
law of the land. ' Unlike supremacy, primacy is not absolute; it applies only to Community 
law provisions that are clear, unconditional and precise enough to be endowed with the 
power to be directly enforced by member states' courts and public authorities, and it applies 
only in instances where the Community has powers. 7 
In the tradition of the functionalist approach, there is no notion of a hierarchy between the 
law of the whole and the laws of member states, but a rule allowing resolving the likely 
clashes between Community standards and member states' standards. 
2. The centrality of joint action and the institutions' functionality 
In my opinion, this is a major resource stemming from the European regional integration 
experience. The Founding Fathers of the European Communities experience, Jean Monnet, 
Robert Schuman, Konrad Adenauer, Alcide de Gasperi, Paul Henri Spaak, to name just the 
best-known among them, and the jurists who assisted them, especially Paul Reuter, Pierre­
Henri Teitgen and Maurice Lagrange,8 initially had in mind primarily joint action, stemming 
from their functionalist approach. 
In this respect, the words used in the Treaty of Rome setting up the European Economic 
Community strike us as particularly interesting. There is no mention of powers, but of 
Community actions. Things are being done in common, and the appropriate institutions are 
created for that purpose. Here, the way things are done is the reverse of what constituent 
powers are often prone to do. Constituent powers proceed to create institutions to govern 
relations between the governed and the rulers, and they let these institutions determine the 
possible actions to perform. 
Conversely, as part of an approach based upon common action and the institutions' 
functionality, there is more flexibility in creating institutions adapted to various actions. The 
procedure consists of agreeing on objectives, on diagnosis, i .e . ,  on identifying resources and 
constraints - which is often a difficult proposition - and on ways to act. Only on the basis of 
such an agreement are institutions set up. 
What is particularly meaningful in the European experience is that as a result of this 
approach there has been a balance between the use of supranational-type actions, with 
institutions separate from participant members and given powers of their own - especially 
7 Regarding this topic, see Jacques Ziller, Les Nouveaux traites europeens: Lisbonne et apres, Paris, 
Monchrestien, Collection Clefs, 2008, pp 49 and 1 0 1 .  
8 See, in particular, Paul Reuter, L a  Communaute europeenne du charbon et de l 'acier, Paris, LGDJ, 1 953 ;  and 
Pierre-Henri Teitgen, Cours de droit institutionnel communautaire. Structure et fonctionnement des 
communautes, Paris: Les Cours de droit, 1 976; as for Maurice Lagrange, who was the first French prosecutor at 
the ECJ, see remarks by Jean Monnet in his Memoires, Paris: Fayard, 1 976, pp 5 19, 568 and 570. 
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the European Coal and Steel Community and the European Commission - and types of 
action for which the intergovernmental approach, the traditional procedure of sovereign 
states, is used. 
3. Differential integration 
This is the third particularly relevant point in the European experience in regional integration. 
Differential integration is a more and more relevant topic in the framework of European 
integration. It is cited more and more often on account of the setbacks suffered by the treaty 
establishing a Constitution for Europe in 2005 and the 2008 Lisbon Treaty. Here, projects 
that do not necessarily involve all the participant members in the regional whole - 27 in the 
European Union since 2007 - are started. 
This procedure is relatively new regarding some legal techniques implemented since the 
1 992 Maastricht Treaty and the 1 997 Amsterdam Treaty, but the concept is not a new one. 
This aspect has always been present when it comes to taking into account what political 
analysts and economists call asymmetry between member states. For that matter, differential 
integration accounts for the peculiar character of the voting system within the Council, 
whereas when the undifferentiated principles such as one state/one vote were applied, 
processes were blocked in their early stages. 
Legal techniques for differential integration are many - temporary or geographical special 
dispensations, transitional periods, 'opt-ins' and 'opt-outs ' ,  enhanced cooperation, etc . The 
only technical limit is the legal minds ' inventiveness. It must be emphasized, however, that if 
differential integrations mean too many components, citizens will have more trouble 
comprehending the regional integration project. It does not matter if it is only about limited­
impact technical achievements. By contrast, it is very important as the scope of common 
actions extends and as the impact of decisions made outside the democratic institutions of 
each state grows more significant. 
4. Multilingualism and cultural diversity 
This is an essential aspect of the European integration experience, although it is most often 
largely underestimated by legal minds. Naturally, the 1 3  official languages used in the 
European Union are very few compared to the thousands of Melanesian languages, and many 
compared to the three vernacular languages of Melanesia, English, French and Bislama. No 
matter. The major thing is to be mindful of the fact that in the European experience, it has 
been possible to develop a legal system which takes multilingualism fully into account -
sometimes very easily, sometimes with considerable difficulty. 
In a few words, there are European law rules9 which are directly enforceable, that is, they are 
enforceable without the need for them to be turned into national laws, decrees or ordinances. 
Obviously, since this law is enforced directly in all the participant members, it must be 
9 See Alain Fenet, 'Diversite linguistique et construction europeenne' ,  in Revue trimestrielle de droit europeen, 
200 1 /2, p 235 ff.; in Italian, Diana Urania Galetta and Jacques Ziller, ' II regime linguistico della Comunita' ,  in 
Mario P Chiti and Guido Greco, Trattato di diritto amministrativo europeo, Milan: Giufffre, 2nd edition, 2007, 
pp 1 067- 1 1 1 3 .  
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written in all languages used in those states - as it turns out, 23 since 1 January 2007. This 
dispensation has led Community institutions to develop procedures and systems enabling the 
different countries to publish these laws in 23 languages at the same time. For its part, the 
ECJ is constantly reasserting the linguistic parity principle, and it takes into account all 
linguistic versions when constructing the Community' s  law, with well-established principles 
in case of conflicting interpretations resulting from linguistic issues. 
Another particularly relevant aspect, in connection with linguistic diversity, is that of cultural 
diversity, which is sanctioned notably by the Preamble to the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the European Union, proclaimed in Nice on 12  December 2000. One of the aspects of this 
recognition of cultural diversity regards identity symbols, which matter so much in New 
Caledonia and Melanesia. The issue is not unknown to the European Union, and it is 
illustrated by the provisions adopted for the euro. While all bills are the same in all member 
states in order to take into account the fact that they are meant to circulate not only in all 
member states but also worldwide, European coins are different, depending on issuing 
countries. 1 0 As I see it, in case Pacific francs are replaced by euros, it would be quite 
conceivable to have specific identity symbols, just as is the case for Monaco, San Marino and 
the Vatican - although these are not European Union members, they are part of the monetary 
union. 
All this goes to show that in the concept of European integration there is a whole series of 
practical consequences leading to positive lessons - when the solutions are operative - or on 
the contrary negative ones - when the institutions and procedures specific to the Union or to 
the European Communities are not operative. As an entity applying for Melanesian unity, 
New Caledonia benefits from its being part of the French Republic, and thus it can 
theoretically rely on fifty years of expertise among academics and practitioners in European 
integration. 
B. The resources and constraints for Melanesian unity resulting from New Caledonia's 
status as an entity in association with the European Union 
One much more concrete and focused way to comprehend the title of the paper I was asked 
to contribute consists in analysing what, in the framework of a New Caledonia application 
for Melanesian unity, could be regarded as a resource stemming from the European Union's  
positive law. This results especially from New Caledonia' s status as  an entity in association 
with the Community among overseas countries and territories (OCTs) . 
From the point of view of Melanesian regional unity, both useful opportunities and 
insurmountable constraints result from the fact that the European Union operates strictly 
under the law. Here we are not assessing the economic and financial aspect of EU aid to 
OCTs and ACP and the EU's  Pacific policy. From a legal analysis and political science point 
of view, it is about drawing conclusions from the fact that the EU' s  action is conducted under 
very strict legal rules. 
1 0 Regulation (CE) No. 975/98 by the 3 May 1 998 Council on unitary values and technical specifications of 
euro coins meant for circulation, European Communities Gazette, L 1 39, 1 1 .5 . 1 998, pp 6-8, and a 14 December 
200 1 Commission paper, 'Characteristics of euro coins' ,  COM(200 1 )  776 final - ECG, C 373, 28. 1 2.200 1 .  
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The European Union is not a state, but a group made up of sovereign states and based upon 
international treaties: the treaty instituting the European Community and the treaty on the 
European Union - complemented by the Euratom Treaty. It is also based on all the protocols 
and schedules, which have the same status as agreements between states (EU members), as 
well as the international agreements concluded between the European Community and other 
states or international organizations. The body these treaties make up includes clauses that 
are relevant to and that cannot be ignored by the Union's  institutions when they act; the same 
applies to derivative law, i .e . ,  directives, regulations, decisions and other instruments adopted 
by the Union' s  institutions on the basis of treaties. What is interesting from the point of view 
of New Caledonia joining Melanesian unity are the constraints resulting from the legal nature 
of these instruments and the adoption procedures that apply. Before analysing what, in this 
instance, are the European Union policy components that are relevant for Melanesian unity, 
two consequences can be singled out for emphasis; they relate to New Caledonia and to the 
other Melanesian states. 
1. New Caledonia is the only OCT in Melanesia 
The whole EU policy regarding the Pacific can develop only on the basis of clauses in the 
treaties, whether they relate to OCTs (New Caledonia, French Polynesia and Pitcairn) in 
association with the Community on the basis of a system within the treaty (4th part); or to the 
independent sovereign states in association with the European Community (this is the case 
for the four independent states in Melanesia, Fiji ,  Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, and 
Vanuatu) on the basis of a particularly important association agreement (Yaounde, Lome, 
and now Cotonou Agreements);  1 1  or to other states that are not in association, such as 
Australia and New Zealand, or the United States. In each case an analysis of the powers of 
the Community or the European Union is necessary in order to undertake an action and 
conclude possible agreements, and specific decision processes are necessary to the exercise 
of these powers. 
a) It is particularly important not to lose sight of the fact that as soon as a change in policy 
toward the Pacific is likely to fall outside what is allowed by the treaties in their present 
condition, the legal bases must be changed. For that purpose, a change in the founding 
treaties (EC Treaty and EU Treaty) is necessary, and this change can be performed only 
through unanimous agreement between all governments within the Union - whether they 
have any specific interest in the Pacific or not - followed by ratification, which requires 
authorization from Parliament - or even a referendum - as well as the agreement of the 
Heads of State, again in all member states. One good illustration of these constraints is the 
fate of the clause allowing, if and when necessary, an OCT to become an outermost region or 
vice-versa. The clause' s  fate was predicated on the ups and downs of the 2005 referendums 
in France and the Netherlands, and the 2008 Irish referendum. 
1 1  To get the full text of this agreement, as it results from the 2005 half-way review, see Decision 2005/599.CE 
of the 21 June 2005 Council regarding the signing, in the name of the European Community, of the agreement 
amending the partnership agreement between the ACP group on the one hand, and the European Community 
and its member countries on the other hand, signed at Cotonou, on 23 June 2000, European Union Gazette, no. 
L 209, 1 1  August 2005 . 
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It is to be noted in this connection that, except for this ' link' clause and some other minor 
changes in form regarding the policy of aid to development, neither the 29 October 2004 
Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe - now lapsed - nor the 13 December 2007 
Lisbon Treaty - whose ratification is still uncertain, at least as regards its date - plan any 
changes relevant to our topic. 
There is another important point: the agreement making up the basis for relations between the 
European Union and the ACP states is based on the clauses relevant for concluding 
association agreements. They are Articles 3 1 0  and 300, subsection 3, paragraph 2 of the EEC 
treaty. These documents show that it is necessary on the one hand to have a unanimous 
decision by the European Union Council, and thus a unanimous decision by the member 
states, and on the other hand the official approval by the European Parliament with a majority 
- and not a mere plurality - of its members. The procedure is different in the case of the other 
agreements between the Community and other states .  Here, the European Parliament plays 
only a consultative role, and more often than not, the Council ' s  decision is made on the basis 
of a qualified majority. This means that regarding the Union' s  Pacific policy, there are 
numerous players with the ability to block an action: the European Commission, all member 
states, and the European Parliament. 
In this regard, it is particularly important to become aware of the rising powers of the 
European Parliament within the framework of internal politics, particularly since the 
Amsterdam Treaty, which came into force on 1 May 1 999. This rise in power goes along 
with the Parliament's  rise in power in matters of foreign policy, resulting from the Maastricht 
Treaty, in force since 1 November 1 999. The Maastricht Treaty requires the Parliament's  
official approval for association agreements. As a result, the European Parliament has 
become a major player in European policies both in internal and foreign domains. This 
means that if people want a new action by the Union, they must convince not only the 
relevant services within the Commission and the European Commissioners in charge of aid 
and development and external relations, but also the governments of all member states - or at 
least their permanent representatives in Brussels - as well as the members of the European 
Parliament, particularly the members of the Parliamentary committees with powers in the 
matter, and the agreement project's rapporteurs. 
b) As noted above, New Caledonia is the only OCT in Melanesia, and one of the four OCTs 
in the Pacific, along with French Polynesia, Wallis and Futuna, and Pitcairn, a British 
territory with minor political and economic importance - if we except the possible 
consequences of the existence of the vast EEZ, or even the continental shelf surrounding it. 
Now OCTs are governed on the one hand by the relevant provisions in the EC Treaty 
(Articles 1 82 to 1 87) with the constraints already noted regarding their possible amendment, 
and on the other hand by an Association Declaration, based upon Article 1 87 .  
The above means first that from a formal standpoint, i t  is a unilateral act by the Council and 
not an agreement between European institutions and OCT institutions, even though practice 
has changed toward a more and more effective partnership between these different 
institutions in the working-out of this decision. 
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This also means that the decision must be based on a proposal by the Commission. The 
Commission can withdraw its proposal if the Council attempts to depart from it in a way that 
to the Commission would seem to run counter to the Community' s  interests. 
This also means that governments in each member state in the Union can oppose this 
decision, which must be unanimous, whereas the European Parliament can at most issue a 
consultative opinion if it wishes, but it cannot bring any changes to or influence the contents 
of the decision. 
This also means that the decision is likely to be reviewed by the ECJ, and thus it can be 
struck down or invalidated through a demurrer if it contradicts the EC Treaty provisions, 
whether in form or content. 
This also means that, especially in a period like the present period, when preparations for the 
renewal of the association decision are ongoing, we must take into account other players than 
the relevant Commission services alone, particularly of member states '  governments, 
whether they are interested in the Pacific or in OCTs or not. 
2. The other Melanesian states belong to the ACP group linked to the European Union 
by the Cotonou Agreement 
The other four Melanesian states are in association with the Community through the Cotonou 
Agreement between the EC and the ACP; the same applies to the Pacific independent states 
except for Australia and New Zealand. As it is an association agreement, we must take into 
account the fact that on the basis of Article 300 in the EC Treaty, first it is the Commission 
which must present the recommendations to the Council. On the basis of these 
recommendations, the Council, unanimously, commissions the Commission and if necessary 
gives it instructions for negotiation. Then the Commission conducts the negotiations in the 
Community' s  name, until an agreement is signed between the Community and all the ACP 
states. Next, this agreement is submitted, for approval, to the European Parliament through 
the official approval process, and then to the Council, which, again, must make a unanimous 
decision. 
It must be added that the association agreement between the Community and the ACP states 
- we know that since June 2000 it has been the Cotonou Agreement, and previously the 
Lome Agreement - must comply with the agreements relating to the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) .  Moreover, the EU' s  policy toward the ACP countries is not confined to 
negotiations for the association agreement. For the agreement' s  implementation, which is not 
restricted to aid funded by the EDF, the European Commission negotiates Economic 
Partnership Agreements (EPAs) - and this is new with the Cotonou Agreement. EPAs are 
free-trade agreements taking into account the differences in development levels between the 
EU and the ACP countries; they are negotiated with the various countries combined into 
various regions - big economically integrated regions, regions in the process of being 
integrated or in the process of enhancing integration, such as the Caribbean, the Pacific and 
Africa (or the Africas). As we know, the year 2008 is precisely the year when these 
negotiations should come to fruition. 
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3. Aspects of the European Union's policy that are relevant to Melanesian unity 
The European Union's  foreign policy in the Pacific is not governed by a specific and 
constraining treaty or a legal act but by acts which specialists are wont to call, rightly or 
wrongly, ' soft law' ,  that is, acts which are not binding in law. These acts, however, can have 
important consequences in practice, because they are viewed as morally mandatory for the 
various institutional players they address. Three documents are particularly interesting for 
our topic, and therefore deserve analysis. 
a) First, we will mention the 'Communication from the Commission to the Council, the 
European Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee - EU Relations with 
the Pacific Islands - A Strategy for a Strengthened Partnership ' . 1 2 There are particularly 
important points in the EU's  strategy for the topic of regional integration, since the Union, 
like other parts of the world, wants to foster regional, even sub-regional integration. The 
Commission' s  communications are, as noted above, documents which are not binding, but 
once they have been adopted by the Commission and transmitted to Parliament and to the 
Council, and if neither of these institutions nor a government in a member state negative 
them, they become particularly significant reference documents for the development and the 
implementation of the Union' s  policies. If somebody can refer to a specific passage in a 
given document in a process where support, notably financial support, is requested from the 
European Union, the requesting party has a significant argument for at least opening 
negotiations, whereas lacking this reference, they may get a blunt refusal, such as 'Your 
project is quite interesting, but it is not part of the European Union's  priorities. ' As it turns 
out, a certain number of passages in the 2006 Communication deserve to be pointed out, for 
the big number of these references clearly shows how important the support to regional (or 
sub-regional) integration is (my italics) : 
Point 3 :  'The strategy proposed consists of three components: 
( 1 )  a strengthened relationship between the EU and the Pacific ACP countries and 
region in order to pursue a broad political dialogue on matters of common interest 
ranging from political and security to economic, trade, social, environmental and 
governance issues, thus enhancing the visibility and political profile of the EU-Pacific 
partnership on both sides; 
(2) more focused development action, with greater emphasis on regional cooperation 
to build up critical mass, enhance regional governance and facilitate cross­
fertilization. The main focus will be on matching the key priorities of the region, 
notably as defined in the Pacific Plan; 
(3) more efficient aid delivery, including greater use of budget support and closer 
coordination with other partners, in particular Australia and New Zealand. ' 
Point 3 .2 .  'More focused development action 
12 SEC(2006) 642} /* COM/2006/0248 final 
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'Focus is necessary to ensure optimal impact. It is proposed to focus on three 
priorities reflecting interlinking key needs of the Pacific and European comparative 
advantages: Governance, regionalism and sustainable management of natural 
resources. 
Point 3 .2 .2 Regionalism - Achieving critical mass 
'The Pacific Plan is based on the concept of regionalism. Stronger regional 
cooperation would improve the region' s  capacity for dealing with the development 
challenges it faces. An effective development support strategy must therefore be based 
primarily on assistance for regional integration to build up critical mass, to enhance 
regional governance and to facilitate cross-fertilization. 
[ . . .  ] 
'A  long-term formula for effective and politically well-anchored regional integration 
in the Pacific is still under construction. In certain areas regional cooperation is 
already yielding good results, such as the Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency 
(FF A), which brings together 1 7  member governments. The Pacific Plan, while an 
important step, must be considered a ' living document' and the start of a process 
rather than the end. Pacific regional cooperation is bound to evolve and the EU' s  
policy for the region will therefore have to adapt over time. This i s  best done through 
sustained support to the Forum Secretariat and other relevant CROP (Council of 
Regional Organizations in the Pacific) agencies in particular as regards natural 
resources management, vulnerability and governance. This will encourage 
strengthening Pacific regionalism in areas where it is · needed and where the EU can 
bring real added value. 
'Economic Partnership Agreement 
[ . . .  ] 
'Only a group of larger Pacific countries are involved in trade in goods with the EU. 
The main traded products are fish and fish products, and sugar. Fij i, as a Sugar 
Protocol country, is eligible for assistance for its adaptation strategy following the 
sugar reform. The expected restructuring of the sugar industry in Fiji together with 
the EPA should improve competitiveness. Moreover, accompanying measures for 
Sugar Protocol countries, benefiting from specific EU funding, are very likely to 
reinforce the action on sustainable development of natural resources, focusing on 
energy production from biomass and reforestation. 
' The EU remains a distant and comparatively small trading partner for the region and 
the eventual impact of trade liberalization under the EPA on the Pacific ACP 
countries collectively is likely to be relatively small. On the other hand, the proposed 
regional free trade agreement with Australia and New Zealand (PACER) is of another 
order of magnitude and could entail significant adjustment costs for the Pacific ACP 
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countries. It will therefore be important to favour a gradual approach to trade 
liberalization in combination with other measures, such as opening developed 
partners ' markets to labour from the Pacific A CP countries and increasing 
development assistance. 
' In order to maximize the desired effect of the EPA, it is crucial that the negotiations 
and outcome are closely coordinated with programming and, in due course, 
implementation of development assistance, at both regional and national levels, in 
order to harness synergies. Of particular importance are trade-related assistance and 
capacity-building, socio-economic, financial and tax governance as well as targeted 
support measures including compliance with international customs standards and 
trade facilitation where relevant, sugar, the private sector or human resource 
development and social protection. 
'Through flexibility, constructiveness and innovation the EU can set new development 
friendly standards in trade negotiations with small developing island economies, 
which could be taken into account by the region' s  other developed trading partners 
when (re )negotiating their own trade arrangements with the Pacific ACP countries. ' 
b) As regards the consequences of this strategy, it is important to draw attention to the Green 
Paper, 'Future Relations Between the EU and the Overseas Countries and Territories' . 1 3  The 
Green Paper has been a much-used tool for over a decade. When the EU wishes to work out, 
develop or change a policy, it starts by publishing a Green Paper, a preparatory document 
meant to be referred to and usually including a certain number of issues to which the 
concerned public, and mainly those to whom the policies are targeted, are asked to respond. 
It is interesting to mention the following passages from the Green Paper on future relations 
with OCTs: 
'The aim of the present Green Paper is therefore not to set out a new policy or 
establish new financial instruments or detailed procedures, but to examine a series of 
challenges and opportunities and to obtain input from interested parties before 
defining a new partnership between the EU and the OCTs, in particular in view of the 
expiry of the current Overseas Association Decision at the end of 20 1 3 .  [ . . .  ] 
'Question 5 :  What could be the advantage for the OCTs of increased regional 
cooperation and integration? How could a transfer of knowledge between the OCTs 
and their neighbours be encouraged? [ . . .  ] 
'Question 7 . 1 :  What are in your view the benefits of greater regional economic 
integration that could present an advantage for certain OCTs in response to 
globalization and the erosion of their trade preferences vis-a-vis the Community? [ . . .  ] 
'Question 7 .2 :  How could the OCTs engage in wider regional trade and how could 
the Community facilitate this? [ . . .  ] 
1 3 {SEC(2008) 2067} COM(2008) 383 final Brussels, 25 June 2008 . 
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' Question 14 :  How could the OCT-EC association be adapted to take greater account 
of the OCTs ' diversity without increasing the administrative burden for the OCTs and 
the Commission? [ . . .  ] 
'The period of public consultation will commence on 1 July 2008 and end on 1 7  
October 2008.  
'The European Commission invites you to submit your contribution using the 
electronic form that you can find on its website at the following address: 
http ://ec.europa.eu/yourvoice/ consultations/index_ fr.htm' 
This Green Paper is, as usual, the first stage in a consultation. Thereafter, responses to the 
queries are analysed in-depth by the European Commission services and they are used to set 
up the following document, which, more often than not, is a White Paper or a Paper by the 
Commission expounding the outline, along with a certain number of key details, of the future 
policy. Of course, responses that run totally counter to the objectives mentioned in the Green 
Paper cannot be expected to be taken into account if they are isolated. However, interactions 
can arise, and thereafter they may materialize in specific projects. It is worth restating that 
the Green Paper and the Commission's paper are program documents, legally not binding, 
but in practice they can prove particularly useful as a lever for action. 
c) A third document is particularly relevant to our topic. It is The European Union' s  
Cooperation Program for OCT Countries - Overseas Countries and Territories regional 
integration impact study, 14 including, among other things recommendations regarding the 
amending of the association decision in order to allow the OCTs to be parties to EU-other 
countries agreements on services. In particular, two excerpts deserve quoting: 
'The aim of this OCT regional integration impact study, in accordance with its terms 
of reference, is to clarify the choices now facing the OCTS with regard to their trade 
arrangements with European Union MS and neighbouring States in their geographical 
region, at a time when those States are negotiating a radically different framework for 
their mutual future economic and trade relations from the beginning of 2008 . '  (p. vii) 
'On the other hand, a possible strategy for New Caledonia and French Polynesia 
would be to join PICTA, in order to benefit eventually from the PACP services 
markets, while integrating in a more marked way the regional decision-making circles 
and thus being able to exert some influence on future negotiations on the 
implementation of the PACER agreement, since the latter will have a substantial 
impact, from both an offensive and defensive point of view. ' (p. 1 6) 
This document is particularly interesting as an example of what sociologists call an 
'epistemic community, ' a group of specialists - academics, practicing professionals, and 
14 A study for the European Commission by Pohl Consulting & Associates Consortium, July 2007, available 
on: http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/OCT _Impact_ Study_ Reglnt_and%20EPA_ 20070907 _ E 
N.pdf 
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politicians - who deal with the same issues and share the same language. The author of this 
report is Jean-Michel Salmon (see p. ii of the report) - who, for that matter, is a member of 
the lnstitut de droit d'Outre-mer, whose assistant director and founder is Jean-Yves Faberon, 
one of the organizers of this colloquium. Jean-Michel Salmon is a French academic working 
out of Martinique and one of the few specialists in small island economies, which are 
particularly significant for our topic. Of course, this report has no legal value whatsoever, 
and it is not even a document issued by an institution. It does, however, show in a very 
concrete way how we can follow up on exchanges such as those House Blong Melanesia is 
initiating through this conference. If House Blong Melanesia succeeds in developing an 
epistemic community, it will grow into an essential player in Melanesian unity. 
In closing, obviously, we must specify again that the economic dimension of the EU's  
Pacific policy is essential, but i t  i s  not the only one. Among the innovations that will come as 
a result of the Lisbon Treaty' s  taking effect, there is a particularly relevant provision 
regarding the Pacific. It will appear in the future Article 1 9 1  of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union, which develops Article 14 7 of the EC Treaty: 'Union policy on the 
environment shall contribute to [ . . .  ] promoting measures at the international level to deal 
with regional or worldwide environmental problems, and in particular combating climate 
change. '  
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2 5 . Discussion : what ro le can New Caledonia 
p lay in Melanesian u nity? 
Jean-Yves Faberon, Christiane Waneissi, Laurent Semavoine, 
Charles Washetine, Simon Loueckhote, Jean- Brice Herrenschmidt, 
Gerard Fey, Louis-Jose Barbancon, Paul De Deckker 
Jean-Yves FABERON 
New Caledonia has powers with regard to external relations, but so do the provinces, and 
precisely, our session chairwoman, Mrs WANEISSI, whom I hail as both a lovely and strict 
person, has an assignment in regional relations at the Southern Province. How does the 
Southern Province complement New Caledonia and where do the other two Provinces stand 
in this regard? 
Christiane W ANEISSI 
Article 33 of the Organic Law gives authority to Province Presidents, whether in the South, 
in the Islands or in the North, to conclude agreements and sign cooperation conventions with 
their counterparts in the region. Therefore, in Vanuatu, our counterpart is, of course, the 
province and not the Vanuatu government. It is important to specify at what level the 
Southern Province 's  actions are conducted: health, for example, since the Province has 
powers in this area, social work and sanitary education, or the environment. This is how we 
act in Tana, Vanuatu. 
Laurent SEMA VOINE 
The Southern Province has a significant cooperation program with communities in various 
countries, Vanuatu among them. During the latest joint commission meeting, on 1 July 2008 
in Port Vila, the Vanuatu government asked New Caledonia to coordinate the efforts of the 
three provinces so we could, together, contribute a more complete and perhaps easier-to-read 
program with regard to our various partners and interlocutors. During the corning months we 
will start working on this, for the Islands Province has also developed interesting programs, 
and the Northern Province has projects that it would like to implement in 2009. Those 
responsible for regional cooperation and external relations will be available, along with 
representatives from the three provinces, to set up a joint cooperation project in 2009 and 
ensure wide dissemination of information regarding the projects and events which will be 
organized as part of decentralized cooperation. Decentralized cooperation will be a welcome 
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addition to regional cooperation as implemented by the government within the :framework of 
New Caledonia' s incorporation into its surrounding region. I believe that in the distribution 
of powers we have built a balanced system made up of regional cooperation and 
decentralized cooperation, and the whole system is highly likely to develop. The French 
diplomatic representations in the Pacific and the neighbouring countries are increasingly 
calling on us to set up new partnerships. This is true for Australia and New Zealand, but also, 
and mostly in recent years, for Melanesian countries, especially Vanuatu, Fiji ,  and Papua 
New Guinea. Closer cooperation projects are also being examined with the two other French 
Pacific OCTs, French Polynesia and Wallis and Futuna. In the course of the increasingly 
frequent meetings and events in Melanesian countries, an atmosphere marked by dialogue 
and friendship is shaping up, and this necessarily generates new opportunities for honest 
partnerships, for cross-fertilization made more valuable by more and more dynamic 
cooperation despite constraints, differences and challenges. Relationships are more and more 
enthusiastic in this area, which now is of interest to most people. 
Charles W ASHE TINE 
I think that since yesterday - and this morning as well, at least those who attended - we have 
seen how the incorporation of many countries into the region has proceeded, with all the 
realities that we witness. I wonder if so strong a commitment as Australia 's  does not reflect a 
will to take control of the zone. In New Caledonia we have some means for emancipation; 
this is not the case for most Pacific island countries which are now facing many problems. 
But at the same time, New Caledonia views Europe' s  contribution favourably - three billion 
[Pacific francs] are given yearly to New Caledonia. We hail this, as it enables New Caledonia 
to train its youth. Right now we have a peculiar status: we are not totally independent, but at 
the end of the day, the question is for us to see how New Caledonia will be able to influence 
things, especially since the Noumea Agreement allows us to play the regional cooperation 
card. Thus, initially, New Caledonia was not a Forum member, but later it became an 
observer, and now it is an associate member. But we can wonder about the limit of big states '  
interventionism in small states; small states have no recourse but to turn to neighbouring 
countries in the name of Pacific solidarity. This is an open question. 
Laurent SEMA VOINE 
Of course, a will for cooperation with Australia and New Zealand has been shown, on 
account of geographical closeness and development levels. That ' s  a fact, but New Caledonia 
has also shown a willingness to cooperate with Melanesian countries. There is a micro­
project fund. It might be contended that it is not very significant in terms of volume, but it 
shows the will to cooperate. The micro-project fund is a funding instrument which fosters 
dialogue and allows people to initiate a project, which could later be extended through 
exchanges, creation and dissemination within the networks that spring up within and between 
Melanesian countries. The bilateral cooperation convention with Vanuatu is significant. It 
can act as a model for the other countries that contemplate setting up such a partnership with 
New Caledonia some time in the future. The Vice-Chair of the New Caledonian government, 
Dewe Gorodey, yesterday said, ' In the final analysis, one area has been conspicuous, and that 
is the cultural area. In the cultural area exchanges are spontaneous, frequent and regular. ' 
And Dewe Gorodey illustrated her idea with the Melanesian Arts Festival and the Pacific 
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Arts Festival, two major events in which most countries in the region take part. Certainly, we 
still have the technical and financial tools to provide assistance and support, but now New 
Caledonia is really involved through a clear wish for real participation, and year-round 
exchanges, in virtually all Melanesian countries. The involvement relates to artists ' 
residencies, cultural programs, and musical exchanges. Besides, we are anticipating the 
France-Oceania Summit, which is scheduled in Noumea in September 2009. The summit will 
be a clear example of a renewed French will to cooperate, to be involved and to show 
solidarity in the South Pacific. France, given its three communities in the region, regards the 
region as strategic and essential. Cooperation over the last ten years will be assessed, and 
new objectives will be spelled out for regional cooperation and New Caledonia' s  
incorporation into the area. This issue directly affects New Caledonia and it i s  a highly 
political one. It is not to be dealt with only by technicians. Debates will be conducted and 
directions determined through impetus from the executive, from local political leaders, from 
members of parliament, with New Caledonia's decision-makers and population. That is 
where the will originates, just as does the initiative to establish wise partnerships and rich 
cooperation between Melanesian countries. 
Charles W ASHE TINE 
It seems we have a concept problem. We cannot manage to define the cooperation issue. We 
are mixing cooperation and technical assistance. What I heard in Mr Ziller 's paper is that 
normally, integration must be found in common action by governments so there is real 
cooperation between Melanesians. I am not talking about integration, but we have to find, at 
the institutional level, the kind of cooperation that enables Melanesian countries to operate in 
common, with common actions . We are also dependent on France' s  foreign policy, just as in 
African countries, where cooperation was actually based on handouts. What matters for us 
here, in Melanesia, are exchanges in cultural and economic terms. How will these exchanges 
materialize? When I hear Mr Ziller mention common actions I think, 'We probably must 
have a common market in Melanesia. That is what I mean by cooperation: interchanges, not 
simply repeated technical assistance through the provinces or through the New Caledonian 
government. In Melanesia there are two key countries, Papua New Guinea and New 
Caledonia, with significant mineral resources. What are Papua New Guinea and New 
Caledonia doing with the other countries in terms of cooperation in the mineral and 
metallurgical fields so exchanges can actually be viewed as partnerships? Now the image 
people have of Vanuatu and other Melanesian countries is always the same; they view them 
as assisted nations. Now, within the Spearhead Group there is a common market in which 
Melanesian countries exchange their goods. It is perhaps advisable to find a better definition 
of ' cooperation' as we analyse relations between New Caledonia and Melanesian countries. 
That 's  because in New Caledonia, when people think about outside, they think not of 
Melanesia but rather of Paris and Queensland. They don't  think about Vanuatu, Papua or Fiji .  
Simon LOUECKHOTE 
The evolution of New Caledonia' s  geo-political status must not impede New Caledonia' s  
incorporation into the region. I had the opportunity to  state this many times while addressing 
the various delegations that come to New Caledonia: just because we are not a completely 
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emancipated and independent country does not mean we should not have a say among the 
Pacific Forum countries. 
New Caledonia is in this part of the world; it cannot stay out of ongoing debates. It must take 
part, for example, in the debate about the environment. New Caledonia must take part in all 
debates and be a part of pressure groups, committees and regional organizations that exist in 
this part of the world. 
To contribute to the debate about cooperation and technical assistance we must not play on 
words and run the risk of doing nothing. I 'm afraid speculating on definitions of cooperation 
and technical assistance, supposing we can find the right definitions, will result in our doing 
nothing. I don't  think that the New Caledonian communities that help Vanuatu have ulterior 
political motives. Each of us, New Caledonian government officials, knows what kind of 
situation Vanuatu is in. 
Many ni-Vanuatu come over to New Caledonia and explain their problems to us, and we 
sincerely want to help them out. So whether it ' s  called cooperation or technical assistance 
doesn't  matter. It doesn't  matter what words we use to describe this action to help Vanuatu! 
The major thing is for us to be able to act. Let 's  not forget that the French state has accepted 
to share this right of sovereignty with New Caledonia; so we should use it to the full. New 
Caledonia has a role to play in this part of the world. As we said, given its important natural 
resources, its ability to exploit them, and its ability to create wealth, New Caledonia has a 
duty towards the neighbouring countries, including Melanesian countries. 
Jean-Brice HERRENSCHMIDT 
I think we must be careful what we say. When we talk about incorporating New Caledonia 
into the rest of Melanesia, we must be careful to avoid condescension. New Caledonia is not 
the only one to contribute something to Melanesia; it is a two-way street. 
I think we can learn much from current research activity. There is a great French research 
tradition in Vanuatu. Why is research conducted in Vanuatu? Precisely because we can learn 
a great deal from the rest of Melanesia, including things about New Caledonia itself. I ' ll take 
a very concrete examples to show I 'm not dealing with ideology but trying to show how 
other countries can contribute to our knowledge. There is much talk about culture, and in the 
cultural domain we have the Vanuatu Cultural Centre, which operates in a pretty interesting 
way: for example, they devised the 'Tabu Rum' ,  a place where customary copyright and 
customary lore are protected. It is a room in the Cultural Centre which is taboo, i .e . ,  restricted 
to people authorized by customary officials to consult what is held there. For example, a clan 
secret is accessible only to people belonging to that clan, a video is accessible only to the 
village people, etc. This is a very interesting process, and it raises a great deal of questions 
here in New Caledonia. There are surely things that we could do here in a social sciences 
context where people are looking for the means to protect clan identities and guarantee the 
confidentiality of information provided in order to gain access to it. 
There are many other fields that we can study there. In Vanuatu, the coastal environment is 
being sold off to foreign investors. Identity transformations in Melanesian villages and the 
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advent of cell phones in villages show us how fast Melanesian societies are changing. We 
have a lot of things to learn because those countries are ahead of us in a certain number of 
areas. So we must really go back to what Jean-Pierre was saying a moment ago: we must act 
more and more in the spirit of exchange. Technical assistance is OK, but as the gentleman 
was saying a moment ago, we must act in a real spirit of cooperation, really do things in 
common, in areas where each has something to bring to the others. And we, as researchers, 
are familiar with and used to this .  It has been going on for years and years, and I ' ll mention 
Joel Bonnemaison as an example; thanks to people like him, we have been able to better 
comprehend Kanak societies by going to Vanuatu, Fiji ,  etc. ,  and comparing the findings. So 
we have a great deal to learn from Melanesian countries. 
As I see it, and in conclusion - as I wouldn't like to speak too long - regarding political 
cooperation and political and economic unity, which are much talked about, it is still too 
early. There is a prerequisite, exactly like the ongoing process in New Caledonia: that is the 
need for mutual recognition. And I think that just as the Noumea Agreement provides for 'the 
recognition of the Kanak identity' here in New Caledonia (and let 's  not forget we are 
engaged in a long process), also, on a Melanesia-wide scale, we need a construct: we need to 
build mutual recognition. And when Jean-Pierre says, 'Today, we, Melanesians from outside, 
we tell you that you are part of Melanesia, ' he actually means 'We acknowledge you as being 
part of Melanesia. ' And now, as we talk with Melanesian countries, we feel like telling them, 
'Yes, we too feel we are from Melanesia. ' We are just in the early stages of the process of 
building mutual recognition. Common recognition can be grounded in a domain in which it is 
probably easier to build than in the political or economic domain, namely the cultural 
domain, where exchanges already exist. We deeply feel that this is the way to go. Another 
domain, as Mr Loueckhote suggested, is the environment, and here, obviously, we will be 
working on a scale much bigger than our coral reefs and islands. We have some areas where 
we know that with respect to recognition and common action, exchange processes are already 
in train, and here we are not in a situation that consists in saying, 'Because we have money 
and because we have the technology, we are bringing you something and you'll follow our 
model. ' We can build mutual recognition by working together in areas where people have 
been working for years, and I think that we need this prerequisite before we can build a more 
comprehensive political and economic unity. Thank you. 
Gerard FEY 
My testimony is in line with what has just been said about areas in which cooperation is 
under way between the region' s  different nations. I 'm the presiding judge at the Noumea 
Court of Appeals, and in this capacity, it seemed to me quite useful to go along with New 
Caledonia' s desire to fit more closely into the surrounding region by commencing judicial 
cooperation with the neighbouring countries. 
Just for your information, there is a Chief Justices Conference in the South Pacific, and it 
meets every two years. It was held in Noumea in 200 1 and in Port Vila last year. 
During these meetings we share our experiences, and these exchanges are very rich, for we 
very often face comparable or similar situations, in particular the coexistence of European-
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inspired rules and local customs and traditions . With regard to justice, the objectives are the 
same, but each country has its own history and its practices, and it is interesting to compare 
these. 
Beyond that, we have started cooperation with Vanuatu which is by no means technical 
assistance.  As part of this cooperation, we decided to twin the Noumea Court of Appeals and 
the Vanuatu Supreme Court, presided by Chief Justice Vincent Lunabek. Judges, 
prosecutors, court clerks, secretaries and administrative officials from Vanuatu visited our 
court and we visited theirs. These exchanges allow us to become familiar with other working 
methods and to share experiences, in particular about the place that custom has in our 
respective judicial systems - giving custom its place, recognizing custom, human rights 
protection. 
These issues are present in all those countries, and we need to discuss them without trying to 
determine who is right and who is wrong: on this kind of subject we are on an equal footing. 
This cooperation must be fostered, and we are lucky we were able to get enough funds to 
pursue it. 
I also take part in another conference with a larger scope, the Asia-Pacific Conference. It 
meets every two years and works on the fundamental principles for the good administration 
of justice, which is an essential basis for economic and social development in all countries. 
Christiane W ANEISSI 
Should we make a distinction between technical assistance (the content of technical 
assistance) and cooperation? Should we also make a distinction between aid for 
development, humanitarian aid, and cooperation? And what is the content we can ascribe to 
political will to assist? Maybe we should remember that for a long time this power was 
exerted by the State. Later, when the Organic Law allowed the New Caledonian government 
and the various provinces to engage in cooperation in Melanesia and in the rest of the world 
as well, there were interchanges. The Pacific Ocean is a zone of interchange, and we have not 
waited until things were formalized within the institutions to interchange with neighbouring 
countries. There have always been interchanges, whether in agricultural or other products, 
just as in Europe. And cooperation is a new and very rich tool. The Southern Province has 
started, and it is important for the other two Provinces to follow the same dynamics.  
Cooperation is the modern word, but interchanges have always existed. Jean-Pierre Nirua 
precisely talked about the necessity for New Caledonia to continue the interchange process. 
Our ancestors exchanged, and these interchanges will not be discontinued with status change. 
In terms of political definition, what do we wish to do with our cooperation? What is the 
message that New Caledonia wants to profer? Professor Ziller, early in his paper, said 
something particularly important: New Caledonia and the Pacific, and Melanesia generally 
speaking, have something to bring to the table, and that is identity, Melanesian identity. 
Louis-Jose BARBANCON 
I would like to bring an additional thought to this conference and its themes .  I am concerned, 
just like Dr Rogers, about the way we are going to be able to convey to our youth all the 
thoughts that we have expressed. What kind of world are we going to hand on to our youth? 
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We are thinking about New Caledonia and Melanesian Unity. At the same time, in high 
schools, curriculums will be modified, and some chapters in the planned textbooks, in 1 1  th 
grade, in 1 2th grade, etc. will deal with the Pacific. One chapter will be entitled the Pacific 
Interface, the Oceanic Interface. In geography, textbooks will show students that 
development in the Pacific is all but impossible because of two elements that have emerged: 
the island nature of the Pacific and the mindsets of chiefdoms and traditional customs. I 'm 
worried because on the one hand in this kind of colloquium we try to say that we must think 
about this Melanesian unity, and on the other hand, in their schooling, our children will be 
branded with these two original sins meant to prove that they have no chance of developing. 
In short, it is because they are neither Europeans nor Asians that they cannot develop. It 
would be a good thing if the proceedings of this colloquium were published very quickly, 
and education inspectors, who are by definition omniscient, have an understanding look at 
what has been said in this colloquium, because in this room, for the last couple of days, I 
have not seen many of those who are preparing the future chapters. So this is the thought I 
wanted to share, because what's at stake once again is the future of our youth; I cannot see 
how to give to this cause, New Caledonia's incorporation into Melanesia, a dimension which 
is both useful and noble. Thank you. 
Paul De DECKKER 
In response to Louis-Jose Barban9on's wish, I 'd  like to tell you that the proceedings of the 
colloquium are scheduled to be published very quickly. Publication will not depend on Jean­
Yves Faberon and Paul De Deckker but on the paper's authors. The deadline for paper 
collection is 30 September. The job will be done in a scientific way, because both of us think, 
and I believe you all agree, that what has been said is essential for the future. But it must be 
technically faultless. So tedious editorial work will start, and I personally pledge to see that 
the job is done properly with the help of all those who would contribute to it. In this way, we 
will satisfy the inspectors mentioned by Louis-Jose Barban9on. Given the scarce media 
coverage this scholarly event has received, I have a feeling that some deem it premature and 
politically incorrect. House Blong Melanesia - whose founding conference gathered us 
together these last two days - has allowed us to move forward and advance our knowledge 
amid general agreement. We must avoid making this an overly intellectual affair. As an 
example, the word 'development' does not exist in Melanesian languages; the concept does 
not exist, just like the word 'work' ,  or ' labour' and the concepts that they convey. Indeed, 
from an etymological standpoint, in French the word 'work' or ' labour' implies suffering. 
Now the Melanesian context is of a hedonistic nature, and some find out that people do not 
like to suffer. We must take this into account when we contemplate development policies, for 
development automatically depends on the good will - or lack of it - of the people. 
So let 's  go on with the work. I have assurances that the publication will be achieved quickly, 
both in French and in English. Thus our exchanges during the last couple of days will be 
available to all those who are interested in Melanesia. The objective of moving things 
forward will then be more clearly outlined. 
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